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Security: overpressure/phoenix

docs/security.md

Security

What the headset exposes, who can reach it and what protects it. It runs as a device on a home network and holds the owner's Steam login and Wi-Fi passwords.

Access SSH with enrolled keys only (sshd_config.d/50-pico4.conf), on USB and Wi-Fi; no account has a password
Network nothing else of ours listens; pico4-listeners checks it; no firewall, no forwarding
Not protected a person holding the headset (unlocked bootloader); data at rest is not encrypted

Who it protects against

Who Protected How
Someone on the same network yes SSH takes only the keys enrolled at install; no account has a password; nothing else of ours listens
A program of the session user as on a desktop steamos has no way to root: no password, and sudoers grants only root. It can read everything the session user owns, such as Steam's login data
Someone holding the headset no the bootloader is unlocked by design (device-preparation.md): with a cable anyone can boot their own image and read the data partition

Logins

Where Who How
Installed system, USB link and Wi-Fi, also in charger mode root SSH with an enrolled key; AuthenticationMethods publickey, no password, no empty password
Installed system steamos no remote login; the session logs in by itself
Maintenance stage 1 in recovery root dropbear on the USB link with a key or the empty password, telnet, a web page and a serial shell, all without a password

Root and steamos have no password in the image (* in /etc/shadow), so su gives nothing. From the PC a password login or a key that was not enrolled is refused for both, on USB and Wi-Fi (Permission denied (publickey)).

The keys. python -m overpressure dev image makes this PC's key once, out/dev/id_ed25519; PICO4_SSH_PUBLIC_KEY in .env adds the owner's own public key: the install's Your SSH key step saves a pasted one as out/dev/owner-key.pub and names it there. dev install writes both, with the install ID, from the maintenance stage 1 onto the data partition (pico4-install keys): /root/.ssh/authorized_keys (/root is on the data partition) and /etc/pico4/install-id in the /etc overlay's upper layer. They are never in the system image, a boot image or anything the project publishes, and no two headsets share one. A lost key: dev recovery, then dev install, which skips partitions that already hold their image and writes the keys again. The host keys are made on the first boot (sshdgenkeys.service) and stay in the /etc overlay.

Why the maintenance stage 1 stays open. It runs only when asked for (dev recovery, or a failed boot), only on the USB cable, and it is the rescue when a key is lost. Whoever has the cable and the headset can use the unlocked bootloader anyway, so a password there would protect nothing.

Listening services

From the configuration. pico4-listeners reports what listens beyond loopback against its allowlist, and pico4-userspace-check fails on anything unexpected.

Stage Port Program Reachable from Why
Maintenance stage 1 tcp 22 dropbear USB cable the development loop, installs, rescue
Maintenance stage 1 tcp 23, tcp 80 telnetd, httpd USB cable rescue, status page
Maintenance stage 1 udp 67 udhcpd USB cable the PC's address on the link
Installed system tcp 22 sshd, keys only USB cable, Wi-Fi dev commands, the owner's access, also in charger mode
Installed system udp 67 systemd-networkd's DHCP server USB cable the PC's address on the link
Installed system udp 68, udp 546 NetworkManager, systemd-networkd the link's network DHCP clients
Installed system tcp and udp 5355, udp 5353 systemd-resolved the link's network name resolution
Installed system its NTP socket systemd-timesyncd the link's network time
Installed system Steam's ports (discovery on 27036, mDNS) steam, steamwebhelper, vrlink, vrserver Wi-Fi Steam's local discovery, Remote Play and Steam Link

Valve's kernel configuration builds RDS in, whose TCP transport listens on tcp 16385 in the kernel itself; the kernel's pico4.config (overpressure/linux) turns RDS off.

There are no firewall rules: nothing listens that one would have to hide. The headset forwards nothing; the USB link serves one PC and gives it no route.

Data at rest

The data partition is plain ext4: Steam's login, game data and Wi-Fi passwords are not encrypted. The headset cannot take a passphrase at boot, and a key on the headset protects nothing while the bootloader is unlocked. Before selling or returning it, go back to PICO OS (install.md), which wipes the data partition's start and makes a new file system; that is no secure erase.

Integrity

The system image is checked when it is written, not at boot (no dm-verity). Valve's repositories publish no signatures; the build pins their packages by hash (userspace.md) and Valve's kernel source by hash and commit.

There aren't any published security advisories