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Security: heycupola/wrapper

SECURITY.md

Security Policy

Wrapper provides access to live terminal sessions, so vulnerabilities must be reported privately before public disclosure.

Report a vulnerability

Do not open a public issue or pull request for a suspected security problem. Use the hosted security-reporting instructions, email [email protected] (Cupola Labs security), or submit a private GitHub security advisory while signed in to GitHub.

Include:

  • affected version and platform
  • impact and attack prerequisites
  • minimal reproduction steps using test data
  • logs with tokens, share codes, paths, and terminal content removed
  • a safe proof of concept, if available

Do not access another user's terminal, retain terminal data, or disrupt production while investigating. We will acknowledge valid reports as soon as practical and coordinate disclosure after affected users are protected.

Operational security

Suspected credential exposure, unauthorized relay access, or production-data loss is a security incident even when no software vulnerability is confirmed. Report it through the private channels above. Operators follow the incident, backup/restore, and secret-rotation procedures in OPERATIONS.md; production backups and secret values must never be attached to a public GitHub issue.

Audited dependency exceptions

GHSA-jmr9-qjv8-65gv has no fixed upstream extract-zip release. Wrapper only receives it through Mint's development-time Puppeteer toolchain and applies patches/[email protected] to reject symlink targets outside the extraction root. CI regression-tests that patch before allowing the advisory-specific audit exception. Remove the exception when Mint no longer resolves the affected package.

Security boundaries

  • A session is local and owner-only until the host explicitly shares it.
  • Non-owner relay viewers need the session id and share code.
  • Every accepted viewer can read and control the shared shell.
  • P2P traffic is encrypted between peers and exposes peer IP addresses.
  • Relay fallback is encrypted in transit, but the relay processes terminal traffic after TLS termination.
  • Processes running as the same operating-system user, and root/administrator, are inside the local trust boundary.

See the Privacy Policy for the complete data flow.

There aren't any published security advisories