What the headset exposes, who can reach it and what protects it. It runs as a device on a home network and holds the owner's Steam login and Wi-Fi passwords.
| Access | SSH with enrolled keys only (sshd_config.d/50-pico4.conf), on USB and Wi-Fi; no account has a password |
| Network | nothing else of ours listens; pico4-listeners checks it; no firewall, no forwarding |
| Not protected | a person holding the headset (unlocked bootloader); data at rest is not encrypted |
| Who | Protected | How |
|---|---|---|
| Someone on the same network | yes | SSH takes only the keys enrolled at install; no account has a password; nothing else of ours listens |
| A program of the session user | as on a desktop | steamos has no way to root: no password, and sudoers grants only root. It can read everything the session user owns, such as Steam's login data |
| Someone holding the headset | no | the bootloader is unlocked by design (device-preparation.md): with a cable anyone can boot their own image and read the data partition |
| Where | Who | How |
|---|---|---|
| Installed system, USB link and Wi-Fi, also in charger mode | root | SSH with an enrolled key; AuthenticationMethods publickey, no password, no empty password |
| Installed system | steamos |
no remote login; the session logs in by itself |
Maintenance stage 1 in recovery |
root | dropbear on the USB link with a key or the empty password, telnet, a web page and a serial shell, all without a password |
Root and steamos have no password in the image (* in /etc/shadow), so su gives nothing. From the
PC a password login or a key that was not enrolled is refused for both, on USB and Wi-Fi
(Permission denied (publickey)).
The keys. python -m overpressure dev image makes this PC's key once, out/dev/id_ed25519;
PICO4_SSH_PUBLIC_KEY in .env adds the owner's own public key: the install's Your SSH key step saves a pasted
one as out/dev/owner-key.pub and names it there. dev install writes both, with the
install ID, from the maintenance stage 1 onto the data partition (pico4-install keys):
/root/.ssh/authorized_keys (/root is on the data partition) and /etc/pico4/install-id in the /etc
overlay's upper layer. They are never in the system image, a boot image or anything the project
publishes, and no two headsets share one. A lost key: dev recovery, then dev install, which skips
partitions that already hold their image and writes the keys again. The host keys are made on the first
boot (sshdgenkeys.service) and stay in the /etc overlay.
Why the maintenance stage 1 stays open. It runs only when asked for (dev recovery, or a failed
boot), only on the USB cable, and it is the rescue when a key is lost. Whoever has the cable and the
headset can use the unlocked bootloader anyway, so a password there would protect nothing.
From the configuration. pico4-listeners reports what listens beyond loopback against its allowlist,
and pico4-userspace-check fails on anything unexpected.
| Stage | Port | Program | Reachable from | Why |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Maintenance stage 1 | tcp 22 | dropbear | USB cable | the development loop, installs, rescue |
| Maintenance stage 1 | tcp 23, tcp 80 | telnetd, httpd | USB cable | rescue, status page |
| Maintenance stage 1 | udp 67 | udhcpd | USB cable | the PC's address on the link |
| Installed system | tcp 22 | sshd, keys only | USB cable, Wi-Fi | dev commands, the owner's access, also in charger mode |
| Installed system | udp 67 | systemd-networkd's DHCP server | USB cable | the PC's address on the link |
| Installed system | udp 68, udp 546 | NetworkManager, systemd-networkd | the link's network | DHCP clients |
| Installed system | tcp and udp 5355, udp 5353 | systemd-resolved | the link's network | name resolution |
| Installed system | its NTP socket | systemd-timesyncd | the link's network | time |
| Installed system | Steam's ports (discovery on 27036, mDNS) | steam, steamwebhelper, vrlink, vrserver | Wi-Fi | Steam's local discovery, Remote Play and Steam Link |
Valve's kernel configuration builds RDS in, whose TCP transport listens on tcp 16385 in the kernel
itself; the kernel's pico4.config (overpressure/linux) turns RDS off.
There are no firewall rules: nothing listens that one would have to hide. The headset forwards nothing; the USB link serves one PC and gives it no route.
The data partition is plain ext4: Steam's login, game data and Wi-Fi passwords are not encrypted. The headset cannot take a passphrase at boot, and a key on the headset protects nothing while the bootloader is unlocked. Before selling or returning it, go back to PICO OS (install.md), which wipes the data partition's start and makes a new file system; that is no secure erase.
The system image is checked when it is written, not at boot (no dm-verity). Valve's repositories publish no signatures; the build pins their packages by hash (userspace.md) and Valve's kernel source by hash and commit.