This is a product-neutral reference template. It is not a shipped product and has no release channel; do not run it against data you care about.

Report suspected vulnerabilities through GitHub security advisories on this repository. Do not open a public issue for an unfixed vulnerability.

The webview is treated as untrusted. Everything the UI can reach on the host is listed here, and nothing else is reachable.

• No filesystem, shell, HTTP, process, dialog, clipboard, or updater plugin is compiled into the binary. There is therefore no plugin command the frontend could call to touch the disk or spawn a process, whatever the frontend code does.
• src-tauri/capabilities/default.json grants an explicit, narrow subset of core: permissions to the main window only. It is committed and reviewed, and scripts/validate-desktop-config.mjs fails CI if a denied permission family (fs:, shell:, http:, process:, dialog:, updater:, clipboard-manager:, global-shortcut:, os:, autostart:, deep-link:, store:, upload:, websocket:) ever appears there.
• The only host access the UI has is three application commands — save_note, read_note, list_notes — implemented in src-tauri/src/vault.rs. Each validates its input before touching the disk.
• Notes are written only under app_data_dir()/notes. Note names are restricted to ^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9._-]{0,63}$, .. is rejected explicitly, and the resolved path must be a direct child of the vault root or the call is refused. Bodies are capped at 8 KiB and may not contain control characters other than tab, CR and LF.
• The Content Security Policy in src-tauri/tauri.conf.json is restrictive (default-src 'self', object-src 'none', frame-ancestors 'none'), the custom asset protocol is disabled, and prototype freezing is on.

There is deliberately no Dependabot configuration. This project is trunk-based and takes no pull requests, so a bot whose only output channel is a pull request has nowhere to put its findings.

Third-party GitHub Actions are pinned by commit SHA with the version in a trailing comment, so a moved tag cannot change what runs. The cost of pinning is that nothing announces a stale pin, so npm, Cargo and Action versions are reviewed by hand — on each release and whenever CI reports a deprecated runtime — in a commit that re-runs the whole gate set.

Two honest limitations, recorded rather than glossed over:

• The cadence is manual. That is a real residual risk, not a solved problem.
• There is no cargo audit, cargo deny, or npm advisory gate in CI, so an advisory in a transitive dependency will not fail the build. Dependency Hygiene is still a planned standard; a fork that ships to users should add an advisory gate before it does.

The compensating control in this template is surface area rather than scanning: the app has no fs, shell, http, process, dialog, clipboard, updater or global-shortcut plugin as a Cargo dependency at all, and scripts/validate-desktop-config.mjs fails CI if one is introduced.

This template stores no credentials and reads no secret environment variables. Do not put secrets in VITE_* variables — everything with that prefix is inlined into the shipped frontend bundle and is readable by anyone with the app.

If you fork this and need real secret storage, use the OS keychain (tauri-plugin-stronghold, keyring, or an equivalent) from Rust, keep the secret on the Rust side of the boundary, and never return it to the webview.