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Multi-tenant task manager with a deliberate IDOR (CWE-639): queries filter by resource id but not by tenant, so you read and act across organizations — A hands-on Node/NestJS AppSec lab with Docker.

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tasknest

CWE-639 Node Docker GHCR

tasknest is an intentionally vulnerable application built for security education. It contains a deliberate IDOR / broken access control (CWE-639) flaw in a multi-tenant task manager — proving that "you must be logged in" is not the same as "this record belongs to your organization".


🛡️ Vulnerability 🎯 Difficulty 🛠️ Stack 🚩 Entry point
Tenant-isolation IDOR (CWE-639) ⭐⭐⭐⭐ Level 6 Node · NestJS GET · PATCH · DELETE /api/tasks/:id

Note

The guided, spoiler-free path is GUIDE.md; the full answer waits in SOLUTION.md whenever you want it.


📂 Project layout

The repository is organised so the vulnerable code is easy to find and reason about. The application lives in src/ (a small NestJS API plus a static kanban board), the data layer is Drizzle ORM over Postgres (src/db/ + drizzle/ migrations), and the tooling around it (Docker, CI/CD, linters) turns the lab into a production-shaped project. The challenge flag is never in the repo — it is baked into the image and seeded into the victim organization's confidential task.

tasknest/
├── src/                      # the application (the bug lives here)
│   ├── main.ts               # bootstrap: session, validation pipe, static UI
│   ├── app.module.ts         # root module
│   ├── health.controller.ts  # GET /healthz → "ok"
│   ├── config.ts             # env-backed configuration
│   ├── auth.ts               # password hashing
│   ├── auth/
│   │   └── auth.controller.ts   # POST /api/login · /api/logout · GET /api/me
│   ├── tasks/
│   │   ├── tasks.controller.ts  # list/create (scoped) + the vulnerable by-id endpoints
│   │   ├── tasks.service.ts     # queries (list · create · find · update · remove)
│   │   ├── auth.guard.ts        # session guard (no tenant check)
│   │   └── tasks.module.ts
│   ├── db/
│   │   ├── schema.ts         # Drizzle schema (orgs + users + tasks)
│   │   ├── client.ts         # Postgres connection
│   │   ├── migrate.ts        # applies migrations on startup
│   │   └── seed.ts           # seeds 3 organizations (flag on the victim's task)
│   └── public/               # the board UI (html/css/js)
├── drizzle/                  # generated SQL migrations
├── tests/                    # http smoke tests (vitest + supertest)
├── GUIDE.md                  # non-spoiler learning guide
├── SOLUTION.md               # exploit writeup + the fix (spoilers)
├── SECURITY.md               # security policy (it's a lab — read before reporting)
├── .github/workflows/        # integration · delivery · security · release
├── Dockerfile                # hardened multi-stage image (node:26-slim)
├── docker-compose.yml        # postgres + tasknest + traefik stack
├── docker-entrypoint.sh      # migrates + seeds, then starts the app
└── .env.example              # DB creds, session secret, Traefik ACME

The flag is not in the repo: the Dockerfile bakes it in via a build arg and the seed writes it into the victim organization's task.


🚀 The Lab

The lab ships as a Docker Compose stack with three services:

  • postgres — Postgres 16. The app waits until it is healthy before migrating.
  • tasknest — the API + task board UI, published on port 3000.
  • traefik — an optional reverse proxy for HTTPS on a real hostname.

Because the stack attaches to an external Docker network (iv0ks-dev), create it once before the first run:

docker network create iv0ks-dev

Option A — app + database (quickest)

Build and start the database and the app (Compose skips traefik when you name services explicitly):

docker compose up -d --build postgres tasknest

The entrypoint migrates the schema and seeds the data automatically, so the app is ready at:

Sign in with the seeded demo account alice / password123. That is all you need to start playing with Burp Suite.


Option B — full stack with Traefik (HTTPS + hostname)

Bring up everything to also expose the app through Traefik with TLS:

docker compose up -d --build

Now the same app is reachable two ways at once:

Traefik routing is defined in tools/traefik/. TLS uses the ACME DNS-01 challenge via Namecheap, so Traefik needs those API credentials — copy .env.example to .env and fill them in (the .env file is gitignored). The dashboard is at https://traefik.iv0ks.dev.


Caution

The tasknest.iv0ks.dev hostname must resolve to the host running the stack. For purely local experiments, Option A (localhost) is simpler and needs no DNS or certificates.


🎯 The Challenge

The Scenario

tasknest is a team task manager used by several companies at once. Every company is an organization with its own private board. You sign in as alice, who works at Northwind Traders, and your board lists Northwind's tasks — each one with a plain task number. A legitimate user only ever sees and edits their own organization's tasks. You're going to find out whether the walls between the organizations are real.

Your objective

Reach a task that belongs to another organization — specifically, the confidential task of the company Globex Corporation — and capture the flag hidden in it. You'll also want to prove you can change and delete data across the boundary.

Note

The flag has the format FLAG{...}.

The rules

Everything happens over HTTP against the running app — no need to read the source to win (though you can). The flag is not in the repo: it lives in another organization's task in the database, reachable only by breaking access control on the running app. Look closely at what your own board tells you about how tasks are numbered.

Tip

For the full method, the Learning Guide walks you through it.


⚖️ Legal / ethics

This is an educational, deliberately vulnerable lab. Run it only locally, on owned, isolated infrastructure (Docker). Never deploy it publicly, and never use these techniques against systems without explicit written authorization.

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Multi-tenant task manager with a deliberate IDOR (CWE-639): queries filter by resource id but not by tenant, so you read and act across organizations — A hands-on Node/NestJS AppSec lab with Docker.

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