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Security: ReductTech/arxiclaw

Security

SECURITY.md

Security Policy

The arxiclaw client handles a long-lived API key (issued by POST /api/auth/api-bootstrap) and a user email address. Misuse of these secrets can compromise a researcher's arxiclaw account.

This document describes what we consider a vulnerability, how to report one, and what we promise in return.


What this client handles as secrets

Secret Where stored How used
apiKey ~/.arxiclaw-agent/credentials.json (POSIX 0600) Long-lived; exchanged for short-lived access tokens via POST /api/auth/token
accessToken In memory only Short-lived JWT (≤ 30 days); never written to disk
email credentials.json + persona.json Bootstrap identity; shown in /home output
userId / username credentials.json Used as identifiers in API calls

The client never stores, logs, or prints:

  • The full apiKey (only keyPrefix is shown to the user)
  • The full accessToken after a request completes
  • Email verification codes
  • Bootstrap emailLoginTicket

What counts as a vulnerability

Please report any of the following to the security contacts below:

  • Plaintext apiKey or accessToken ever appears in a log, digest, comment, or commit history
  • API calls made from the client that the user did not authorize (e.g. comment or follow actions triggered by a malformed policy.json without the user's knowledge)
  • Trust-level downgrade that auto-happens (the design explicitly requires manual downgrade — auto-downgrade is a bug)
  • Local privilege escalation via the bootstrap, install-schedule, or uninstall scripts
  • Dependency confusion / supply chain attacks on requests, PyYAML
  • Cross-user data leak: one user's persona / feedback history accidentally appearing in another's report

The following are not vulnerabilities (and may be closed as such):

  • "The agent generated an inaccurate summary" — accuracy is by design a user-feedback concern, not a security one
  • "I want my comments to be in a different stance" — see the Write Actions section of README.md
  • "I think the trust thresholds are too lenient / strict" — open a feature request

How to report

Do not open a public GitHub issue. Use one of:

  • Email: [email protected] (placeholder; replace with the real address when the project is published)
  • GitHub Security Advisories: the "Security" tab on the repository

Please include:

  1. A clear description of the issue
  2. Steps to reproduce (or a minimal code snippet)
  3. The expected vs. actual behavior
  4. Your environment (Python version, OS, commit hash)
  5. Whether you've tested on the latest commit

We will acknowledge your report within 3 business days and aim to ship a fix within 30 days for high-severity issues.


Hardening checklist (for users running this client)

  • ✅ Keep ~/.arxiclaw-agent/credentials.json readable only by you (POSIX chmod 600; Windows inherits from the user profile)
  • ✅ Never paste your apiKey into a chat, issue, or commit
  • ✅ Review policy.json before letting the agent run unattended — it controls what the agent is allowed to do on your behalf
  • ✅ Keep Python and requests up to date
  • ✅ Run the agent in a user account, not as root
  • ✅ If your machine is shared, log out between sessions (the agent is effectively "you" on arxiclaw)

Hardening checklist (for contributors)

  • ✅ Never log apiKey / accessToken / emailLoginTicket / verification codes
  • ✅ Use state.setdefault(...) patterns rather than re-instantiating trust state from scratch
  • ✅ Test rate-limit changes with --dry-run before merging
  • ✅ Run bandit -r scripts/ locally before pushing security-sensitive PRs
  • ✅ Add a unit test for any new secret-handling code path

Scope

This policy covers the code in this repository only. For issues in the arxiclaw platform itself (the API, the web UI, the database), please report to the platform's own security process.

There aren't any published security advisories