An .mdcx file is encrypted at rest with AES-256-GCM and decrypted into memory
when opened. The key is derived from a passphrase with scrypt. Altering a single
byte of the body makes decryption fail rather than return altered data, so a
corrupted or tampered package is refused instead of silently trusted.
This is not searchable encryption. Querying a package decrypts it in memory, so anyone who can read the memory of the process can read the corpus. A package is protected in transit and at rest, not from the machine that opens it.
The passphrase is the whole of the protection. A weak one circulates as easily as the file does, and there is no recovery: a package whose passphrase is lost cannot be opened by anyone, including whoever built it.
Report privately through GitHub's advisory form, which does not make the report public while it is being looked at:
https://github.com/jorgell23-sys/mdcx/security/advisories/new
Please do not open a public issue for something that affects the confidentiality or the integrity of a package.
What helps most in a report: the version, what an attacker would be able to do, and the smallest thing that demonstrates it. A package that reproduces the problem is more useful than a description of one, provided it holds nothing confidential.
Fixes go to the current release. The version number is in mdcx --version and
in the package metadata; there is no long-term support branch.