Skip to content

Security: lord007tn/rilldisk

SECURITY.md

Security

Do not include sensitive paths or scan reports in public issues. Report a vulnerability through GitHub private vulnerability reporting.

RillDisk is a local metadata reader. It has no network listeners, telemetry or embedded AI. Its only file mutation is removing reclaim candidates a person selected and confirmed in the CLI or desktop, to the Recycle Bin / Trash by default, under the rules in docs/proposals/cleanup.md; MCP has no mutation tools. The only outbound requests are update checks, scoped in docs/proposals/updates.md: an anonymous GitHub Releases query and, after the user agrees, a SHA-256-verified download that replaces RillDisk's own executables. RILLDISK_NO_UPDATE_CHECK=1 disables them; MCP exposes no update tool. MCP clients control any downstream transmission of paths. Allowed roots are a convenience boundary, not an operating-system sandbox. Do not expose the stdio server through an untrusted bridge or run it elevated by default; it never enables the backup privilege or offers elevation. The desktop and CLI read more when the user elevates them through the OS (UAC, sudo, polkit), as scoped in docs/proposals/elevation.md. On macOS, granting Full Disk Access to RillDisk or the terminal also lets them read more, without elevation. Filenames are untrusted data.

There aren't any published security advisories