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Codecov Report❌ Patch coverage is Additional details and impacted files@@ Coverage Diff @@
## develop #1004 +/- ##
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+ Coverage 81.53% 83.87% +2.33%
- Complexity 3071 3737 +666
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Files 129 148 +19
Lines 12253 14352 +2099
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+ Hits 9991 12038 +2047
- Misses 2262 2314 +52
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@whyisjake we'll likely want the streaming PR in the PHP AI client into a tagged release there as a precursor to this PR (and perhaps something in the Requests library as well?), so if you could help on those upstream effort(s) and then come back to this PR that'll help keep things unblocked. |
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Thanks @jeffpaul, agreed on the sequencing. WordPress/php-ai-client#255 is rebased and mergeable and is waiting on @JasonTheAdams's review. The streaming subset vendored here is byte-identical to the current head of that PR, apart from the core-prefixed PSR imports, and the AI Workspace test suites run it under core's prefixed environment. I'll post that as a consumer review there and weigh in on the two open design questions (the opt-in streaming interface, and aborting a stream mid-way). On Requests: WP's HTTP API buffers the whole body, so this branch opens the stream with This stays a draft until WordPress/php-ai-client#255 is in a tagged release, then I'll re-vendor from trunk. |
…reen Adds a full-screen, capability-gated admin screen behind its own experiment toggle. The screen renders an app shell only; conversation behaviour, REST routes, and streaming land in later units. The capability check is layered rather than single-point: the menu entry, the asset enqueue, and the render callback each gate on manage_options, so a direct call to the render callback cannot emit the app shell or its localized data to a user without the capability. Advances R1, R2, R3, R4 (U1). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRSJEyQyYp3XTeum8fiq3L
Registers ai/search-content, a bounded full-text search over the post types exposed to the Abilities API. core/read-content is exact-match only and is kept byte-similar to core's copy, so this lands as a sibling rather than a change to it. Results are filtered at execute time against the requesting user's read permission, mirroring core/read-content's permission walk including the inherited-parent chain, so every ability consumer inherits the same filtering rather than relying on the query alone. The permission callback can only gate coarsely; the row filter is the authoritative check. Two query behaviours worth noting. per_page is capped at 20 in the schema and clamped again in the callback, so the cap holds on transports that skip schema validation. perm => 'readable' is passed only for a single-post-type query: WP_Query resolves a multi-type query to the placeholder capability read_private_multiple_post_types, which no role holds, silently hiding private posts from users who can read them. Registered from the workspace experiment rather than the Custom Abilities gated collection, so the workspace always has its search tool and every other ability consumer can still reach it. Advances R12, R13 (U2). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRSJEyQyYp3XTeum8fiq3L
…overlay Adds an independently-gated `streaming` feature to SDK_Overlay, alongside `embeddings`, so environments whose bundled PHP AI Client predates streaming get the streaming types from a vendored copy. A spike established what the plan had wrong. WordPress core bundles the SDK without its vendor directory, so upstream PR #255's Guzzle-based streaming transport does not apply here; core supplies its own transporter over wp_safe_remote_request. Only the SDK-level types are useful, and a WordPress streaming transporter is required regardless of whether that PR merges. Vendored files are NOT verbatim, unlike the embeddings feature. Core prefixes its PSR and Nyholm dependencies under WordPress\AiClientDependencies, so every such import is rewritten; the unprefixed names do not resolve under a WordPress bootstrap. The README records the rewrite table. PromptBuilder and AiClient are deliberately excluded. PromptBuilder is 45KB of trunk-era code and the largest drift risk against the bundled 0.3.1, and the method it adds only validates, resolves the model, and delegates. Two further candidates were trimmed as unreferenced by the kept set. The sentinel is StreamedGenerativeAiResult rather than the streaming model interface: resolve() probes with class_exists(), which returns false for interfaces, so an interface sentinel would activate the feature even where the environment already ships streaming. A new test enforces that for every feature. Streaming is not yet reachable end to end: the transport and an Anthropic model implementing the streaming interface are still missing (U12). Adds U11 (new; the plan has no unit for this work). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRSJEyQyYp3XTeum8fiq3L
Makes streaming reachable in PHP. A Streaming_Http_Transporter decorates the configured transporter: non-streaming calls delegate unchanged, and a streaming request is opened through fopen() with a stream context so the body is pulled lazily and wrapped as a PSR-7 stream the SDK's SSE parser reads unmodified. Because this path bypasses wp_safe_remote_request(), it also bypasses connector approval and request logging, so both are restored explicitly. Approval mirrors Http_Guard step for step -- same Connector_Key_Index lookup, same Caller_Identifier, same Approvals_Store check, same pending-approval record -- and runs before the opener is touched. A test asserts zero calls to the opener, which is the only egress point, so "before egress" is proven rather than implied. Logging wraps the whole body in a finally, so a refused request is logged as an error too. Two honest limits are documented on the class: a streamed entry records time-to-headers, not time-to-last-byte, and carries no token counts, because those arrive inside a body that has not been read yet. The same bypass loses that function's SSRF protection, so wp_http_validate_url() is applied before connecting and CRLF is stripped from header names and values. Anthropic's stream is mapped in its own class. Its SSE uses named events rather than a single delta shape, which is why upstream PR #255 does not cover it, and tool arguments arrive as input_json_delta fragments that must be concatenated across deltas before parsing -- parsing a fragment early yields plausible but wrong arguments. Interleaved fragments from concurrent tool calls are covered. The transporter is deliberately not installed globally and nothing constructs the streaming model in production code; ordering against Logging_Http_Transporter in the registry belongs to the turn endpoint that will drive it. phpstan.neon.dist excludes the two classes that implement or extend SDK and provider symbols PHPStan cannot resolve. Verified necessary: without it the run reports 15 errors that PHPStan itself marks unignorable. This follows the existing precedent for Logging_Http_Transporter; the mapper, opener and interface stay fully analysed. Adds U12 (new; the plan has no unit for this work). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRSJEyQyYp3XTeum8fiq3L
The spike in U3 contradicted three assumptions KTD3 rested on, and its outcome added two units the plan did not contain. Brings the artifact back in line with the code so U4 is planned against what exists. - KTD3 records the corrected findings: upstream PR #255 streams via Guzzle, which core does not bundle, so a WordPress-side transport is needed either way; vendoring cannot be verbatim because core prefixes its PSR dependencies; and the guards are restorable by construction through the public transporter seam rather than bypassed. - U3 is marked complete with its outcome; U11 and U12 are added. - U2's file list pointed at the gated-abilities collection, which accepts only gated base classes and runs only when a different experiment is enabled. - U4's approach corrected on three counts found by review and confirmed in the code: the batch resolver call offers no per-call seam for provenance or logging; a null-input permission call cannot filter tools because this repo's content callbacks are input-dependent; and cancellation cannot rely on abort detection on a buffered turn. - Stop conditions and the streaming open question updated: a host that cannot stream now degrades to a buffered request instead of blocking the plan. Also adds the Anthropic provider to the wp-env configs, since Claude is the chosen provider and the environment previously loaded only Google and OpenAI. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRSJEyQyYp3XTeum8fiq3L
…l loop Runs a bounded, permission-filtered, logged tool-calling conversation behind POST ai/v1/workspace/messages, with a companion cancel route. Both gate on capability independently of nonce validation. Tool selection uses a coarse, input-free capability predicate. Filtering with a null-input permission check does not work here: this repository's content permission callbacks are input-dependent and return false without a post id or slug, so that filter would deny every tool to every user including administrators. Object-level authorization stays at execute time, where WP_Ability::execute() runs the ability's own callback. The loop iterates the assistant message's function-call parts and invokes the resolver's single-call execute_ability() per call. The batch form runs every call internally and exposes no hooks, leaving no seam for the provenance envelope or for one log row per invocation. Tool results are wrapped as provenance-tagged data before returning to the model, and every invocation writes exactly one log row -- allowed, denied, and failed alike. Denials are distinguishable from failures on the indexed status column without decoding context, and context.surface discriminates workspace rows from MCP rows sharing the same ability name. Cancellation is out of band: a separate route sets a marker the loop re-reads between rounds. Client-abort detection cannot serve here because PHP observes a disconnect only after writing output, which a buffered turn never does and the strict no-output test setting forbids. The marker is written by a different request, so the read drops its cache entries first -- otherwise the loop would answer from the value cached at request start and never observe a cancel. Conversation state lives in user-scoped transients: session-lifetime, regenerable, and expiring, which matters because it accumulates retrieved private and draft post bodies. Ownership is enforced twice -- the key is derived from the user id, and the stored owner is compared again on load -- so a second user holding the same capability cannot read another's conversation. A miss is a 404 rather than a silently-new conversation. Streaming is driven through U12's transport behind a seam, and every reference to the provider-dependent model is isolated so nothing autoloads where the Anthropic plugin is absent. A transport that cannot stream on this host falls back to a buffered request rather than failing. phpstan.neon.dist excludes one small driver file whose provider parent is unresolvable; the errors are non-ignorable and the surface was deliberately isolated so the rest of the loop stays fully analysed. Advances R6, R7, R8, R9, R10, R13, R18, R20, R21 (U4). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRSJEyQyYp3XTeum8fiq3L
…mission Builds the conversational surface: transcript with tool steps, prompt input with send/stop/clear, the two context scopes, and the streaming client. Server side, Stream_Responder consumes the filter seam the turn endpoint left and emits SSE frames. Model output is rendered by a restricted-subset markdown renderer rather than a parser plus sanitizer. The renderer emits a node tree, never an HTML string, and the components map nodes to elements, so dangerouslySetInnerHTML appears nowhere in the unit. Dangerous constructs are impossible to emit rather than stripped after parsing. Links get the same treatment as images, which the plan understated. Blocking images alone leaves the exfiltration path half open: a model steered by injected post content can emit a link whose destination carries retrieved private content in its query string, behind anchor text that reads as a legitimate next step. A link is live only when it resolves to http or https on this host; everything else renders as text with its destination visible. Images are inert including reference-style syntax, which is not implemented at all. Streaming asks for SSE and branches on the response content type, so a host that cannot stream renders the identical turn arriving at once with a quiet line saying so -- not an error state. Headers are sent lazily on the first delta, so a turn that never streams falls through to the ordinary JSON body. Accessibility replaces the plan's loose wording: one polite visually-hidden live region updated at sentence and paragraph boundaries and on completion, with the transcript itself no longer aria-live. Announcing every chunk was the failure mode that wording invited. Retry resends the original prompt as a new turn rather than replacing the failed one. A turn that failed mid-stream may already have run tools, and replacing it in place would hide that it ran twice -- exactly the fact a person needs once writes exist. Only errors offer retry; round-cap and cancelled turns do not, because the model ended those, not the transport. ContextScope in the TypeScript types was 'site' | 'post-type' | 'selection', which matched neither R6 nor the endpoint's enum. Reconciled to 'site' | 'general'. Known gap, commented at the call site: on the first turn of a new conversation the client does not yet know the server-minted conversation id, so Stop closes the reader locally while that round finishes server-side. Later turns cancel properly. Closing it needs the turn endpoint to publish the id early. Advances R2, R6, R8, R9, R11, R19 (U5). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRSJEyQyYp3XTeum8fiq3L
…the transcript Closes a gap the transcript could not work around: the turn route returned only tool invocation records, never the results, so no post list could reach the client at all. Each tool_calls entry now carries the ability's own return value on success, and null on a denial -- a refusal is not a result. The passthrough is deliberately narrow. Nothing is re-fetched, joined, or enriched, because re-fetching post data client-side would bypass the execute-time permission filtering the whole read path rests on. A test asserts the value the client receives is identical to direct ability execution for the same user and input, so the response cannot leak more than the tool did. The client then treats it as unknown and rebuilds each row from the fields the search ability declares, so a future ability with a wider payload cannot push unexpected fields into the table. The table is chrome-free by construction rather than by configuration: composing DataViews with an explicit Layout child means search, filters, view config and pagination are never mounted, since the component renders its default UI only when given no children. Per-field flags and controlled view state back that up. The plan's instruction to copy the DataViews stylesheet in webpack was unnecessary -- the copy plugin already emits it once to a fixed path outside the entry map -- so the config is untouched and the page enqueues the existing file conditionally, mirroring the request-logs page. R14 is only half-met by this unit: rows link to the post, not to its editor. The search ability returns no edit URL and nothing client-side may invent one, so the edit action is gated on a row-supplied URL and is currently never rendered. Completing it belongs on the ability that already owns the permission walk. Advances R14 (U6). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRSJEyQyYp3XTeum8fiq3L
Completes R14. The transcript table already had an edit action gated on a row-supplied URL, but no ability emitted one, so the action never rendered and rows linked only to the published post. The URL doubles as the permission proof: it is present only when the current user can edit the post, so a consumer does not re-derive the capability and cannot construct an editor URL for a post it may only read. That also avoids guessing wp-admin/post.php, which breaks on non-standard admin paths. The explicit capability check is deliberate redundancy, and the docblock says so: get_edit_post_link() already returns nothing for a user who cannot edit, and a mutation run with the gate removed left the new tests green. The gate stays because the emptiness of this field is a permission guarantee consumers rely on, and that guarantee should not rest on the internals of a core function that is free to change. The tests lock the contract rather than the mechanism. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRSJEyQyYp3XTeum8fiq3L
…ally work Two bugs found by running the workspace against a real provider rather than against tests. Both were invisible because each degraded politely instead of failing. OptionEnum::FUNCTION_DECLARATIONS is not a constant. That call threw an undefined-constant Error, a catch-everything swallowed it, and the screen therefore always reported "no compatible model available" -- even though all eleven Anthropic models advertise function calling. The enum extends AbstractEnum, so the member is reached with isFunctionDeclarations(). The catch is now narrower in effect: an Error is re-thrown rather than swallowed, so a programming mistake in that method surfaces instead of presenting as a permanent, plausible-looking capability gap. An unreachable provider still degrades quietly, which is the case the catch is for. Throwable is still the caught type because the project's coding standard requires it over Exception. The streaming driver called GenerativeAiResultChunk::toText(), which does not exist -- the method is getDeltaText(). The Throwable guard turned that into "this host cannot stream", so every turn silently fell back to a buffered request and the UI truthfully reported a condition that was not true. Verified end to end afterwards: a turn now streams, and the fallback notice is gone. Only the visible delta text is emitted; getReasoningDeltaText() carries the model's thinking, which is not the reply. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRSJEyQyYp3XTeum8fiq3L
…hinking signatures Two defects found by running a two-turn conversation against the real provider. The model was whichever candidate the registry happened to return first, which on a live site resolved to the most capable and most expensive model available -- selected by array position, not intent. Selection now consults an ordered preference, filterable per site, and falls through cleanly when a preferred model is absent. That accidental choice also exposed the second defect. Always-on-thinking models return thinking blocks, and Anthropic rejects a replayed thinking block whose signature is missing, so the second turn of any conversation failed with "messages.1.content.0.thinking.signature: Field required". The signature arrives as its own signature_delta after the block's thinking text, so the mapper now records which block indices opened as thinking and carries the signature onto the part it belongs to, matched by index rather than arrival order. The storage round trip was never at fault: the SDK's MessagePart already carries a thought signature and Message::fromArray()/toArray() preserve it. The loss was ours, in the mapper, on the streaming path only -- which is why no test saw it and why it took a live second turn to surface. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRSJEyQyYp3XTeum8fiq3L
The model can propose drafts; only a person's confirmation writes them. The proposal is persisted server-side and the confirmation renders the stored resolved values, never the model's summary of them -- that summary is attacker-influenceable, which is the reason the requirement exists. There is no registered write ability. The plan called for one kept off the MCP surface, but that is an intention without a mechanism: a registered ability is reachable by the MCP surface, the Abilities Explorer, and any third-party caller, none of which have a confirm gate. Instead the writer is a plain class reachable only from the proposal controller, so the confirm gate is a structural property of the write path rather than a validation rule someone can route around. The model's only reach is a propose ability that writes nothing, is hidden from REST and MCP, and refuses outside an active turn context. Ownership is bound, not merely capability-checked. Capability is not identity: without this, a second user holding the same capability could execute another's proposal by id, and the values they approved on screen would not be the ones written. The store derives its key from the owner, compares the stored owner again on read, and compares the conversation at execution -- three checks independent of the capability re-check at write time. Verified by mutation: with the key no longer user-scoped, the stored-owner comparison still refuses a peer, so both layers hold on their own. Set approval is bounded. Proposals cap at twenty items, matching the search tool's row bound, and items start deselected so an item appended by injected content must be chosen deliberately rather than ridden in on a batch approval. A status the user cannot publish to fails the proposal instead of being downgraded silently. Partial failure is reported per item to both the person and the model, with no auto-retry, and re-executing a confirmed proposal creates nothing. Every write attempt is logged in the shape the tool-call rows already use, so writes and reads join on one conversation. Advances R15, R16, R17, R20 (U7). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRSJEyQyYp3XTeum8fiq3L
An Options-menu action in the post editor opens the workspace with the current post in scope. It carries identity only -- post ID, status, type, title -- and never the body: the workspace reads content through the permission-checked tool path, so there is one enforcement path and nothing trusts a client-supplied body. A test asserts a marker in the post content never reaches the localized data. The seed is re-resolved server-side from the query argument and checked with read_post, so the URL cannot hand someone a post they may not read; a refusal renders an explanation rather than content. A post title is author-controlled text, so it is flattened to single spaces and clamped before it leaves PHP -- a title cannot smuggle a multi-line instruction block -- and it reaches the model only inside a message the person has seen and can edit. The composer is prefilled, never auto-sent. The residual surface is a person who sends a prefilled prompt without reading it; that is bounded to one clamped line with a human in the loop, and removing it entirely would mean not naming the post at all, which the available tools make useless. Mounted as a post-level Options-menu item rather than the block toolbar the plan named. This is a navigation action for the whole post: a block toolbar entry would either repeat on every block or be arbitrarily scoped to one block type the way content resizing is. The repository already has post-level plugin precedent. The webpack entry is part of this change. That build declares every bundle explicitly, and the asset loader bails silently on a missing asset file, so without the entry the action would never appear and nothing would report why. R5 is only half met and should not be read as complete: the handoff carries identity, but no read-full-body tool is in the workspace allowlist, so the assistant can find the post and see its excerpt while the body stays out of reach. Widening the allowlist is a security-relevant scope decision and was deliberately left alone. Advances R5, R18 (U8). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRSJEyQyYp3XTeum8fiq3L
The workspace stopped hiding the admin menu in ec1f727, but six descriptions still called it full-screen, including the experiment description a site owner reads in Settings before enabling it, and a known-limitation entry documenting a body class the code no longer applies. Those are corrected, and the limitation entry is deleted rather than reworded because the problem it describes no longer exists. Correcting the copy surfaced a second, worse inaccuracy. The old Settings string said the assistant "creates or updates content" -- an overclaim, since no registered ability updates anything. The first rewrite replaced it with "can only create drafts", which is an underclaim in the more dangerous direction: `Propose_Drafts` accepts a per-item status of draft, pending, private or publish, and `Draft_Writer` passes it to `wp_insert_post()` behind a `publish_posts` check that exists precisely because publishing is reachable. An approved proposal can create a published post. Both strings now describe the guarantee that is actually true -- nothing is written until a person approves a proposal showing the exact values, post status included. Also records that the draft confirmation deliberately diverges from its design reference: the reference draws a plain list, the implementation gives each item a checkbox starting unchecked. That difference is load bearing rather than cosmetic, and the note cites the server-side contract that carries it so a later reader does not "fix" the code toward the drawing. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
The ordered-item pattern matched the leading digits but captured only the text after them, so every list rendered without a start attribute. That is invisible in a contiguous list, where the browser counts on its own. But a model writing a numbered lineup puts an excerpt between the items, and the blank line ends the list — so five titles became five one-item lists, each restarting at 1 and all displaying "1.". Capture the opening ordinal and carry it to the ol, omitting it when it is 1 so an ordinary list gains no attribute. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
The test proves model-authored markup is stripped even for an approver core would skip its own kses pass for, and it guards that premise by asserting the approver holds unfiltered_html. On multisite nobody below a super admin does, so the guard failed and took all three multisite jobs down with it. Granting the approver super admin for the whole class fixes this one test and breaks two others: a super admin holds every capability regardless of role, so the tests that revoke a capability and assert nothing is written stop revoking anything. The grant is scoped to the single test that needs it and handed back in a finally. Skipping on multisite was the other option and a worse one. The case only exists because of the user core treats differently, so the platform where that user is rarer is not the platform to stop checking. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
…ssor WordPress 7.1 lets wp_get_abilities() filter the registry. WordPress 7.0's takes no parameters, and PHP discards extra arguments to userland functions without a word, so asking 7.0 to filter returns everything. A tool policy that trusted the call would be default-allow on the plugin's own minimum. Tool_Policy answers two questions and nothing else: whether filtered discovery is available here, and whether an ability has declared itself fit for a conversational surface. Both fail closed. The declaration key stays private and provisional while issue #354 settles its public shape. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
…loor The workspace chose its tools from a hand-maintained list of three. An ability can now earn a place by declaring itself fit for a conversational surface, and the list stops being the only way in. Default-deny alone would have emptied the surface: nothing declares yet, and this does not retrofit the abilities that ship here. So the curated three are a floor the policy adds to, never a fallback it replaces. A test pins that by name, because it is the property a change to merge order breaks silently. Two ways in are refused. Core's ability filters are site-wide and fire on every call including ours, so a plugin hooking one could hand the model an ability nobody declared; the query is a candidate set and every row is re-checked here. And the candidates filter, which may skip the declaration, may not skip the effect class -- otherwise a tool that writes reaches a model that has been told it cannot write. Admission requires readonly, not destructive, and not open-world, each asserted explicitly. Core defaults all three to null, and an absent open-world hint means the ability may reach outside the site, so silence is refused rather than assumed. The curated floor is exempt: ai/propose-drafts writes through the confirm gate and would otherwise strip itself out. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
The system instruction promised two things it had no way to know: that the model cannot write to the site, and that a proposal tool is there to call. Both were literals. Once the surface can grow or be narrowed, a literal is a claim the code cannot keep. Each sentence is now earned. The proposal paragraph appears only when the proposal tool was declared, so the model is never pointed at a tool it does not have. The write denial appears only while nothing declared can change the site on its own -- ai/propose-drafts does not count against it, because it stores values a person has to approve rather than writing them. The warning that tool results are untrusted stays unconditional. It does not describe the surface, it describes what to do with anything that comes back, and that is true whatever is admitted. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
The policy decided the surface and nobody could see it. The Abilities Explorer now says, per ability, whether the assistant holds it and why not when it does not -- told apart properly, so an author who declared correctly but writes is told that, and is not sent back to re-check a declaration that was already right. Six reasons, and the report enumerates the whole registry to produce them. The admission query cannot: it only returns what already matched, so it can never explain a non-match. The owner can take any ability off the surface, including a curated one, and switch the policy off entirely. Both persist as options that uninstall already cleans by prefix. The mutation checks a nonce and manage_options, because a control that reshapes what an assistant may call is worth a CSRF. The removal filter is registered from the experiment bootstrap, not from a constructor. Hooking on construction would have made the owner's removal depend on something happening to build a policy first, so a candidate read that did not would quietly serve a tool the owner took away. Two tests proving removal works were relying on exactly that. Descriptions are shown escaped. They are third-party text rendered into wp-admin, and the point is that the owner reads the same words the model reads -- not that wp-admin renders someone else's markup. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
The experiment doc still said three abilities ship in an allowlist and left it there. Three still ship, but they are a floor now, and the interesting half is what an ability has to do to stand beside them: declare itself, and say plainly that it only reads, adds nothing destructive, and stays inside the site. Two opt-ins, which is worth stating, because an author who adds the declaration and stops is not admitted. Also records what a reader would otherwise have to find out by trying: the key is private until #354 settles it, so nothing changes yet; WordPress 7.0 has no filtering to do this with and gets the floor; and the Explorer is where an owner sees the surface and takes something off it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Review found the safety story was not true. The declaration key is a private constant, and the docs said that meant no third-party ability could opt in yet -- but private hides a name from callers, not from an author who reads the source of an open-source plugin. Admission was live on merge. So admission is now off by default, behind a temporary switch that goes away when #354 settles the key's public shape. A declared ability shows in the Explorer as eligible and waits there. The docs say this plainly instead of claiming a barrier that was never one. The owner's removals no longer ride on a filter the workspace bootstrap installs. The Abilities Explorer is a separate experiment that can run while the workspace does not, and in that configuration nothing registered the filter -- so a removed ability was shown as held, beside a button offering to return it. Exclusions apply inside the candidate build now, and a test pins that without any bootstrap. Reasons stop guessing. An ability removed by site code, dropped for its effect class, or waiting on the gate each says so, instead of all three arriving as "withheld by your capabilities" and sending the owner to look at roles. A surface the owner emptied no longer reports that nothing is registered. The docblock claimed two independent opt-ins. They are two keys in one meta array written by one hand. Both are self-attestation; the owner's controls and the permission callback are the boundaries that hold. One correction to what the last commit said: core discards a meta-mismatched ability before wp_get_abilities_item_include fires, so that filter cannot re-widen the query. wp_get_abilities_result can, and the re-verification loop is what stops it. The test now proves the smuggle before proving the defense. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Tool_Selector said "admission decides what the model is told exists" twice, in two halves of the same docblock, and named wp_get_abilities_item_include as the filter a third party could re-widen the query with. Core discards a meta-mismatched ability before that filter fires; wp_get_abilities_result is the one that can inject, and the one the re-verification loop is for. The rest is wording: inverted openers straightened out, a binary contrast stated directly, and the em dashes thinned. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
A full tool description in every row made two rows fill the screen, so the column meant to show what the assistant can reach was the reason the table could not be read. The state is a badge now, an icon beside a short word. The icon is decorative and marked so; the word carries the meaning, because a column whose whole purpose is being read should not depend on being seen. The description moved into a details element, closed by default. It stays there rather than moving to a tooltip or a title attribute: it is the exact string handed to the model, the owner is the only person who can judge whether it is honest, and judging it means reading and selecting long-form prose. Two tests asserted on the old wording. They assert on the state class now, so copy can change without a test pretending something broke, and a new one holds the description in the cell -- collapsing it is the point, losing it is not. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
The column asked "is this on the assistant", which made every other row a negative and told the owner nothing. An ability can be exposed over REST, over MCP, to the assistant, or any combination, and until now there was nowhere to see those three answers together. So the column is "Exposed in" and carries a badge per surface, read from the same meta each consumer reads for itself. core/get-site-info turns out to be REST only, ai/get-post-terms MCP only, and an ability can be eligible for the assistant while exposed nowhere else. That spread is the argument in issue #354. Three consumers invented three flags, and this column is the first place the cost of that shows up as something an owner looks at rather than something a developer reads about. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
… flag WordPress 7.1 added meta.public as the general exposure flag, and a channel resolves as meta[channel] ?? meta.public ?? the channel's own default. Core applies that to show_in_rest at registration and writes the answer back, so reading that key gives the resolved value. Nothing applies it to mcp.public. Reading that key alone reported an ability as absent from MCP when the general flag had put it there, so the column was telling the owner an ability was less exposed than it is -- the wrong direction for a screen whose job is showing reach. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
WordPress 7.1 added meta.public as the general exposure flag, and the precedence every channel resolves by: its own key, then that flag, then the channel's default. The workspace was reading a bespoke key of its own, which is the fragmentation issue #354 is about. It reads ai-workspace.public ?? public ?? false now. An ability marked public is eligible here without naming this surface, and naming it overrides in either direction. Two things follow, neither of them cosmetic. The discovery query lost its meta condition. Core matches meta exactly and cannot express the fallback, so querying the channel key would have silently skipped every ability eligible only through the general flag. Resolution moved per item, and a test holds the query empty so nobody optimises it back. Two exclusion reasons became one. Core writes meta.public onto every ability at registration and validates it as a boolean, so "the author declared nothing" is not a state that exists any more -- an ability with no opinion is eligible-false by core's default. Reporting it as undeclared would send an author to add a key already there with the value they meant. Inheriting widens who is eligible, so the effect class is what keeps that from meaning every public ability can be called by a model that has been talked into it. Five cases cover that: not readonly, destructive, open-world, the hint absent, and no annotations at all. has_declaration() is gone. Since core seeds the key, its fallback branch could never return false, and nothing outside tests called it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Inheriting meta.public cost a lock nobody was counting. core/get-user-info ships public, read-only and not destructive, so the only thing keeping a reader of people's personal data off the assistant was an absent open_world hint -- and open_world => false would be a correct, tidy thing for core to add. One good-faith cleanup upstream and a PII tool lands on a surface reachable by instructions embedded in content someone else wrote. The effect class cannot catch that. It asks whether an ability writes or reaches outside the site, not whether handing it to a model is a bad idea. So a short list answers the second question for the four core abilities where it is plainly yes: user info, users, settings, environment. WordPress registers those, not this plugin, so a list here is the only place the decision can live. It is filterable, because a site with code access deciding otherwise is different from a default deciding for them, and it is checked before the curated floor so it holds on every route in. A test registers a fixture that is declared, annotated impeccably, and on the list, then asserts it never reaches the model -- so the refusal is provably the list rather than something the fixture got wrong. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Fifteen rows said "Not public, and has not opted in to the assistant" under a badge already reading "not the assistant", which buried the three rows where the reason is the whole point: held back for reading personal data, refused on effect class, or waiting on the admission gate. The commonest reason is left unsaid now. The rest still print, because those are the ones an owner or an author can act on. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
#1002 renamed core/read-users to core/users-query and kept the old name as a deprecated alias. Both are registered, and the withheld list named only the old one -- so the ability it exists to hold back was reachable under the name core now prefers. Not reachable in practice yet: core/users-query is not public and does not assert an admissible effect class. But the point of the list is to hold when those change, and it was not holding. Both names are listed, because the alias is a real registration rather than a redirect. A rename upstream is a hole here until someone adds the new name, which the docblock now says. PHPStan goes with it. The composer script pinned 1G, and this branch pushed analysis past it once develop merged in, so the documented command crashed. 2G clears it. CI never used that script -- it runs phpstan with no limit at all -- so this is the local command catching up to what CI already did. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
#1002 renamed core/read-content to core/content-query. Nine docblock and doc references here still pointed at the old name, which now resolves to a deprecated alias -- accurate enough to pass review and wrong enough to send the next reader somewhere that will be removed. The withheld list keeps naming both sides of the users rename, and the docs now say why: the alias is a real registration that copies the replacement's meta, so exposure changes reach both names at once and holding back only one holds back nothing. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
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Hey @whyisjake, I’ve proposed adding streaming support to the Requests library in WordPress/Requests#1056, and there’s also an open PR for it. |
…xists The Anthropic streaming model extends a class that ships in the ai-provider-for-anthropic plugin. Requiring the file where that parent is absent is a fatal error, and the autoloader requires it for any mention of the class name. PHPStan 2.2.13 now resolves the docblock union naming this class in Streaming_Turn_Driver's constructor eagerly, which autoloads the file in an analysis environment without the provider plugin and aborts the run with an internal error. Guard the declaration on the parent's presence so the file declares nothing on such a host. class_exists() on this class then answers false, which is the answer every probe wanted. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <[email protected]>
WordPress 7.1 introduced the `public` ability meta, seeds it to false on every registration, and resolves show_in_rest from it. Two tests assert on that seeding and fail on the 7.0.4 legs of the CI matrix, where the key does not exist. Skip them there, the way the filtered-discovery tests already skip on the same versions. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <[email protected]>
## What? Closes #1016. See #203. Moves the whole Abilities Explorer screen (list, statistics, the "Exposed in" column and its actions, detail view, test runner) off `WP_List_Table`, vanilla JS and admin-ajax onto a `@wordpress/dataviews` screen backed by four new `ai/v1` routes. Stacked on `feat/ai-workspace` (#1004), because the "Exposed in" column and its actions exist only there. ## Why? The Explorer was the plugin's last admin screen on the old stack, and its hand-written search, sort and filters kept needing repair (#883, #641, #648, #344, #588). The "Exposed in" column answers the question an owner most needs answered, which abilities the assistant can reach, but it could not be filtered without more hand-written filtering. #203 asked for a custom-column hook, which would have shipped an API against a table about to be replaced. ## How? **REST routes** (`includes/Experiments/Abilities_Explorer/REST/Abilities_Controller.php`), registered only while the experiment is on and never as abilities: | Route | Method | Purpose | |---|---|---| | `ai/v1/abilities` | GET | every registered ability, including ones without `show_in_rest`, plus the assistant policy state | | `ai/v1/abilities/item?name=` | GET | one ability with schemas, raw data and example input | | `ai/v1/abilities/invoke` | POST | runs the ability through `WP_Ability::execute()`, so its own permission check still applies | | `ai/v1/abilities/surface` | POST | remove, restore, disable_policy or enable_policy | All four share one permission check: `manage_options`, cookie authentication, a valid `wp_rest` nonce, and no application password. The nonce is checked in the callback itself because core skips its own check when an earlier authentication filter has already answered. Ability names travel in the query string or body, never the path, so an encoded `/` cannot 404 on Apache. Each list item is encode-checked on its own, so one ability with unencodable data cannot blank the list. **Screen** (`src/experiments/abilities-explorer/`): a React app mounted like the AI Request Logs page. It routes between list, detail, runner and not-found on the existing `action` and `ability` query args, with browser Back and Forward. The provider filter keeps the #883 rule (origin for Core, Plugin and Theme, exact label otherwise). "Exposed in" is now filterable by assistant state. Surface changes wait for the server, and responses carry a sequence number, tracked per row, so a late refresh cannot undo a newer change. **#203:** plugins that depend on `wp-hooks` can add read-only fields with the `ai.abilitiesExplorer.fields` filter. Built-in field IDs win on a collision, a filter that throws or returns a non-array leaves the built-ins, and a saved view keeps a third-party column's ID while its plugin is inactive. Documented in `docs/experiments/abilities-explorer.md`. **Behavior changes worth knowing:** - Invoke now runs under REST, where `is_admin()` is false. The route loads `wp-admin/includes/admin.php` first. - The list is built from a REST request too, so an ability a plugin registers only when `is_admin()` is true no longer appears. - Errors show the ability's code, message and data instead of the always-null `trace`. - The admin-ajax action `ai_ability_explorer_invoke` and the `Ability_Table` class are removed. - Old list bookmarks with `s`, `orderby` or filter args land on the unfiltered list. - Back to List keeps the view's layout, columns, sort and page size. Search and filters reset. - Row actions (View, Test, and Remove from or Return to assistant) sit under each ability's name and show on hover or keyboard focus, as in `WP_List_Table`. They are always shown below 782px. ### Use of AI Tools AI assistance: Yes Tool(s): Claude Code Model(s): Claude Opus 5.5 Used for: Planning, implementation of the REST controller, React screen, tests and docs, and a multi-reviewer code review whose confirmed findings were fixed in this branch. <!-- JAKE: add your review attestation here in your own words before opening. --> ## Testing Instructions 1. Enable Experiments and the Abilities Explorer experiment, then open **Tools > Abilities Explorer**. 2. Filter by Provider, Category and "Exposed in", search, sort and page. The statistics should not change with search or filters. 3. With the AI Workspace experiment on, remove an ability from the assistant, return it, and turn the admission policy off and on. Each change should show a notice. 4. Open an ability's detail view, copy a schema, then open **Test Ability**. For `ai/content-classification`, `max_suggestions` 11 should report "must be at most 10", and 5 should validate. 5. Use browser Back and reload on each view. ### Tests run locally - `npm run build`, `npm run typecheck`, `npm run lint:js`, `npm run lint:php`, `npm run lint:php:stan`: all pass. - `npm run test:php`: 1988 tests, 40 skipped, 0 failures. - Explorer e2e, 24 tests across four files, all passing: - `tests/e2e/specs/experiments/abilities-explorer-list.spec.js`: - shows the statistics and the table under a single heading - narrows the rows with the "Category" filter - matches "Plugin" by origin and "Acme" by its exact label - keeps the statistics unaffected by search - filters "Exposed in" down to what the assistant can reach - restores layout, fields and sort from a saved view, but not search or filters - loads a saved view with an unknown field ID and keeps the ID - `tests/e2e/specs/experiments/abilities-explorer-surface.spec.js`: - removes an ability and returns it, with a notice for each - returning a withheld ability shows the withheld reason, not the assistant badge - turns the admission policy off and on, updating every row - disables a pending change, so a second click sends nothing - does not let a refresh answered after a remove undo it - moves focus to the list when a change filters its row out - `tests/e2e/specs/experiments/abilities-explorer-runner.spec.js`: - shows each detail section and copies the JSON - validates deep-linked input against the schema - shows the success and error panels, and Clear hides them - never shows one runner the result of another ability in flight - `tests/e2e/specs/experiments/abilities-explorer-navigation.spec.js`: - keeps one heading per view, and Back and reload keep the view - fetches an ability again when it is opened after returning to the list - shows an extension column on first load and keeps it through deactivation - keeps the built-in columns when the filter returns a non-array - does not let an extension replace a built-in field - is unreachable when the experiment is off - is unreachable when AI is globally off - Full `npm run test:e2e`: running at the time this PR was opened; the result will be added below. <details><summary>PHPUnit tests added or moved in this branch (67)</summary> `Abilities_ExplorerTest` (2): - `test_rest_routes_are_registered_when_enabled` - `test_rest_routes_are_absent_when_disabled` `Ability_HandlerTest` (5): - `test_validate_input_accepts_a_type_list` - `test_generate_example_input_returns_empty_for_empty_schema` - `test_generate_example_input_uses_default_values` - `test_generate_example_input_uses_example_values` - `test_generate_example_input_generates_type_defaults` `Admin_PageTest` (12): - `test_load_hook_registers_help_tabs_and_assets` - `test_assets_are_hooked_only_when_the_screen_loads` - `test_enqueue_assets_enqueues_bundle_and_dataviews_fallback` - `test_enqueue_assets_skips_dataviews_fallback_when_core_registers_it` - `test_enqueue_assets_does_nothing_for_an_editor` - `test_localized_settings_route_map_matches_controller_constants` - `test_localized_settings_carry_reason_and_provider_labels` - `test_render_page_works_for_admin` - `test_render_page_ignores_action_for_server_render` - `test_render_page_outputs_nothing_for_editor` - `test_render_page_outputs_nothing_when_logged_out` - `test_help_tabs_register_on_screen` `Abilities_ControllerTest` (48): - `test_list_includes_an_ability_not_shown_in_rest` - `test_list_keeps_origin_and_provider_apart_and_sends_the_category_label_unescaped` - `test_list_decodes_a_category_label_escaped_by_a_filter` - `test_list_survives_an_ability_with_unencodable_meta` - `test_item_returns_schemas_and_example_input` - `test_item_returns_404_for_an_unregistered_name` - `test_item_returns_400_for_a_missing_name` - `test_invoke_with_valid_input_returns_the_data` - `test_invoke_with_input_failing_explorer_validation_returns_400` - `test_invoke_with_input_failing_core_validation_returns_the_ability_error` - `test_invoke_accepts_a_property_typed_with_a_type_list` - `test_invoke_without_an_input_schema_accepts_empty_and_null` - `test_invoke_with_input_omitted_invokes_with_no_input` - `test_invoke_decodes_scalar_input_on_the_server` - `test_invoke_with_malformed_json_returns_400` - `test_invoke_refuses_non_string_input` - `test_invoke_returns_404_for_an_unregistered_ability` - `test_invoke_reports_the_ability_permission_denial_as_its_outcome` - `test_invoke_writes_no_request_log_row` - `test_surface_remove_stores_the_exclusion_and_a_repeat_is_no_change` - `test_surface_restore_clears_the_exclusion` - `test_surface_restore_of_a_withheld_ability_keeps_it_off_the_assistant` - `test_surface_policy_switch_disables_and_enables_and_returns_the_list` - `test_surface_refuses_an_unknown_change` - `test_surface_remove_refuses_an_unregistered_or_missing_name` - `test_surface_get_changes_nothing` - `test_list_reports_only_known_origins` - `test_list_carries_a_custom_provider_beside_the_known_origins` - `test_list_lets_a_custom_provider_row_match_its_origin_and_its_label` - `test_list_marks_a_declared_admitted_ability_as_on_the_assistant` - `test_list_carries_the_reason_an_ability_is_off_the_assistant` - `test_list_and_function_declaration_share_one_description_source` - `test_list_does_not_report_a_removed_ability_as_held_without_the_workspace_bootstrap` - `test_list_reports_the_general_public_flag_on_both_channels` - `test_list_reports_rest_and_mcp_exposure_independently` - `test_surface_remove_takes_the_ability_off_the_model_declarations` - `test_surface_restore_returns_the_ability_to_the_model_declarations` - `test_surface_policy_switch_withdraws_and_returns_admitted_abilities` - `test_editor_is_refused_on_every_route` - `test_application_password_is_refused_on_every_route` - `test_application_password_is_refused_even_alongside_the_cookie_flag` - `test_determine_current_user_without_a_cookie_is_refused_on_every_route` - `test_cookie_administrator_without_a_nonce_is_refused_on_every_route` - `test_cookie_administrator_with_an_invalid_nonce_is_refused_on_every_route` - `test_cookie_administrator_with_a_nonce_for_another_action_is_refused_on_every_route` - `test_cookie_administrator_with_the_nonce_as_a_parameter_is_accepted` - `test_cookie_administrator_reaches_every_route` - `test_no_route_is_registered_as_an_ability` </details> ## Unapplied review findings From the branch's code review, not blocking: - [ ] P3 — `src/experiments/abilities-explorer/api.ts` — The response sequencer and `validate.ts` have no JS unit tests, because the repo has no JS unit test setup. They are covered only through e2e. - [ ] P3 — `includes/Experiments/Abilities_Explorer/REST/Abilities_Controller.php` — The invoke success payload is not passed through the strict encode check the list and item use, so an ability returning NaN or INF produces a generic client error. - [ ] P3 — `src/experiments/abilities-explorer/fields.tsx` — `BUILT_IN_FIELD_IDS` is a hand-kept list. Deriving it from `getBuiltInFields()` would stop a new built-in field from being overridable. - [ ] P3 — Response ordering uses one server's `microtime()`. On multi-node hosting with clock skew, a stale list could briefly show a row's old state until the next refresh. ## Changelog Entry > Changed - Rebuilt the Abilities Explorer on DataViews with REST routes, a filterable "Exposed in" column, and a JavaScript filter for adding read-only table fields. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) <!-- wp-playground-preview:start --> <a href="https://playground.wordpress.net?blueprint-url=data:application/json,%7B%22preferredVersions%22%3A%7B%22wp%22%3A%22latest%22%7D%2C%22login%22%3Atrue%2C%22landingPage%22%3A%22%2Fwp-admin%2Fadmin.php%3Fpage%3Dai-wp-admin%22%2C%22steps%22%3A%5B%7B%22step%22%3A%22installPlugin%22%2C%22pluginData%22%3A%7B%22resource%22%3A%22url%22%2C%22url%22%3A%22https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.com%2FWordPress%2Fai%2Freleases%2Fdownload%2Fci-artifacts%2Fpr-1074-88aa03bda577ce567570cbd90eb3be378851aad0.zip%22%7D%7D%5D%7D" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer"> <img src="https://raw.githubusercontent.com/adamziel/playground-preview/refs/heads/trunk/assets/playground-preview-button.svg" alt="Open WordPress Playground Preview" width="220" height="57" /> </a> <!-- wp-playground-preview:end --> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
Every change on this branch already landed on feat/ai-workspace when #1004 was rebased: 52 commits as identical patches and 3 re-applied with conflict resolutions. Take feat/ai-workspace's tree as-is so the PR has no conflicts and merging it changes no code. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
Resolve the one conflict: develop edited tests/e2e/specs/experiments/abilities-explorer.spec.js for #985, while this branch had already split that spec into four files, so it stays deleted. #985 also removed the global "Enable AI" toggle and its e2e helpers. Carry that into this branch's own tests the way #985 did for the other experiments: - Drop AI_WorkspaceTest::test_global_toggle_off_prevents_registration and the "is unreachable when AI is globally off" e2e test, since there is no global switch left to turn off. - Remove the enableExperiments() and disableExperiments() calls from the AI Workspace e2e specs, keeping the per-experiment enable and disable. - Stop setting the no longer registered wpai_features_enabled option in AI_WorkspaceTest, the Abilities Explorer controller test and the Explorer's e2e setup. - Name the enableExperiment() helper in the docs instead of the removed enableExperiments(). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
…lient streams Provider streaming depended on WordPress/php-ai-client#255, which is not merged or released, so this branch vendored its streaming classes into the SDK overlay. Take that dependency out of #1004 so the workspace can land on released code: every round now goes through the buffered path the workspace already used for providers other than Anthropic, and replies arrive whole. Removed here and restored by the follow-up PR, which reverts this commit: - the Anthropic streaming driver, model, stream mapper and fopen() transport under includes/Experiments/AI_Workspace/Streaming/, with their tests; - the vendored streaming classes and HTTP DTOs, and the SDK overlay's streaming feature; - the default streaming driver in Prompt_Model_Client, the "cannot stream" notice in the transcript, and the streaming docs, hooks and changelog lines. The SSE responder and the optional Stream_Driver_Interface injection stay, so restoring streaming only adds a driver back. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
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Proposal: merge the AI Workspace (#1004) Ask: can someone with write access review #1004? I'd like to land it in the AI plugin during the 7.2 cycle. What it is: a full-screen chat at Tools > AI Workspace (admins only) that reads site content through the Abilities API, under the current user's capabilities. It never writes on its own: it proposes drafts, and a person approves them. It ships as an opt-in experiment. Dependencies — all released Streaming is now a follow-up Housekeeping: #1004 is up to date with Open questions I'd like input on:
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A follow-up turn with Claude failed with "messages.1.content.0.thinking. signature: Field required". The workspace replays the whole conversation each round, including the model's earlier thinking. ai-provider-for- anthropic 1.0.4 drops a thinking block's signature when it reads a reply and sends it back unsigned, which Anthropic rejects. Until #1004 took streaming out, the streaming model restored or omitted that block; the buffered path did not. Drop thought parts that carry no signature before each round. Anthropic accepts an omitted thinking block, including between tool calls, and the Google and OpenAI connectors sign their thought parts, so theirs pass through unchanged. Verified against the live API on a dev site: a two-turn conversation and a tool-calling turn both complete, and the second turn returns the 400 again with the filter disabled. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
Implements #282: a full-screen conversational admin screen where a site owner talks to an AI that can read their content — under their own capabilities, never above them.
What this adds
A new
ai-workspaceexperiment (Tools → AI Workspace,manage_options), built on the Abilities API and core's ability-backed tool loop:execute_ability()rather than the batch path, so every invocation — including denials — produces exactly one log row and a provenance envelope.ai/search-contentreturns titles and excerpts only;ai/read-content-bodiesreturns full bodies for at most five posts named by ID. Both filter row by row at execute time against the requesting user's own capabilities.Notes for review
Permission filtering is execute-time, not declaration-time. The coarse capability on a tool decides whether it is declared; which rows come back is decided per row, per user, on every call. Both matter, and the tests mutate each independently to prove neither is inert.
Withheld counts are measured, not derived — a deliberate divergence from the plan. The plan's U13 prescribed the opposite, specifying the withheld count as "the difference between the ability's total and its returned rows". Implementing it revealed that verification to be wrong, so it was not followed.
total - count(results)conflates pagination with permission filtering: page one of fifty matches would announce forty posts hidden by the person's role on an ordinary search.ai/search-contentcounts withholding as the permission walk drops rows from the page it builds.ai/read-content-bodiesdeliberately reports no count at all — it answers for IDs the caller named, so counting unknown and unreadable apart would say whether those exact posts exist.Tool surface is a hand-maintained allowlist of three abilities, which is deliberate for a first cut and is the subject of follow-up #1003 — every ability the model can call is also reachable by an instruction embedded in content someone else wrote.
Streaming is a follow-up (#1083)
Provider streaming depended on WordPress/php-ai-client#255, which is not merged or released, so this PR used to carry a vendored copy of that PR's streaming classes. It no longer does. Streaming now lives in #1083, stacked on this PR, as a single commit that reverts its removal. It can merge once #255 is released and re-vendored from that release.
What that means for this PR:
publicmeta flag from WordPress 7.1.embeddingsfiles already ondevelopunderincludes/Vendor/AiClient/are unchanged; the streaming overlay entry and its classes are gone.Testing
npm run test:php— 1,990 tests, 6,045 assertions, 42 skipped, 0 failures (on 68425d6).npm run test:e2e— all 38 AI Workspace e2e tests pass, against mocked providers with sequenced tool-calling turns. No network access.npm run lint:php(PHPCS, WordPress-VIP-Go + Slevomat) — clean.npm run lint:php:stan(PHPStan level 8) — no errors.npm run build,npm run typecheck,npm run lint:js— clean.Test suites executed by name, as the WordPress AI Guidelines require:
PHPUnit (
tests/Integration/) —AI_WorkspaceTest,Turn_ControllerTest,Tool_SelectorTest,Proposal_ControllerTest,Propose_DraftsTest,Prompt_Model_ClientTest,Search_ContentTest,Read_Content_BodiesTest,SDK_OverlayTest,UninstallTest.Playwright (
tests/e2e/specs/experiments/) —ai-workspace.spec.js,ai-workspace-tools.spec.ts,ai-workspace-post-results.spec.ts,ai-workspace-markdown.spec.ts,ai-workspace-handoff.spec.ts.Individual tests named in the mutation evidence below:
test_execute_callback_clamps_to_five_without_schema_validation,test_private_body_of_another_author_is_withheld_from_author,test_draft_body_of_another_author_is_withheld_from_lower_roles,test_unexposed_post_types_are_never_read,test_mixed_request_returns_only_readable_posts,test_retrieval_summary_never_counts_paginated_rows_as_withheld,test_pagination_alone_reports_nothing_withheld,test_withheld_counts_the_rows_the_permission_walk_dropped,test_vendored_files_use_the_prefixed_psr_dependencies.Security-relevant tests were verified by mutation rather than by passing alone. Forcing
Read_Content_Bodies::check_read_permission()open and removing its clamp fails five tests, including one asserting an unexposed post type's body sentinel appears nowhere in the encoded result. Replacing the withheld count with subtraction failstest_retrieval_summary_never_counts_paginated_rows_as_withheldandtest_pagination_alone_reports_nothing_withheld.Still open
Opening as a draft — the presentation layer is being worked separately, and three decisions are unresolved: the confirmation modal's default selection state, the full-screen gap (
is-fullscreen-modeis applied but@wordpress/interfaceCSS is never enqueued), and the editor handoff's placement in the Options menu.AI assistance: Yes. Tool(s): Claude Code (Opus 5). Used for: implementation of all units in the linked plan, test authoring including the mutation testing described above, and this description.
🤖 Generated with Claude Code
https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRSJEyQyYp3XTeum8fiq3L