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Security: Surdeddd/BottomSheet

Security

SECURITY.md

Security policy

Supported versions

The package is 0.x. Only the latest minor line receives fixes — there are no long-term support branches, and a security fix ships as a new minor or patch release rather than a backport.

Version Supported
0.14.x yes
< 0.14 no — upgrade first

Reporting a vulnerability

Report privately through GitHub's advisory flow: Report a vulnerability. Please do not open a public issue for anything exploitable.

Include what the vulnerability lets an attacker do, the smallest reproduction you have, affected versions, and which entry point is involved (main bundle, an adapter, /overlay, /webgl, the custom element). A minimal repository or a failing test is worth more than a description.

Expect an acknowledgement within a few days. There is no bounty programme.

Threat model

This is a client-side UI library. It renders markup the host application gives it, runs in the page's origin, and has no network layer, no storage beyond an optional localStorage key for snap persistence, and no server component.

In scope:

  • XSS reachable through the library's own API — an option, attribute, or adapter prop whose value ends up interpreted as markup or script rather than text.
  • The custom element's attribute parsing (snap-points, mode, allowed, drag-from, …), which reads untrusted strings from the DOM.
  • Prototype pollution through options objects or plugin registration.
  • Focus-trap or inert handling that lets a modal sheet be bypassed in a way that defeats the host's own security UI.
  • A dependency of the published package with a known advisory. Note that the runtime dependency count is zero — everything is devDependencies and does not ship.

Out of scope:

  • Content the host application passes in. The library renders your markup as given; sanitising it is the application's job, exactly as with innerHTML.
  • Denial of service from a host that mounts thousands of sheets, or supplies pathological snap-point definitions.
  • Vulnerabilities in the demo site or fixtures under demo/, which are not published to npm.
  • Anything requiring the attacker to already execute script in the page — at that point the sheet is not the weakest link.

What ships

The published tarball contains dist/ (without source maps), README.md and LICENSE. No install scripts, no postinstall hooks, no binaries. Verify with npm pack --dry-run.

There aren't any published security advisories