A delivery platform that connects immutable artifacts, independent verification, separate signing and controlled deployment to Kubernetes. Implemented on Google Cloud, it keeps build, signing and deployment authority separate and uses Binary Authorization to enforce digest-bound trust at admission.
The platform combines Cloud Build, Artifact Registry, Cloud KMS, Cloud Deploy, GKE and Terraform, with OpenTelemetry and Cloud Monitoring for operational visibility. Workloads exercise the platform: a small sample service established controlled promotion, and Online Shop extends the implementation to a microservices application.
| Documentation | What it covers |
|---|---|
| Architecture overview · Diagrams | Platform components and boundaries |
| Release model · Trusted delivery | Immutable artifacts, verification, signing and admission |
| IAM model · Environment policies | Identities, permissions and target contracts |
| Operator runbook | Deployment and operational procedures |
| Observability · Incident runbook | Signals, monitoring and recovery |
| Integration acceptance · Roadmap | Recorded results, limitations and future scope |
- Immutable delivery: pinned source revisions and image digests identify what is built and deployed; promotion reuses existing artifacts.
- Independent trust checks: verification and a separate KMS-backed signer establish digest-bound attestations before deployment.
- Enforced admission: Binary Authorization checks the required attestor before admitting application images.
- Controlled deployment: Cloud Deploy orchestrates releases with protected source/render artifacts and explicit preflight checks.
- Infrastructure as code: Terraform execution roots separate bootstrap, cloud foundation and Kubernetes state ownership.
- Operational visibility: attributed traces, metrics and correlated logs connect application behavior to a workload release; scheduled checks and alerts support incident response.
flowchart TB
Source["Pinned source revision"] --> Build["Cloud Build: image build"]
Build --> Registry["Artifact Registry: immutable digest"]
Registry --> Verify["Independent verification"]
Verify --> Sign["Separate signer: Cloud KMS attestation"]
Sign --> Deploy["Cloud Deploy: protected release and render"]
Deploy --> Admission{"Binary Authorization"}
Admission -->|"Trusted digest"| GKE["GKE: target namespace"]
Admission -->|"Untrusted digest"| Blocked["Pod admission blocked"]
GKE --> Workload["Selected workload: Online Shop in dev"]
Build, verification, signing and deployment are distinct stages. Cloud Deploy consumes existing trusted artifacts; it does not rebuild them during promotion. Preflight establishes deployment eligibility, while action authorization and target approval remain separate controls.
The initial sample-service demonstrated the full dev → stage → prod controlled promotion path using the same verified and attested artifact, without rebuilding or replacing it.
This recorded execution established the platform's promotion workflow. The sample-service is now retired; the screenshot preserves historical delivery evidence and does not describe the current Online Shop topology.
Historical validation · Retirement scope
Online Shop exercises the platform with ten application services, ephemeral Redis and a separately trusted OpenTelemetry Collector. The application is adapted from Google Online Boutique through Application Modernization Lab.
Recorded integration covers trusted artifacts, a protected 45-resource deployment to dev, HTTPS with Cloud Armor WAF enforcement, a bounded checkout journey, ten-service telemetry and incident detection/recovery. Manual node stop/resume restored workload placement and Collector coverage automatically. Online Shop stage/prod progression remains future work.
Cloud Deploy records successful Online Shop rollouts to dev. This evidence complements the earlier sample-service promotion path; it does not establish Online Shop promotion to stage or prod.
Service architecture and observability diagrams · Deployment guide · HTTPS endpoint · Incident and email evidence
Worker nodes are currently paused; screenshots and acceptance records describe completed executions rather than live availability. The platform is a portfolio implementation, with the following boundaries:
- Historical incident PromQL reconstruction returned no data; this is not interpreted as zero errors.
- Redis and Collector buffers are ephemeral. HA, sustained-load reliability and executed release rollback are not claimed.
- Namespace routing is not strong IAM/RBAC isolation. Cold recovery and full cloud-resource removal are planned separately.
See the acceptance record for evidence and detailed limits.
| Area | Responsibility |
|---|---|
cloudbuild/ |
Image builds, verification and separate signing |
deploy/ |
Release contracts, rendering, preflight and deployment acceptance |
terraform/ |
Infrastructure and explicit state ownership |
monitoring/ |
Collector, dashboards, scheduled checks, alerts and incident procedures |
docs/ |
Architecture, access model, operations and recorded evidence |

