Agent Kit is a human-in-the-loop harness for AI-assisted IDEs. It installs prompt and workflow files into a developer's project and ships a local CLI plus a loopback observability panel (Mission Control). Reports about any of those surfaces are welcome.
| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
Latest 5.x release of @dadado/agent-kit-cli |
Yes |
| Anything older | No — upgrade first, then re-test |
There is no long-term-support branch. Fixes land on the latest release line.
Do not dump proof-of-concept detail into a public issue before a private channel exists.
Use, in order of preference:
- GitHub private vulnerability reporting (preferred when enabled) — on the public repository, go to the Security tab → Report a vulnerability. This opens a private advisory visible only to you and the maintainers.
- Public issue as a private-channel request (fallback) — if private vulnerability reporting is unavailable (button missing, fork without PVR, or reporting fails), open a public issue that contains no technical detail, no proof of concept, and no reproduction steps. Say only that you have a security report and need a private channel. A maintainer will open a private advisory (or email) and invite you to it.
- Affected surface: CLI command, installed L0 template, registry skill, Mission Control endpoint, or the sync/CI tooling.
- Version: output of
npx @dadado/agent-kit-cli --version, plus the value ofversionin the project's.cursor/agent-kit.jsonif the issue is about installed files. - Environment: OS, Node version, IDE (Cursor / VS Code / Windsurf).
- Reproduction steps and observed vs expected behavior.
- Impact you believe it has.
This project is maintained on a best-effort basis by a small team. There is no contractual response time and no bug bounty. Reports are triaged in the order received; a fix, a mitigation, or an explicit "won't fix, here's why" is the intended outcome of every valid report. Please allow a reasonable window for a fix before disclosing publicly, and tell us if you have a disclosure deadline.
Credit is given in the advisory and the changelog unless you ask otherwise.
These are documented design decisions, not vulnerabilities. Please read them before reporting.
- Mission Control is local and single-developer. It binds
127.0.0.1by default. The opt-in LAN mode (/dashboard-broadcast) binds a non-loopback interface only with explicit intent and a required session token. Config writes stay loopback-only and allowlisted. Multi-user or internet-facing hosting is out of scope by design — see Mission Control production-ship constraints. - Continuous plan execution runs with the IDE sandbox disabled.
/run-planneeds filesystem and git access to do its job. Plan to-dos and registry skills therefore function as direct agent instructions and must be reviewed before they are run — see Security considerations. - Prompt content is not a trust boundary. A malicious skill, plan, or rule that a user installs on purpose can instruct the agent. Report the delivery path (for example: a way to get unreviewed content into an install) rather than the fact that instructions are followed.
In scope and worth reporting: arbitrary file write or command execution from CLI input, path traversal in install or update, credential or token leakage, the public sync allowlist leaking private paths, an unauthenticated mutation reachable on a non-loopback bind, and dependency issues with a practical exploit path here.
The public repository contains no secrets, and CI secrets live only on the private factory repository. If you believe a credential has been committed anywhere in the history, report it through the private channel above rather than in an issue.