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@jkroonza, @enaess, @jjkeijser, @paulusmack: What do you think about this new @strrs PR? |
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Thanks, I have been working on this for a few weeks. If there is anything specific you would like to see regarding the design, I can try to adjust the code accordingly. |
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I'm not commenting on where hooks are going and general code - I've just scanned - but I like the general direction of this, essentially it looks like you're aiming towards different "levels": required May I recommend a fourth? permitted? Essentially my understanding: required - advertise and enforce. And we must remember that some remotes will advertise an empty option set, which I think there was a merge about recently to ACK that, but simply not enable MPPE in that case. please keep in mind my background is primarily service provider side - so permitted is useful in that "we don't really want it, nor do we want to advertise it, but some arb peers are requesting and enforcing it, as such we don't want to disallow it". We do still prefer L2TP from this perspective, but there's always that one :). |
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| bool refuse_mppe_stateful = 1; /* Allow stateful mode? */ | ||
| static bool require_mppe; | ||
| static bool prefer_mppe; /* Go on without MPPE if it fails */ | ||
| static bool permit_mppe; /* Use MPPE only if the peer asks */ |
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Should these three perhaps be a single enum value?
enum {
none,
permit,
prefer,
require
} mppe_level;
kind of thing? One could then NACK (or ACK empty) if mppe_level < permit, ACK if != none and advertise if >= prefer?
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I kept them as bools because require-mppe, +mppe and their -40/-128 forms are o_bool options on require_mppe (the form we settled on in #646), and an o_bool can't hold a level, so an enum would mean turning those six entries into o_special handlers. If you still prefer the enum, I can change it.
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For comparison, this is the enum version against the current code. I have it ready and tested; only ccp.c changes. The main parts:
@@ -71,7 +71,13 @@ static char deflate_value[8];
bool refuse_mppe_stateful = 1; /* Allow stateful mode? */
-static bool require_mppe;
-static bool prefer_mppe; /* Go on without MPPE if it fails */
-static bool permit_mppe; /* Use MPPE only if the peer asks */
+static enum {
+ MPPE_DISABLED,
+ MPPE_PERMITTED, /* Use MPPE only if the peer asks */
+ MPPE_PREFERRED, /* Go on without MPPE if it fails */
+ MPPE_REQUIRED
+} mppe_level;
static int setmppe (char **);
static int setnomppe (char **);
+static int setreqmppe (char **);
+static int setreqmppe40 (char **);
+static int setreqmppe128 (char **);
static char mppe_value[20];
@@ -137,8 +139,6 @@ static struct option ccp_option_list[] = {
- { "require-mppe-40", o_bool, &require_mppe,
- "require MPPE 40-bit encryption", OPT_PRIO | OPT_A2OR | MPPE_OPT_40,
- &ccp_wantoptions[0].mppe },
- { "+mppe-40", o_bool, &require_mppe,
- "require MPPE 40-bit encryption", OPT_PRIO | OPT_A2OR | MPPE_OPT_40,
- &ccp_wantoptions[0].mppe },
+ { "require-mppe-40", o_special_noarg, (void *)setreqmppe40,
+ "require MPPE 40-bit encryption", OPT_PRIO },
+ { "+mppe-40", o_special_noarg, (void *)setreqmppe40,
+ "require MPPE 40-bit encryption", OPT_PRIO },
/* We use ccp_allowoptions[0].mppe as a junk var ... it is reset later */
@@ -287,6 +284,6 @@ static int mppe_pref[NUM_PPP];
/* With "mppe permitted": the peer hasn't asked for MPPE yet */
-#define MPPE_WAITING(unit) (permit_mppe && !require_mppe \
+#define MPPE_WAITING(unit) (mppe_level == MPPE_PERMITTED \
&& !(mppe_pref[unit] & (MPPE_SOFT \
| MPPE_GAVE_UP | MPPE_WAS_UP)))
-#define MPPE_MODE (permit_mppe? "permitted": "preferred")
+#define MPPE_MODE (mppe_level == MPPE_PERMITTED? "permitted": "preferred")
#endif
@@ -440,5 +435,3 @@ setnomppe(char **argv)
{
- require_mppe = 0;
- prefer_mppe = 0;
- permit_mppe = 0;
+ mppe_level = MPPE_DISABLED;
ccp_wantoptions[0].mppe = 0;
@@ -520,3 +542,3 @@ ccp_open(int unit)
#ifdef PPP_WITH_MPPE
- if (!mppe_pref[unit] && prefer_mppe && !require_mppe)
+ if (!mppe_pref[unit] && mppe_level == MPPE_PREFERRED)
mppe_pref[unit] = MPPE_SOFT;
@@ -831,4 +853,4 @@ ccp_resetci(fsm *f)
go->mppe = 0; /* only ask for MPPE once the peer has */
- if ((require_mppe || (mppe_pref[f->unit] & (MPPE_SOFT | MPPE_WAS_UP)))
- && !go->mppe) {
+ if ((mppe_level == MPPE_REQUIRED
+ || (mppe_pref[f->unit] & (MPPE_SOFT | MPPE_WAS_UP))) && !go->mppe) {
mppe_unavailable(f, "both 40-bit and 128-bit disabled.");Each form gets one small handler, for example:
static int
setreqmppe40(char **argv)
{
mppe_level = MPPE_REQUIRED;
ccp_wantoptions[0].mppe |= MPPE_OPT_40;
return 1;
}The other forms use setreqmppe() and setreqmppe128() the same way. The checks stay == rather than < and >=, since permitted also asks for MPPE once the peer has. The option dump also lists require-mppe, +mppe and the -128 forms by name again. If you prefer this, I'll push it.
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I get the concern.
I personally prefer the enum mechanism, but I think I need to defer to @paulusmack here.
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I kept the o_bool form for now and will switch to the enum if that is the decision.
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jkroonza
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Looked more in-depth. I like this, but I've not tested any of this. Code looks reasonable. Other than still personally preferring the enum over a bunch of booleans.
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ccp.c calls lcp_close() from inside its fsm callbacks when required
MPPE fails, for example in ccp_reqci() ("MPPE required but peer
negotiation failed") and in ccp_down() ("MPPE disabled"). lcp_close()
takes CCP down before it returns, but the caller in fsm.c then
continues. fsm_rconfreq() sets the state to ACKSENT or REQSENT after
the reqci callback. After the down callback, fsm_rconfreq() and
fsm_rtermack() send a Configure-Request, start its timer and set
REQSENT.
Nothing resets that when the call ends. With persist or demand the
next call finds CCP still in that state, where fsm_lowerup() and
fsm_open() do nothing. After a close from ccp_reqci() pppd sends no
CCP Configure-Request in the next call. After a restart from OPENED
the timer is still running and keeps resending the old request,
between the calls and in the next one.
Add a phase notifier that takes CCP down again at PHASE_DISCONNECT,
the way upper_layers_down() does when LCP goes down. Like link_down(),
it leaves CCP alone when multilink is on, where the bundle keeps its
CCP.
Signed-off-by: Semih Baskan <[email protected]>
With require-mppe the network protocols are held until CCP has come up with MPPE. If the peer never completes CCP, for example because it acks our request and then stays silent, or ignores CCP without sending a Protocol-Reject, the CCP Configure-Requests time out and CCP stops. Nothing reacts to that, since ccp_callbacks has no "finished" handler: the link stays up with no network protocol, and the log only has the fsm warning "CCP: timeout sending Config-Requests". Add ccp_finished(). When CCP stops while MPPE is still required and LCP is up, it logs "MPPE required but peer negotiation failed" and closes the link, like the other places where required MPPE fails. Signed-off-by: Semih Baskan <[email protected]>
pppd can either require MPPE (require-mppe*) or not use it at all. Issue ppp-project#57 asks for a setting in between: use MPPE when the peer agrees, and keep the link up without it when the peer can't do MPPE, for example on an SSTP client or on a PPTP server that also has clients without MPPE. Add "mppe required|preferred|disabled[,40][,128]", the syntax suggested in ppp-project#57. "required" and "disabled" set the same state as require-mppe and nomppe. With no strength given, both 40-bit and 128-bit are allowed, as with require-mppe. The option sets the state and the strengths together. A require-mppe-40 or require-mppe-128 given after it adds that strength and makes MPPE required. nomppe and -mppe are now handled by setnomppe(), which also clears the preferred state, so they still turn MPPE off after "mppe preferred". With "preferred", pppd negotiates MPPE as with require-mppe. If MPPE fails before it has come up (the peer rejects it, Naks with something we can't use, rejects CCP or never answers, no strength is left, or there are no MPPE keys, for example after PAP or CHAP-MD5), pppd logs a warning, stops asking for MPPE, drops the MPPE keys and the kernel's CCP state, and starts the network protocols that were waiting for MPPE. No other compression is used after that either, as with require-mppe. Once MPPE has been up it is required for the rest of the call, as with require-mppe, also after an LCP renegotiation: there is no fallback any more. ccp_link_terminated() clears this when the call has ended, so the next call of the same pppd is preferred again. MPPE is never left on in one direction only. If we have already accepted the peer's MPPE request when our own fails, or the peer has accepted ours and its own request has no MPPE we can take, the link is closed. ccp_up checks the same before it brings CCP up. With the existing options required MPPE has normally closed the link before CCP gets that far. In the preferred state a Configure-Reject is acted on only after the whole packet has been checked, and at a CCP timeout ccp_finished() gives MPPE up instead of closing the link. ccp_open now also clears the silent flag when there is something to ask for, so a fallback in one session can't keep CCP silent, and the network protocols held, in the next one. It does that for every compression type. The checks in ccp_resetci that log why MPPE is not available now go through mppe_unavailable(). The existing options behave as before and keep their log messages. In the new state the messages say "preferred" instead of "required". Signed-off-by: Semih Baskan <[email protected]>
Add "mppe permitted[,40][,128]": pppd doesn't ask for MPPE, but uses it when the peer asks for it. This is the third of the four states listed in ppp-project#57 (written "optional" in the syntax suggested there), for a server that doesn't want MPPE but has to take peers that insist on it. A CCP request only covers the direction its sender receives, so acking the peer's MPPE request alone would encrypt one direction. When the peer asks, pppd therefore asks for MPPE too and from then on behaves as with "mppe preferred": MPPE comes up in both directions, or pppd gives it up with the usual warning, or the link is closed if pppd has already accepted the peer's MPPE. pppd must not send a CCP request of its own before the peer's, because a peer with require-mppe closes the link on any request without MPPE. So with "permitted" CCP stays in silent mode until the peer has sent a request in this LCP session, and two permitted peers negotiate no compression at all; after that, SIGUSR2 restarts CCP as before. The decision has to be made before fsm_input(): in the stopped and opened states fsm_rconfreq() sends our request before it calls ccp_reqci(). While pppd waits, mppe_peer_asks() looks at each Configure-Request that fsm_rconfreq() will negotiate on; one that the state machine drops or answers with a Terminate-Ack, because CCP is closed or going down, doesn't count. If the request's first MPPE option asks for a strength we allow, is not stateful while stateful mode is refused, and pppd has MPPE keys, mppe_ask_too() sets the preferred state. If our own request is already out without MPPE, the CCP state machine is restarted, so that a new request with MPPE goes out before the reply. The network protocols are not held back for "permitted": they start at once, as with MPPE off, so ccp_up() and mppe_failed() don't call continue_networks() a second time when the peer asked. Until MPPE is up, data can be sent unencrypted. Against a peer that holds its own network protocols until MPPE is up, as pppd does with require-mppe and "preferred", no data flows before that. In this state the warnings say "permitted" instead of "preferred". An MPPE request that doesn't ask for a strength pppd can use (40-bit is dropped after MS-CHAPv1, as in ccp_resetci()), for example one with no bits set or with only MPPC, is handled as with MPPE off, and so is any MPPE request while pppd has no MPPE keys from the authentication of this LCP session (after PAP, for example). For that, ccp_lowerup() now drops the keys before the session authenticates, and ccp_link_terminated() drops them, with the rest of the MPPE state, when the call is over. It waits for the dead phase because a multilink bundle can outlive the link that terminates, and the bundle's CCP may still need the keys. A bundle that renegotiates LCP keeps its CCP and with it the keys, since link_established() skips the upper layers' lowerup there. Until now the keys of a session that ended before MPPE came up were still there in the next one, and a session without keys of its own (EAP without TLS, for example) passed the key check with them, also with require-mppe. When pppd asked for MPPE, ccp_resetci() turned the other compressors off in ccp_allowoptions, and mppe_give_up() did the same; nothing in the MPPE code turned them on again. A later call or LCP session without MPPE, which is normal with "permitted" and also happens when options from the secrets file turn MPPE off, then asked for Deflate but refused the peer's. ccp_allowoptions now keeps what the options say, and ccp_reqci() refuses the other compressors while the session asks for MPPE or has given it up. The other states behave as before, apart from the keys and that later session. Signed-off-by: Semih Baskan <[email protected]>
Describe the four states, the default strengths and how they relate to require-mppe and nomppe. Say when a preferred link falls back and when it is still closed, when a permitted link starts to use MPPE, that it doesn't hold the network protocols back and only uses other compression when the peer starts CCP, that anyone who can block or alter the CCP negotiation can make either run unencrypted (RFC 3078 says the link should be closed when MPPE fails), and that the option does not keep pppd from authenticating with PAP. Add a note on the new states to README.MPPE, which says MPPE is either required or off. Signed-off-by: Semih Baskan <[email protected]>
Check both roles: MPPE comes up against require-mppe and preferred
peers, at 40-bit with "preferred,40", and pings go through. Against a
peer without MPPE, with noccp, with PAP instead of MS-CHAP on either
side, or with no strength left ("preferred,128 nomppe-128"), the link
comes up with no compression at all, IPCP comes up once, pings work and
only the preferred side logs the warning. A require-mppe-128 peer still
closes the link, and "mppe preferred require-mppe" is required again;
the side that closes exits with EXIT_NEGOTIATION_FAILED and the other
with EXIT_HANGUP. "mppe preferred nomppe" brings up a normal link with
Deflate and no warning. Also check the dryrun output and that bad
values are option errors.
Signed-off-by: Semih Baskan <[email protected]>
Check both roles. Against require-mppe and preferred peers the permitted side sends its first CCP request only after the peer's, with MPPE in it; MPPE comes up, also at 40-bit with "permitted,40", IPCP comes up once and pings go through. Two permitted peers, and a permitted peer against noccp, send no CCP packet at all. With PAP instead of MS-CHAP, only a preferred peer warns. Against a peer without MPPE, and with "require-mppe mppe permitted", Deflate comes up, and so it does between "mppe permitted nomppe" and a permitted peer. A require-mppe-40 peer closes the link against "permitted,128" without the permitted side asking for MPPE, and "mppe permitted require-mppe" is required again. Also check the dryrun output and that bad values are option errors. Signed-off-by: Semih Baskan <[email protected]>
chap_handle_response() reports the result with auth_peer_fail() or auth_peer_success() and only then sets AUTH_DONE and, on success, arms the chap-interval timer. Both calls can close the link before they return: auth_peer_fail() always does, and auth_peer_success() does when ccp_open(), reached through network_phase() and start_networks(), finds that required MPPE can't be used (for example no strength left or no keys). lcp_close() takes the protocols down at once and chap_lowerdown() clears the CHAP state, so AUTH_DONE is set again on a link that is down. In the next call of a pppd with persist or demand, chap_handle_response() then answers the peer's response with Success but never calls auth_peer_success(), and that call stays in the authentication phase until the peer gives up. The failure case happens with 2.5.5 as well. After a close from ccp_open() with no strength left (ccp_gotoptions.mppe is 0), start_networks() also goes on to continue_networks() and opens IPCP and IPV6CP on the closing link. In the next call they send their requests at LCP up, before the peer is authenticated. Set AUTH_DONE and arm the timer before reporting the result, so that chap_lowerdown() clears them when the link goes down; chap_server_timeout() and chap_handle_status() also set their state before they report. Return from start_networks() when LCP is no longer open after CCP and ECP have been started. Signed-off-by: Semih Baskan <[email protected]>
radius_chap_verify() applies the server's reply only while rstate.done_chap_once is clear, so that a CHAP re-authentication (chap-interval) keeps the reply of the session. The flag is set after the first successful CHAP authentication and never cleared, so in a pppd that serves several calls (persist or demand on the authenticating side) every later CHAP authentication is sent with the first call's user name and its reply is ignored: the CHAP Success has no MS-CHAP2-Success authenticator, so an MS-CHAPv2 client fails mutual authentication, and there are no MPPE keys and no address, Class, timeouts or MPPE policy of its own. The same happens after an LCP renegotiation, where pppd authenticates the peer from scratch. Clear the flag from a phase change notifier when a new authentication phase starts. Clear there also the reply data the plugin keeps, as a reply only sets the attributes it has: the Framed-IP-Address choice, the Class, the interim accounting interval and the two script variables. PAP replies, which were applied every time, no longer start from what an earlier reply left either. Re-authentications within a session are unchanged. Settings a reply writes into pppd itself, such as the peer address that ipcp_resetci() stores through ip_choose_hook or the connect and idle time limits, stay as they were. radius_acct_stop() now cancels the interim timer whatever the interval is, and radius_acct_interim() only schedules itself again for a non-zero interval, so the timer no longer depends on the interval that a new authentication phase clears. Signed-off-by: Semih Baskan <[email protected]>
With the radius plugin, an MS-MPPE-Encryption-Policy of 2 (encryption required, RFC 2548) does not make pppd require MPPE. The plugin hands it to mppe_set_enc_types() only when the reply also has a types attribute and MPPE keys, and that function only turns off the strengths that MS-MPPE-Encryption-Types does not allow. So with "mppe preferred" a server that requires encryption still gets a link without it when its types leave no strength, when the peer refuses MPPE, or when the reply has no keys: pppd gives MPPE up and brings the link up unencrypted. With "mppe permitted" pppd does not ask for MPPE unless the peer does. Make a policy of 2 work as "mppe required" until the call ends, if MPPE is enabled at all. "mppe preferred" already has that state for "MPPE has been up on this call": it holds across an LCP renegotiation and is reset when the call is over. The bit is renamed MPPE_HARD for the wider use. A policy of 2 does not turn MPPE on when it is disabled, and a policy of 1 only applies the types as before, so the server can only make MPPE stricter than configured. mppe_set_enc_types() also changed ccp_wantoptions[0].mppe for good: in a pppd that serves several calls, the strengths that one reply turned off stayed off in the calls after it. Record the bits it turns off and give them back when the call ends, where the MPPE state is reset. The function moves from mppe.c to ccp.c, next to the state it changes. It was the only code in mppe.c that used ccp.h, and the reason for the #ifndef UNIT_TEST there. The early return for policy 1 when MPPE is not configured goes away, as turning bits off in an empty mask changes nothing. The radius plugin now passes the policy whenever the reply has one, also without a types attribute or keys. The plugin reads the policy and the types correctly only when the dictionary declares MS-MPPE-Encryption-Policy and MS-MPPE-Encryption-Types as integers. The dictionary.microsoft that comes with pppd declares them as strings, and with it the plugin takes the length of each value, 4, as the value, so this change has no effect there until the plugin also reads the string form. Signed-off-by: Semih Baskan <[email protected]>
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I added three commits at the end. The first fixes the call after a close during CHAP authentication with persist or demand: after a failed authentication (on 2.5.5 too), or after ccp_open() closed the link because required MPPE couldn't be used, that call stayed in the authentication phase. The second makes the radius plugin apply the server's reply in every authentication phase; it only did so for the first CHAP authentication of the process, so later calls got no MS-CHAP2-Success authenticator and no MPPE keys. The third makes an MS-MPPE-Encryption-Policy of 2 work as "mppe required" for the call when MPPE is enabled (with an integer dictionary), and gives back the strengths a reply turned off when the call ends. |
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I am running about a bit, but willing to test if I can find the time, otherwise, on eyeball looks good. |
This adds the "preferred" MPPE state from #57: pppd uses MPPE when the peer agrees and brings the link up without it, with a warning, when the peer can't do MPPE. It also adds the "permitted" state from the same list in #57, which jkroonza asked for again below: pppd doesn't ask for MPPE but uses it when the peer asks for it. I wrote it from scratch, from the pppd source, RFC 3078 and the states jkroonza listed in #57.
The first two commits fix two problems in the existing code that the new states run into. They don't depend on the option.
persistordemand, the next call then sends no CCP request of its own, or only keeps resending the old one. The first commit takes CCP down when the link has terminated.require-mppe, a peer that never completes CCP leaves the link up with no network protocol, because nothing handles the CCP timeout. The second commit closes the link at that timeout.The last three commits fix three more problems; the first two don't depend on the option.
persistordemand, the call after a failed CHAP authentication stayed in the authentication phase, on 2.5.5 too: chap_handle_response() set AUTH_DONE after auth_peer_fail() had already closed the link. A close from ccp_open() in the CHAP Success path, when required MPPE can't be used, did the same, and could also open IPCP and IPV6CP for the next call. The eighth commit sets the CHAP state before reporting the result and stops start_networks() when CCP has closed the link.mppe preferredormppe permitted. The last commit makes that policy work asmppe requireduntil the call ends when MPPE is enabled (it never turns MPPE on), and gives back the strengths a reply turned off when the call ends. The plugin reads the policy and the types correctly only when the dictionary declares them as integers; the shipped dictionary.microsoft declares them as strings, so with that dictionary this has no effect yet.The option syntax is the one suggested in #57, with
permittedfor the state it writesoptional:mppe required|preferred|permitted|disabled[,40][,128]. With no strength given it allows 40 and 128-bit, likerequire-mppe.requiredanddisabledset the same state asrequire-mppeandnomppe; arequire-mppe-40orrequire-mppe-128given later adds that strength and makes MPPE required, andnomppestill turns MPPE off aftermppe preferred. A preferred link only falls back before MPPE has come up, and then it also drops the MPPE keys and the kernel's CCP state and uses no other compression. Once MPPE has been up it is required for the rest of the call, as withrequire-mppe, also after an LCP renegotiation: there is no fallback any more. MPPE is never left on in one direction only: the link is closed if pppd has already accepted the peer's MPPE when its own request fails, or if the peer has accepted pppd's MPPE and its own request has no MPPE that pppd can use.A permitted pppd sends no CCP request until the peer has sent one, because a
require-mppepeer closes the link on a request without MPPE. When the peer's request asks for MPPE at a strength we allow and pppd has MPPE keys, pppd asks for it too and goes on as withpreferred, so that MPPE runs in both directions. The network protocols are not held back, so data can go out unencrypted until MPPE is up; a pppd peer withrequire-mppeormppe preferredholds its own until then, so against it no data is sent before MPPE.For the existing options and the default (MPPE off) four things change, the first two through the fix commits: the next call after such a close negotiates CCP again, a CCP timeout with required MPPE closes the link, CCP leaves silent mode again when a later session of the same pppd has a compressor to ask for, and a call or LCP session no longer leaves its MPPE keys, or the other compressors turned off, to the next one. With
persist, a required-MPPE call that hung on 2.5.5 is now closed and redialled, and pppd exits aftermaxfailfailed calls, as it does for any other link that keeps failing. With the last three commits, the call after a failed CHAP authentication, or after such a close, authenticates normally, the radius plugin applies the reply of every call, and the strengths a reply turned off come back when the call ends.Tested with the new
testsuite/mppe-preferred_test.pyandtestsuite/mppe-permitted_test.py, both roles, and the whole testsuite, which passes; it also builds with--disable-microsoft-extensionsand with--enable-multilink. The rest was run outside the tree, in both roles (a fewmppe permittedcases in one only):mppe preferred: MPPE came up against every peer that asks for it at a strength we allow. Against peers without MPPE, or with PAP instead of MS-CHAP, the link came up unencrypted with the warning. The same happened against a test peer that never answers CCP, after our CCP timeout of about 30 s, as long as that peer's IPCP was still trying (with the default 10 tries it gives up at the same time and closes the link). A peer that requires a strength we had turned off closed the link. Against a test peer that renegotiates LCP once MPPE is up and then refuses MPPE, pppd closed the link, asrequire-mppedoes on 2.5.5.mppe permitted: against a pppd 2.5.5 peer withrequire-mppe,require-mppe-40orrequire-mppe-128, pppd asked for MPPE too and it came up in both directions. A 2.5.5 peer that requires a strength we had turned off closed the link. Against 2.5.5 with its default options ornoccpthe link came up as with MPPE off, and two permitted peers negotiated no compression. Test peers that start asking for MPPE while our request without it is out, or that renegotiate CCP after Deflate is up, got MPPE in both directions. As with MPPE off, pppd refused an MPPE request that came after an LCP renegotiation without authentication, and a request for 40-bit only after MS-CHAPv1. When a test peer rejected our MPPE, pppd gave it up with the warning, and after an LCP renegotiation without MPPE it negotiated Deflate again, or BSD-Compress when the secrets entry used in that session hasnodeflate. When a test peer took its network protocols down after pppd had asked for MPPE, pppd closed the link, whether MPPE was up or had been given up. Withpersistand withdemand, pppd waited for the peer's request and asked again in every call.persistand withdemandover a pty link (the testsuite's notty link can't redial): after a close from ccp_reqci(), 2.5.5 withrequire-mppesent no CCP request in the next call and stayed up without a network protocol. With the commit it sends its request and closes again, and a preferred link falls back with the warning. When a CCP Terminate-Ack arrived in OPENED, 2.5.5 went on resending the old request after the link had terminated; with a 5 s holdoff the next call then got no MPPE and CCP timed out. With the commit MPPE came up again.require-mppestayed up without a network protocol. With the commit it logs "MPPE required but peer negotiation failed" and closes after the CCP timeout.persistagainst a pppd client, two calls: after a rejected first call (2.5.5 too), or one that closed for missing keys or no strength left, the series without the commit left the second call in the authentication phase until it timed out. With the commit the second call authenticates and comes up as its reply allows, without an IPCP or IPV6CP request before authentication.require-mppeand MPPE disabled behave as before. Over two calls a "required" or "40-bit only" reply does not carry into the second call.With the radius plugin, MS-MPPE-Encryption-Policy 2 now makes a preferred or permitted link require MPPE for that call, when the dictionary declares the policy and types attributes as integers.
Closes #57