opsdeck is an intentionally vulnerable application built for security education. It contains a deliberate broken access control (CWE-284) flaw in an operations dashboard — proving that hiding an admin button in the UI is not the same as forbidding the action on the server.
| 🛡️ Vulnerability | 🎯 Difficulty | 🛠️ Stack | 🚩 Entry point |
|---|---|---|---|
| Vertical privilege escalation, UI-only role check (CWE-284) | ⭐⭐⭐⭐⭐⭐ Level 8 | Node · Next.js | GET /api/admin/users · PATCH /api/admin/users/:id · GET /api/admin/secrets |
Note
The guided, spoiler-free path is GUIDE.md; the full answer waits in SOLUTION.md whenever you want it.
The repository is organised so the vulnerable code is easy to find and reason
about. The application is a Next.js (App Router) project in src/ — React
pages styled with Tailwind and shadcn/ui, plus Route Handlers that form the
API. The data layer is Drizzle ORM over Postgres (src/db/ + drizzle/
migrations), and the tooling around it (Docker, CI/CD, linters) turns the
lab into a production-shaped project. The challenge flag is never in the repo —
it is baked into the image and seeded as an admin-only secret.
opsdeck/
├── src/
│ ├── app/ # Next.js App Router
│ │ ├── page.tsx # service overview
│ │ ├── incidents/ # incident list + acknowledge
│ │ ├── admin/page.tsx # the admin console (hidden from members in the UI)
│ │ ├── login/ # sign-in page
│ │ ├── healthz/route.ts # GET /healthz → "ok"
│ │ └── api/ # Route Handlers (the bug lives here)
│ │ ├── login/ logout/ me/ services/ incidents/
│ │ └── admin/
│ │ ├── users/route.ts # GET staff + roles (no role check)
│ │ ├── users/[id]/route.ts # PATCH change a role (no role check)
│ │ ├── secrets/route.ts # GET break-glass keys (no role check)
│ │ └── services/[id]/route.ts # PATCH status override (checks the role)
│ ├── components/ # shadcn/ui components + header
│ ├── lib/
│ │ ├── session.ts # signed session cookie (done right)
│ │ ├── api.ts # requireSession() · requireAdmin()
│ │ ├── ops.ts # queries
│ │ └── password.ts # password hashing
│ ├── db/
│ │ ├── schema.ts # Drizzle schema (users + role, services, incidents, secrets)
│ │ ├── client.ts # Postgres connection
│ │ ├── migrate.ts # applies migrations on startup
│ │ └── seed.ts # seeds 3 staff accounts (flag = admin-only secret)
│ └── config.ts # env-backed configuration
├── drizzle/ # generated SQL migrations
├── tests/ # route-handler tests (vitest)
├── GUIDE.md # non-spoiler learning guide
├── SOLUTION.md # exploit writeup + the fix (spoilers)
├── SECURITY.md # security policy (it's a lab — read before reporting)
├── .github/workflows/ # integration · delivery · security · release
├── Dockerfile # hardened multi-stage image (node:26-slim, standalone)
├── docker-compose.yml # postgres + opsdeck + traefik stack
├── docker-entrypoint.sh # migrates + seeds, then starts the app
└── .env.example # DB creds, session secret, Traefik ACME
The flag is not in the repo: the Dockerfile bakes it in via a build arg
and the seed writes it into the admin-only break-glass-token secret.
The lab ships as a Docker Compose stack with three services:
postgres— Postgres 16. The app waits until it is healthy before migrating.opsdeck— the dashboard UI + API, published on port3000.traefik— an optional reverse proxy for HTTPS on a real hostname.
Because the stack attaches to an external Docker network (iv0ks-dev),
create it once before the first run:
docker network create iv0ks-devCopy the example environment file, then build and start the database and the app
(Compose skips traefik when you name services explicitly):
cp .env.example .env
docker compose up -d --build postgres opsdeckThe entrypoint migrates the schema and seeds the data automatically, so the app is ready at:
Sign in with the seeded on-call account alice / password123. That is all
you need to start playing with Burp Suite.
Tip
The seed runs on every start and resets roles, so if you promoted yourself and
want a clean slate, just restart the container: docker compose restart opsdeck.
Bring up everything to also expose the app through Traefik with TLS:
docker compose up -d --buildNow the same app is reachable two ways at once:
- http://localhost:3000 — direct, no TLS (handy for quick testing).
- https://opsdeck.iv0ks.dev — proxied by Traefik with a real certificate.
Traefik routing is defined in tools/traefik/. TLS uses the ACME DNS-01
challenge via Namecheap, so Traefik needs those API credentials — fill them in
.env (it is gitignored). The dashboard is at https://traefik.iv0ks.dev.
Caution
The opsdeck.iv0ks.dev hostname must resolve to the host running the stack.
For purely local experiments, Option A (localhost) is simpler and needs no
DNS or certificates.
opsdeck is the internal operations console of a small software company: a live service overview, an incident queue, and an admin console where administrators manage people, hold the emergency break-glass credentials and override service status. You sign in as alice, an on-call engineer. You are a regular member, and the app treats you like one — your menu has no Admin entry and the admin page politely tells you it is for administrators only.
Get to the break-glass credentials that only an administrator is meant to see, and capture the flag hidden among them. Then prove the damage is real: make yourself an administrator.
Note
The flag has the format FLAG{...}.
Everything happens over HTTP against the running app — no need to read the source to win (though you can). The flag is not in the repo: it lives in the database, reachable only by breaking access control on the running app. The front end will not help you; ask yourself what the server thinks about your requests, not what the page shows you.
Tip
For the full method, the Learning Guide walks you through it.
This is an educational, deliberately vulnerable lab. Run it only locally, on owned, isolated infrastructure (Docker). Never deploy it publicly, and never use these techniques against systems without explicit written authorization.