If you find a security issue in this repository, please report it privately first. Do not open a public issue for anything that could put funds at risk.

Preferred channel: GitHub private vulnerability reporting — use the "Report a vulnerability" button on the Security tab of this repository. This creates a private advisory only the maintainers can see.

Please include:

• what the issue is, and which file and line it lives in
• how to reproduce it — a script or a curl command is ideal
• what an attacker gains

• Acknowledgement: within 3 working days.
• Assessment: within 10 working days we will tell you whether we consider it a vulnerability, and what severity we assign it.
• Fix: critical issues that can move funds are prioritised over everything else. We will keep you updated while the fix is in progress.
• Credit: we will name you in the release notes unless you prefer otherwise.

We do not currently operate a bug bounty.

In scope:

• this repository's server, HD wallet module and front end
• the swap protocol as implemented here

Out of scope:

• third-party APIs this software calls (Blockcypher, WhatsOnChain, Kraken)
• any hosted deployment operated by someone other than the maintainers
• findings that require an attacker to already hold the operator's admin key, liquidity WIF or server access

This software is published so that anyone can run their own on-ramp. If you operate an instance, the security of your deployment is yours:

• ORDSWAP_ENCRYPTION_KEY and ORDSWAP_ADMIN_KEY must be strong, unique and kept out of version control (both are mandatory; the server refuses to start without them).
• Keep only working liquidity in the hot wallet. It is a hot wallet by design.
• Terminate TLS in front of this service; it speaks plain HTTP.
• Keep the setup endpoints loopback-only (the default) unless you have a specific reason not to.
• Watch the needs_review counter on /admin/stats. Orders in underpaid, payout_failed, processing or broadcasting are deliberately not retried automatically — they wait for a human.

Version 3.0.0 contained two critical issues affecting funds: an unauthenticated SQL injection in the order-creation path, and payouts that were released without waiting for confirmations. Both are fixed in 3.1.0. See SECURITY-FIXES-v3.1.0.md. Anyone running 3.0.0 should upgrade immediately.