Skip to content

Security: Suro4ek/burrow

Security

SECURITY.md

Security policy

Reporting a vulnerability

Please report security issues privately through GitHub Security Advisories rather than a public issue.

Include what you did, what happened, and what you expected. A proof of concept helps a lot. I will acknowledge the report and keep you updated as it is fixed.

This is a hobby project maintained in spare time, so please do not expect an enterprise response time — but security reports go to the front of the queue.

What burrow assumes

Being honest about the threat model saves everyone time:

  • A tunnel publishes a local service to the internet. That is the whole point of the tool. Anyone who knows the URL reaches your service; burrow does not add authentication in front of it. If the thing you tunnel has no auth, neither does the tunnel.
  • Agent tokens are bearer credentials. Whoever holds one can publish tunnels as that token. They cross the network in the clear unless the control listener has TLS (-tls-cert / -tls-key) — configure it on any server that is not on a trusted private network.
  • The admin panel is a single-password gate. It is meant for one operator, not for a team with roles. If you would rather not expose it at all, leave it off the public host and bind it to loopback with -admin-addr 127.0.0.1:7002, reaching it over an SSH port-forward.
  • -insecure disables certificate verification. The connection stays encrypted but is no longer authenticated, so it is only reasonable while setting up a self-signed certificate.
  • Tunnel operators can see tunnel traffic. The server proxies plaintext HTTP to the agent; end-to-end secrecy from the server operator is not a property this design has.

In scope

Reports that fit the model above are very much wanted, for example:

  • Bypassing admin authentication or the CSRF protections on the API.
  • One token claiming a subdomain or port reserved by another.
  • Reaching a tunnel or the panel from a host that should not route there.
  • Crashes or resource exhaustion triggered by a remote, unauthenticated peer.
  • Anything that lets an agent read or affect another agent's traffic.

Out of scope

  • Missing authentication on whatever you chose to tunnel.
  • Attacks that require the admin password or a valid agent token you were given.
  • Denial of service by an authenticated agent that you yourself issued a token to (revoke it in the panel).

There aren't any published security advisories