The main branch carries all fixes; there are no long-lived release
branches yet.
Do not open a public issue for anything you believe is a soundness or security problem.
Report privately to the maintainers via GitHub's Report a vulnerability flow (the Security tab → Report a vulnerability), which routes encrypted to the repository admins. Include:
- The component (crate, function, proof structure) you believe is unsound;
- The attack sketch — what a malicious prover would do, and which identity or bound it evades;
- The fix idea, if you have one.
We respond within 7 days and credit reporters unless anonymity is requested.
Magnetar is a research-grade proof system implementation. The security properties that matter are, in order:
- Knowledge soundness of every reduction (sum-check round checks, address virtualization product identities, the Δ* one-hotness, the Φ-combination, the routing identities, the ring-switch anchors, and the PCS fold chain);
- Constant-time arithmetic in
magnetar-field(no secret-dependent branches or indices); - Fiat–Shamir transcript hygiene (domain separation, length binding, and the exact prover/verifier absorb order — a divergence between the two sides is a soundness-relevant bug even when the honest prover still verifies).
Out of scope: denial-of-service through extreme trace lengths, and side channels on prover-local memory.