Verify postil-cli commit signature before building from source - #9
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When prebuilt binaries are unavailable, the action falls back to building postil-cli from source via cargo. Without signature verification, a compromised postil-cli repository could run arbitrary code in CI with access to secrets. This verifies the target commit is GPG-signed by a trusted key before building, both in the composite action and in a dedicated CI job covering the signed and unsigned cases.