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| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Affected service | The directory under services/ — one of api, chat, embeddings, ingest, knowledge, reranker, retrieval, runtime, tools — or contracts/, deploy/, scripts/ |
| Version | The tag or commit SHA the finding was reproduced against |
| Reproduction | The requests, inputs, or steps in the order you ran them, including the response that shows the effect |
| Configuration | Which deviations from the service's .env.example or from weave.yaml the finding depends on, and in particular which secrets were set and which were left empty |
| Impact | What an attacker gains, and what access they need to begin |
A finding that only reproduces under one particular configuration is still worth reporting. Name the configuration.
The repository carries a single branch, main, with tags up to v0.5.6.
There are no release branches and no backports. Fixes land on main; report
against main or against the commit you tested.
In scope: the nine services under services/, the cross-service contracts in
contracts/, the Compose stack and database initialization in deploy/, and
the configuration renderer scripts/weave_config.py.
Out of scope:
- The development defaults shipped in the
.env.examplefiles. Some name themselves in the value —SECRET_KEY=dev-only-insecure-secret-key-do-not-use-in-production(services/knowledge/.env.example; weave-api ships an emptySECRET_KEYand refuses to start with that default) — and the rest are marked by the comment above them: the SQLiteDATABASE_URLfallbacks and thefakeembedding and LLM providers. A deployment that keeps any of them is misconfigured rather than vulnerable. Values written as an instruction rather than a default (generate-me-with-openssl-rand-hex-32) are placeholders that cannot start a service at all. - Anything that presupposes access to
deploy/.envor to the environment variables it is rendered from. That file is generated, is ignored by Git, and holds every service token in the stack; the README's "Internal calls and how each one authenticates" table names three of them as effectively master keys. - The two documented properties of the shipped Compose stack: every
published port binds
0.0.0.0, and there is no TLS anywhere indeploy/. Both are stated in the README and left to the operator. A way past an authentication check on one of those ports is in scope; the port listening is not. - Dependency advisories already covered by CI.
.github/workflows/pr-ci.ymlrunsnpm audit --audit-level=highagainstservices/ingest/frontendandpip-audit --strictagainstservices/ingest/backend/requirements.txt. Those two audits are the only ones in the workflow; the other services' dependencies are not audited there, and a finding in them is in scope. A demonstrated exploit path through a dependency remains in scope either way.
Worth knowing before digging in:
- Identity lives in Ingest. The gateway receives it through a single-use handoff code and keeps no second user directory (ADR-0006).
- All containers share one flat bridge network. What separates the services is
the bearer token each one demands, checked fail-closed — an unset token
yields
503rather than an open door. The credential on each internal hop is tabulated in the README. - Three databases share one PostgreSQL cluster (ADR-0004):
weave_ingest,weave_knowledge, andweave_api. Ingest, Knowledge, and Weave-API each connect with the same superuser, so what separates them is a database boundary, not a privilege boundary. The one privilege boundary inside PostgreSQL isweave_retrieval_ro, theSELECT-only role through which Retrieval reads the Knowledge chunk store (ADR-0005). - Ingest routes the outbound URLs an administrator can set — OIDC discovery,
Confluence import, export webhooks, the vision endpoint — through an
SSRF-hardened fetcher (
services/ingest/backend/app/services/safe_fetch.py) that rejects private addresses unless the specific host is allowlisted. The endpoints the other services call are requested over plainhttpxwithout that check.
For the detail: docs/betrieb.md is the operations guide (in German) — section 5 covers the values that several services must share, section 6 the misconfigurations that fail silently. docs/adr/ holds the architecture decisions, among them ADR-0002 (authentication and authorization), ADR-0003 (secrets), ADR-0005 (the shared read model), and ADR-0006 (federated login).