The package is 0.x. Only the latest minor line receives fixes — there are no
long-term support branches, and a security fix ships as a new minor or patch
release rather than a backport.
| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
| 0.14.x | yes |
| < 0.14 | no — upgrade first |
Report privately through GitHub's advisory flow: Report a vulnerability. Please do not open a public issue for anything exploitable.
Include what the vulnerability lets an attacker do, the smallest reproduction
you have, affected versions, and which entry point is involved (main bundle, an
adapter, /overlay, /webgl, the custom element). A minimal repository or a
failing test is worth more than a description.
Expect an acknowledgement within a few days. There is no bounty programme.
This is a client-side UI library. It renders markup the host application gives
it, runs in the page's origin, and has no network layer, no storage beyond an
optional localStorage key for snap persistence, and no server component.
In scope:
- XSS reachable through the library's own API — an option, attribute, or adapter prop whose value ends up interpreted as markup or script rather than text.
- The custom element's attribute parsing (
snap-points,mode,allowed,drag-from, …), which reads untrusted strings from the DOM. - Prototype pollution through options objects or plugin registration.
- Focus-trap or
inerthandling that lets a modal sheet be bypassed in a way that defeats the host's own security UI. - A dependency of the published package with a known advisory. Note that the
runtime dependency count is zero — everything is
devDependenciesand does not ship.
Out of scope:
- Content the host application passes in. The library renders your markup as
given; sanitising it is the application's job, exactly as with
innerHTML. - Denial of service from a host that mounts thousands of sheets, or supplies pathological snap-point definitions.
- Vulnerabilities in the demo site or fixtures under
demo/, which are not published to npm. - Anything requiring the attacker to already execute script in the page — at that point the sheet is not the weakest link.
The published tarball contains dist/ (without source maps), README.md and
LICENSE. No install scripts, no postinstall hooks, no binaries. Verify with
npm pack --dry-run.