feat: probe without TLS certificate verification by default - #9
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Certificate failures (self-signed, expired, wrong host) previously aborted the scan with exit 2. assess() now retries the same https:// URL once with verification disabled and flags the report with the new HeadersReport.tls_verified field, surfaced as a warning banner in the terminal/file reports and as "tls_verified" in --json output. Certificate posture is tlsvalidator's domain; the module already grades headers fetched over plain HTTP, so an unverified TLS channel is no weaker than what is accepted elsewhere. The grade is unaffected. TLS errors still never trigger the http:// fallback, and if the unverified retry also fails the original TLS error is raised as before. fetch_headers() suppresses urllib3's InsecureRequestWarning for unverified fetches — the condition is reported explicitly instead.
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📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughThe release adds TLS verification fallback for certificate failures, records TLS status in ChangesTLS verification fallback
Estimated code review effort: 3 (Moderate) | ~20 minutes Merge Risk: 🟡 Moderate · up to The PR changes default HTTPS probing to allow unverified connections and adds tls_verified reporting. At the current head, redirect handling can report an unverified final HTTPS response as verified, which may mislead users about certificate verification; documentation and changelog follow-ups also remain. This bounded correctness issue should be fixed or explicitly accepted before merge. Sequence Diagram(s)sequenceDiagram
participant assess
participant fetch_headers
participant HeadersReport
participant reporter
participant CLI
assess->>fetch_headers: Request HTTPS with selected TLS verification
fetch_headers-->>assess: Response or TLS error
assess->>HeadersReport: Set tls_verified
HeadersReport->>reporter: Render TLS warning when unverified
HeadersReport->>CLI: Serialize tls_verified in JSON
🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 4 | ❌ 1❌ Failed checks (1 warning)
✅ Passed checks (4 passed)
✨ Finishing Touches 💡 1📝 Generate docstrings 💡
🧪 Generate unit tests (beta)
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Actionable comments posted: 3
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Inline comments:
In `@CHANGELOG.md`:
- Around line 16-17: Add blank lines immediately after the Added and Changed
headings in the changelog, preserving the existing list entries and content.
In `@headersvalidator/assessor.py`:
- Around line 83-89: Update the TLS verification logic around fetch_headers so
tls_verified is derived from the final response.url, not the initial url: track
whether the request used unverified TLS, then set tls_verified false only when
that condition is true and the final URL uses HTTPS. Add coverage for both
HTTP-to-HTTPS and HTTPS-to-HTTP redirects.
In `@tests/test_assessor.py`:
- Line 204: Update assessor.py to import http_utils and have the assessor HTTP
flow call http_utils.fetch_headers. In tests/test_assessor.py at lines 204, 262,
283, 296, 303, 312, 327, and 339, patch
headersvalidator.http_utils.fetch_headers with monkeypatch. In tests/test_cli.py
at lines 158-159, remove _patch_assess and patch
headersvalidator.http_utils.fetch_headers with monkeypatch; mock only this HTTP
boundary.
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CHANGELOG.mdREADME.mddocs/SECURITY_VERDICT.mdheadersvalidator/__init__.pyheadersvalidator/assessor.pyheadersvalidator/cli.pyheadersvalidator/http_utils.pyheadersvalidator/models.pyheadersvalidator/reporter.pypyproject.tomltests/test_assessor.pytests/test_cli.pytests/test_models.pytests/test_reporter.py
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verify=False propagates across the redirect chain, so the flag must reflect the channel the graded headers actually arrived on: an unverified http:// request landing on https:// is now flagged, and an unverified https:// retry landing on http:// is not. Also fix MD022 blank lines in the 0.4.0 CHANGELOG section. (CodeRabbit review)
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Per review of the fallback approach: a verified-first attempt costs an extra request against every broken-cert host. The probe now sends a single unverified request per target; invalid certificates cannot block header assessment and the report carries tls_verified=False (final post-redirect URL semantics unchanged). verify_tls=True becomes an explicit opt-in for strict verification and aborts on TLS errors as before. CLI gains --tls-verify; --no-tls-verify stays valid as the explicit default.
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ECC code review (author-side, posted as comment — self-approval not possible).
Decision: APPROVE-equivalent — no CRITICAL/HIGH/MEDIUM findings.
Verified: tls_verified derived from final post-redirect URL (both redirect directions tested); strict mode aborts on SSLError with a single request and never falls back to http://; CLI default/--tls-verify/--no-tls-verify wiring; docs & release metadata consistent (CHANGELOG 0.4.0, README 435 tests, SECURITY_VERDICT note, version files). Validation: 435 tests / 100% coverage / ruff clean; live default scan of a self-signed host exits 0 with banner, --tls-verify exits 2.
LOW notes (no action required):
- warnings.catch_warnings() in fetch_headers mutates process-global state (not thread-safe) — cosmetic impact only; revisit if the module ever runs in threads.
- Accepted risk by design: unverified-by-default headers could be MITM-influenced; mitigated by the tls_verified flag/banner, and certificate posture is tlsvalidator's domain.
Full artifact: .claude/reviews/pr-9-review.md
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Inline comments:
In `@CHANGELOG.md`:
- Around line 31-38: Clarify the single-request documentation to note that the
default probe uses one unverified HTTPS request, except that a non-TLS HTTPS
connection error may trigger an HTTP fallback. Update CHANGELOG.md lines 31-38,
docs/SECURITY_VERDICT.md lines 45-48, and README.md lines 112-115; preserve the
existing behavior that TLS certificate errors do not fall back to HTTP.
In `@README.md`:
- Line 156: Update the Python API “Working with results” documentation to
include the HeadersReport.tls_verified field, explaining that False indicates
the final HTTPS response was fetched without certificate verification.
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…he API example The unverified default saves the verification attempt, but the pre-existing HTTP fallback (refused HTTPS) and HEAD-to-GET 405 retry can still add a request; say so in CHANGELOG, README, and SECURITY_VERDICT. Add report.tls_verified to the README results example. (CodeRabbit)
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Summary
headersvalidator checkaborted with exit 2 on any TLS certificate verification failure (e.g. self-signed certs):Certificate posture is tlsvalidator's domain, and this module already grades headers fetched over plain HTTP, so an unverified TLS channel is no weaker than what is already accepted. The probe now sends a single unverified request per target by default — no verified-first attempt, no retry — keeping the query count at one and making invalid certificates unable to block header assessment.
Changes
assess()default is nowverify_tls=False: one probe per target.verify_tls=Trueis an explicit opt-in for strict verification — TLS errors then abort (exit 2) and are never silently retried, and TLS errors never trigger thehttp://fallback.HeadersReport.tls_verifiedfield (defaultTrue):Falsewhen the final post-redirect response was served over HTTPS without verification, so an unverifiedhttp://request landing onhttps://is flagged and a probe ending on plain HTTP is not. Grade is unaffected.tls_verifiedkey in--json.--tls-verify(opt-in strict) /--no-tls-verify(explicit default).fetch_headers(): urllib3InsecureRequestWarningsuppressed for unverified fetches — the condition is reported explicitly.Verification
--tls-verifyagainst the same host exits 2.Release
Version 0.3.2 → 0.4.0; CHANGELOG, README, and
docs/SECURITY_VERDICT.mdupdated. Tag + GitHub release after merge.Summary by CodeRabbit
Summary by CodeRabbit
New Features
Bug Fixes
Documentation