[Madraka]

Two follow-ups to the trust ceremony (RFC-0046 §9). Scripts and docs only, so no changeset.

1. root-init KDF

• Before: root-init wrote the root as PBES2 with PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 at 2,048 iterations. That is the default of Node's KeyObject.export({ cipher, passphrase }), and the API has no option for more.

• Now: the new scripts/release-keys/pkcs8.ts writes the PBES2 EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo itself (RFC 8018, RFC 5958):

  • PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 at 600,000 iterations (ROOT_KDF_ITERATIONS, OWASP);
  • a 16-byte salt;
  • AES-256-CBC.

  This is the same form as openssl pkcs8 -topk8 -v2 aes-256-cbc -v2prf hmacWithSHA256 -iter 600000.

• Reading roots: sign-keys is unchanged: createPrivateKey({ key, passphrase }) reads both the new and the old 2,048-iteration roots.

• readPbes2 parses the PBES2/PBKDF2 parameters back out of the DER.

• Tests (packages/cli/test/release-keys.test.ts):

  • The written file is exactly { iterations: 600000, saltBytes: 16, prf: "hmacWithSHA256", cipher: "aes-256-cbc" }.
  • It opens with the passphrase and yields the announced public key; a wrong passphrase fails.
  • Every file gets its own salt.
  • An old-form root (Node's default export, which readPbes2 reads as 2,048 iterations) still signs a keys.json that the consumer's verifyKeys accepts.

• Checked by hand with OpenSSL 4.1: openssl asn1parse shows PBES2 / PBKDF2 / INTEGER 0927C0 / hmacWithSHA256 / aes-256-cbc, and openssl pkey -passin opens the file.

2. Custody text (owner decision, 2026-11-15)

• docs/security/release-signing-keys.md, Root keys › Custody:
  • The encrypted root has two sealed copies:
    • one in the private repository cloudhal-dev/key-custody (owner only; no Actions, apps or deploy keys; no passphrase and no plaintext key in it);
    • one kept offline.
  • The passphrase is kept apart, in a password manager and on sealed paper.
  • The repository copy is the one documented exception.
  • A new bullet gives the by-hand re-encryption for roots made before this fix, how to check the result with asn1parse, and records that cloudhal-root-2026a was re-encrypted on 2026-11-15.
• Custody of the release key: the general sentence now reads: "Apart from their environment secrets, no copy of the release key or the yank key, and no passphrase, is ever in a repository, a chat, an issue or a cloud service." It names the encrypted root in key-custody as the one exception.
• Yank key:
  • The secret is its only copy: the plaintext key was deleted once the secret was set, and a lost key is rotated, not restored. The same holds for the yank-list deploy key.
  • Setup step 4 now says to delete the .pem instead of "move to offline storage".
  • Setup step 7 adds what to do if the deploy key's secret is lost.
• RFC-0046 §9: the root custody line carries the same copies, the passphrase placement and the exception. It also states the KDF.

Tests run, one at a time

• packages/cli: release-keys (22), release-workflows (14), release-trust-assets (4), yank-list-workflow (6), deploy-release (24).
• packages/core-contracts: release-schemas (23).
• packages/release-verify: package (16), trust.
• Also clean: tsc in packages/cli (it type-checks the scripts it imports), biome, and pnpm size:check.

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