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fix(http_policy): allowlist dial host for SSRF - #58
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Reject \\ and userinfo; compare urlparse vs requests prepare host; block private/link-local except exact allowlisted loopback. Co-authored-by: Cursor <[email protected]>
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| # A4: exact allowlisted loopback may pass; other blocked ranges stay refused. | ||
| if dial in _LOOPBACK_HOSTS: | ||
| return True | ||
| if _hostname_is_blocked(dial): | ||
| return False |
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For an allowlisted DNS hostname, dial remains only the textual hostname, so _hostname_is_blocked never evaluates the address that requests will connect to. If an allowlisted hostname resolves (or DNS-rebinds) to 127.0.0.1, a link-local address, or another private target, this branch returns True and the fetch/POST proceeds, bypassing the newly added private-target refusal. Resolve and validate the destination addresses (and ensure the connection uses the validated address) rather than applying the guard only to IP literals.
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Summary
\@/ userinfo): reject unsafe URL shape, allowlist the hostrequestswill dial (prepare().url), require parse/dial parity.assert_localhost_fetch_urland HTTP localhost scheme checks through the same dial-host helpers.Test plan
PYTHONPATH=src pytest tests/test_http_policy_host_allowlist.py tests/test_appsec_host_allowlists.py -q\@URL with allowlistexample.comfails before Session get/post (no L402 Authorization attached)http://127.0.0.1/...still works when127.0.0.1is allowlisted