cursor · Aug 9, 2026 · Aug 9, 2026 · Aug 9, 2026
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ upload role R&R → tag people → year-round dossier
 
 | Step | Status | Notes |
 |------|--------|--------|
-| Encrypted workspace unlock/lock | Done | AES vault; seed password `workbench`; `.session` is token-only (re-unlock after API restart) |
+| Encrypted workspace unlock/lock | Done | AES vault; demo seed password `workbench` (demo only — never a silent API default); `.session` is token-only (re-unlock after API restart) |
 | Encrypted backup / restore | Done | Settings → one-click snapshot under `data/backups`; restore replaces live DB while unlocked |
 | People list + CSV / manual add | Done | `POST /api/people/import` + Team paste/file; template download |
 | Role catalog + assign + author | Done | Seeded ladder; Roles page add/edit/delete; CSV/markdown or AI extract from R&R doc |
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ upload role R&R → tag people → year-round dossier
 | Promotion packets | Done | Next-role marks + AI case draft |
 | Backfill + MCP bulk load | Done | Thin = ach+fb+docs+goals &lt; 2; MCP needs explicit unlock / `PRM_PASSWORD` |
 | Settings → AI | Done | Private notes / meeting / document extract egress **enforced** on cloud paths |
-| Desktop CSP / launch token / API sidecar | Done | CSP set; shell IPC removed; packaged Node + `prm-api.mjs` spawned by Tauri; CI builds Linux/macOS/Windows on `main` |
+| Desktop CSP / launch token / API sidecar | Done | CSP set; shell IPC removed; packaged Node + `prm-api.mjs` spawned by Tauri; desktop installers via Actions **Run workflow** (not every merge) |
 
 ## Remaining gaps (honest)
 

@@ -6,22 +6,27 @@ Aligned to [TRUST_MODEL.md](./architecture/TRUST_MODEL.md).
 
 ## Phase 0 — Foundations & safety
 
-**Status:** Implemented in-repo (browser+API; Tauri shell compiles).
+**Status:** Vertical slice shipped (browser + API; Tauri shell + Node sidecar). Several Phase 0 *targets* remain open — see below.
 
-**Outcome:** Signed-capable app skeleton that can hold real data safely.
+**Outcome:** App skeleton that can hold real data safely **when locked**, with honest threat-model docs.
 
-- Tauri + Vite UI + IPC (spike: no naked HTTP API)
-- Encrypted SQLite + app-data layout; sync-folder warning
-- Single Account; keychain + Linux fallback
-- `Person` / EmploymentRecord / manager tree
-- CSV import
-- ActivityEvent hash chain
-- Workspace backup/restore (SQLite backup API)
-- Synthetic 12-person seed org (demo + AI fixtures later)
-- CI matrix spike on one primary OS, then expand; signing keys process started
-- Design-partner outreach (data-handling agreement)
+**Shipped**
+- Tauri shell + Vite UI + Node Hono API on `127.0.0.1` (launch token in packaged desktop)
+- AES-256-GCM seal of SQLite + files on lock; sync-folder hard-warn
+- Single Account; workspace-password vault (API keys encrypted with workspace secret — not OS keychain yet)
+- `Person` / manager tree + CSV import (requires EM)
+- ActivityEvent hash chain + HMAC export
+- Encrypted workspace backup/restore
+- Synthetic **8-person** demo seed (rolling relative cycle dates)
+- CI: unit tests on every `main` PR; desktop installers on manual `workflow_dispatch`
 
-**Exit:** App runs encrypted workspace on at least one OS; backup/restore verified; trust model reflected in UI copy.
+**Still open (do not claim done)**
+- OS keychain for API keys
+- SQLCipher / Rusqlite-primary path
+- Signed / notarized installers + auto-update
+- IPC-only topology without Node sidecar
+
+**Exit (partial):** App runs encrypted-at-rest workspace on supported OS targets; backup/restore verified; trust model reflected in UI copy. Signing + keychain remain follow-ups.
 
 ---
 
@@ -111,8 +116,8 @@ docs/
 |-------|----------|
 | Product mode | Solo EM workbench |
 | Collaboration | Import bundles |
-| Stack | Tauri + Vite/React + SQLite encrypted |
+| Stack | Tauri + Vite/React + SQLite (AES seal on lock) + Node Hono sidecar |
 | Upward / live anonymity / adverse impact | Hosted-only |
 | next_level_gap | Conditional |
 | Local retention | Current + previous cycle (+ export to SoR) |
-| AI keys | In-app Settings → keychain |
+| AI keys | In-app Settings → encrypted with workspace secret (keychain target) |
@@ -10,37 +10,39 @@ Primary target: installable app on **Linux, Windows, macOS**. No Docker/Postgres
 
 | Layer | Choice | Notes |
 |-------|--------|-------|
-| Shell | **Tauri 2** | dmg / msi|NSIS / AppImage|deb |
+| Shell | **Tauri 2** | dmg / msi|NSIS / AppImage|deb (manual CI `workflow_dispatch`) |
 | UI | **React + TypeScript + Vite** | |
-| Backend bridge | **Prefer Tauri IPC commands** for DB/FS/keychain/HTTP; optional thin Hono only if needed | Avoid unauthenticated TCP |
-| If HTTP sidecar used | Hono on `127.0.0.1` + **per-launch capability token** + origin checks | Or Unix socket / named pipe |
-| DB | **SQLite** via **Rusqlite in Rust** (preferred) or one pinned JS driver | Pick one in Phase 0; enables SQLCipher path |
-| ORM / migrations | Drizzle or sqlx migrations — single choice in Phase 0 | |
-| Files | OS app-data directory | |
+| Backend (shipped) | **Node Hono sidecar** on `127.0.0.1` + session token; desktop adds **per-launch capability token** | Prefer migrating privileged ops to Tauri IPC over time |
+| Backend (target) | Tauri IPC commands for DB/FS/HTTP without a long-lived TCP sidecar | Aspirational |
+| DB (shipped) | **SQLite** via **better-sqlite3** + Drizzle; AES-GCM file seal when locked | Plaintext on disk while unlocked |
+| DB (target) | Rusqlite / SQLCipher path | Aspirational |
+| Files | OS app-data directory (desktop) or `PRM_DATA_DIR` / `./data` (dev) | |
 | Search | SQLite FTS5 | |
-| Jobs | Durable `jobs` table + run-while-open worker | Reminders don’t fire when app closed — documented |
-| Auth | Single Account; OS keychain for API keys | Linux: Secret Service or app-password-wrapped key file fallback |
-| AI | Settings → AI; BYO keys + Ollama | |
-| Encryption | **Required** for real data: SQLCipher or authenticated encryption of DB+files | Phase 0/1 gate |
-| Packaging | Code signing + notarization (Apple) + Windows Authenticode | Phase 0 infrastructure |
+| Jobs | In-process while app open | Reminders don’t fire when app closed — documented |
+| Auth | Single Account; workspace password vault | API keys encrypted with workspace secret (keychain still a target) |
+| AI | Settings → AI; BYO keys + Ollama + Cursor gateway | |
+| Encryption | **Required** for real data: authenticated encryption of DB+files on lock | |
+| Packaging | Unsigned CI artifacts today; code signing + notarization still needed | |
 
 ---
 
 ## Topology
 
 ```
 ┌──────────────────────────────────────────┐
-│ Tauri (Win / Mac / Linux)                │
-│   React UI ── IPC ── Rust commands       │
-│                 │                        │
-│            SQLite (encrypted)            │
-│            App-data files (encrypted)    │
-│            OS keychain                   │
+│ Tauri (Win / Mac / Linux)  [optional]    │
+│   React UI ── HTTP ── Node Hono sidecar  │
+│                 │      (127.0.0.1)       │
+│            SQLite (sealed on lock)       │
+│            App-data files (sealed)       │
+│            Workspace-secret crypto       │
 └───────────┬──────────────────┬───────────┘
             ▼                  ▼
      Cloud AI (opt-in)    Ollama (opt)
 ```
 
+**Dev browser mode:** Vite UI + `pnpm dev:api` (no launch token). Anyone on the same OS account who can reach loopback and guess/know the password owns the vault.
+
 **Rejected as v1 primary:** Electron (fallback only), Docker-only UX, Next.js SSR, naked Postgres.
 
 ---
@@ -58,9 +60,9 @@ Same OS paths as before (`Application Support` / `%APPDATA%` / `~/.local/share/.
   backups/
 ```
 
-- **Refuse or hard-warn** if path is under Dropbox/iCloud/OneDrive/Google Drive sync folders.  
-- Backup: SQLite Online Backup API / `VACUUM INTO`, then encrypt zip; verify restore.  
-- Portability: versioned workspace archive with schema version + forward migrations.
+- **Hard-warn** if path is under Dropbox/iCloud/OneDrive/Google Drive sync folders (status + unlock UI).  
+- Backup: encrypted `.sqlite.enc` snapshots under `backups/`; verify restore while unlocked.  
+- Portability: versioned workspace archive with schema version + forward migrations (partial).
 
 ---
 
@@ -74,7 +76,7 @@ Same OS paths as before (`Application Support` / `%APPDATA%` / `~/.local/share/.
 
 ## AI configuration
 
-Fully in-app **Settings → AI** (see Features §8). Keys never in SQLite. Dev env overrides allowed for `pnpm dev` only.
+Fully in-app **Settings → AI** (see Features §8). Keys are encrypted with the workspace secret in SQLite. Dev env overrides allowed for `pnpm dev` only. OS keychain storage remains a target, not current behavior.
 
 ---
 

@@ -16,16 +16,16 @@ Hosted multi-tenant SaaS is a **separate track**, not a config switch.
 
 ## Stack
 
-See [LOCAL_STACK.md](./LOCAL_STACK.md). Summary: Tauri 2, React/Vite, SQLite encrypted, IPC-first, app-data files, keychain, BYO AI + Ollama.
+See [LOCAL_STACK.md](./LOCAL_STACK.md). Summary: Tauri 2 (optional shell), React/Vite, SQLite via better-sqlite3 with AES-GCM seal on lock, Node Hono on loopback (+ launch token in desktop), app-data files, BYO AI + Ollama. OS keychain and IPC-only topology remain targets.
 
 ---
 
 ## Topology
 
 ```
-Tauri → React UI → IPC/commands → SQLite + files + keychain
-                         ↓
-              Cloud AI / Ollama (opt-in)
+Tauri (optional) → React UI → HTTP (127.0.0.1 Hono) → SQLite + files + workspace crypto
+                                      ↓
+                           Cloud AI / Ollama (opt-in)
 ```
 
 ---
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ Tauri → React UI → IPC/commands → SQLite + files + keychain
 | Workspace Account (EM) | Full read/write on workspace; export subject packets; configure AI |
 | Person (no Account) | Not an actor in-app; appears in exports the EM creates |
 
-Export redaction (`packages/policy`) strips `em_only` fields from subject packets. This is **share-time policy**, not protection from the EM.
+Export redaction strips `em_only` fields from subject packets (implemented in API export paths). This is **share-time policy**, not protection from the EM.
 
 ---
 
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ Conceptual routes — implemented as Tauri commands or authenticated localhost:
 - Link evidence; snapshots on finalize
 
 ### AI
-- Settings get/set (keychain)
+- Settings get/set (API keys encrypted with workspace secret)
 - `evidenceDigest`, `draftSection`, `roleGapAnalysis`, `promotionDraft`, `biasLint`
 - Returns `generation_id`; client accepts into draft
 

@@ -57,10 +57,17 @@ No anonymity theater: imported peer text is attributed to the named peer for the
 
 ## Security baseline (v1)
 
-- Encrypt SQLite + `files/` at rest (workspace password / OS key material) — **required before real employee data**
-- Local API authenticated per launch (capability token) **or** Tauri IPC only (no naked TCP)
-- API keys in OS keychain (with documented Linux fallback)
-- Refuse/warn if app-data path is inside Dropbox/iCloud/OneDrive
-- Consistent backup via SQLite backup API + encrypted archive
+### Shipped today
+- Encrypt SQLite + `files/` at rest with the workspace password (scrypt + AES-256-GCM seal on **Lock & encrypt**)
+- Local API bound to `127.0.0.1`; session token after unlock; packaged desktop adds a per-launch capability token
+- Integration / AI secrets stored encrypted in SQLite under the workspace secret (not returned in plaintext from settings GETs)
+- Hard-warn when the data directory looks like Dropbox / iCloud / OneDrive / Google Drive
+- Encrypted backup / restore under `data/backups`
+
+### Not shipped yet (do not market as done)
+- OS keychain custody for API keys (keys ride the workspace secret today)
+- SQLCipher / Rusqlite-in-Rust as the primary DB path (Node `better-sqlite3` + file seal is what runs)
+- Signed auto-update / notarized installers (desktop artifacts are manual CI builds)
+- Background jobs when the app is closed
 
 See [LOCAL_STACK.md](./LOCAL_STACK.md) and [SYSTEM.md](./SYSTEM.md).