fix(cve): UT-2026-0115 - su runs in its own pseudo-terminal by default - #22
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Reviewer's guide (collapsed on small PRs)Reviewer's GuideConfigures su to allocate a dedicated pseudo-terminal by default for interactive sessions via a Debian patch, mitigating TIOCSTI-based shared-terminal privilege escalation, and wires the patch into the Debian packaging metadata. File-Level Changes
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TAG Bot TAG: 2.40.4-3deepin13 |
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/test all |
Interactively started su (stdin is a tty) now allocates its own pseudo-terminal by default, so the target session does not share the controlling terminal with the caller session. A process in the low-privilege session can no longer use TIOCSTI/TIOCLINUX ioctls to inject commands into the shared terminal input queue that would later be executed by the privileged session (kernel < 6.2 or dev.tty.legacy_tiocsti=1). The pty slave and proxy stdin handling is unchanged (upstream lib/pty-session.c keeps the slave cooked and makes the proxy stdin raw), so line editing and tab completion keep working. Use -T/--no-pty to opt out; runuser keeps its historical behavior. CVE: UT-2026-0115 (medium) - su TIOCSTI shared-terminal local privilege escalation Upstream: util-linux/util-linux#2685 (--pty default direction), util-linux/util-linux@2863ed6 (TIOCSTI security notes) Change-Id: I71b8fe310fe297f753f5cdd1c26f14da5eefd4b0
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/test all |
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Interactively started su (stdin is a tty) now allocates its own pseudo-terminal by default, so the target session does not share the controlling terminal with the caller session. A process in the low-privilege session can no longer use TIOCSTI/TIOCLINUX ioctls to inject commands into the shared terminal input queue that would later be executed by the privileged session (kernel < 6.2 or dev.tty.legacy_tiocsti=1). The pty slave and proxy stdin handling is unchanged (upstream lib/pty-session.c keeps the slave cooked and makes the proxy stdin raw), so line editing and tab completion keep working. Use -T/--no-pty to opt out; runuser keeps its historical behavior.
CVE: UT-2026-0115 (medium) - su TIOCSTI shared-terminal local privilege escalation
Upstream: util-linux/util-linux#2685 (--pty default direction), util-linux/util-linux@2863ed6 (TIOCSTI security notes)
Change-Id: I71b8fe310fe297f753f5cdd1c26f14da5eefd4b0
Summary by Sourcery
Harden interactive su sessions against shared-terminal privilege escalation by enabling private pseudo-terminals by default.
Bug Fixes:
Tests: