fix(security): reject dot segments and hide raw dependency-review identity

.github/workflows/security-scan.yml

@@ -16,10 +16,13 @@
 # pull_request workflows upload to refs/pull/N/merge, so no single ref ever holds
 # all tools. Bundling at the workflow/check level is ref-independent.
 #
-# NOTE on dependency-review: dependency graph can be unavailable on some repos.
-# Treat that as "not enforceable here" instead of making the required workflow
-# unsatisfiable; keep medium-or-higher dependency findings hard-failing where the
-# API is supported.
+# NOTE on dependency-review: unavailable evidence is not a clean result. Only
+# an exact base/head comparison returning HTTP 200 may reach the pinned hard
+# gate. Named refs, `.`/`..` repository segments, and other malformed
+# identity fail closed before the network call and are not echoed. Curl's
+# `000` sentinel is unavailable evidence. Every other probe outcome fails
+# closed without printing the response body. Diagnostics include allowlisted
+# repository visibility. See docs/doctoring/dependency-review-fail-closed.md.
 #
 # NOTE on trivy-fs: it scans the whole repo, so a pre-existing FIXABLE
 # MEDIUM/HIGH/CRITICAL finding blocks every PR in that repo until it is fixed.
@@ -257,9 +260,11 @@ jobs:
       contents: read
       pull-requests: read
     steps:
-      - name: Checkout
+      - name: Checkout exact head
         uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7.0.0
         with:
+          repository: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.repo.full_name }}
+          ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}
           persist-credentials: false
       - name: Check dependency review support
         id: dependency_review_support
@@ -268,36 +273,53 @@ jobs:
           BASE_SHA: ${{ github.event.pull_request.base.sha }}
           HEAD_SHA: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}
           REPOSITORY: ${{ github.repository }}
+          REPOSITORY_VISIBILITY: ${{ github.event.repository.visibility }}
         run: |
           set -euo pipefail
 
           api_url="${GITHUB_API_URL:-https://api.github.com}"
-          response_file="$(mktemp)"
+          case "${REPOSITORY_VISIBILITY}" in
+            public|private|internal) visibility="${REPOSITORY_VISIBILITY}" ;;
+            *) visibility="unknown" ;;
+          esac
+          revision_pattern='^[0-9a-fA-F]{40}$|^[0-9a-fA-F]{64}$'
+          repository_pattern='^[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+/[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+$'
+          repository_owner="${REPOSITORY%%/*}"
+          repository_name="${REPOSITORY#*/}"
+          if ! [[ "${BASE_SHA}" =~ $revision_pattern ]] || ! [[ "${HEAD_SHA}" =~ $revision_pattern ]]; then
+            echo "::error::Dependency review evidence unavailable for the allowlisted repository (visibility ${visibility}): HTTP unavailable; curl exit uncalled. Malformed revision. Supply the pull request's exact 40- or 64-character hex base and head SHAs, then rerun. Named refs are not evidence. Failing closed."
+            exit 1
+          fi
+          if ! [[ "${REPOSITORY}" =~ $repository_pattern ]] || [ "${repository_owner}" = "." ] || [ "${repository_owner}" = ".." ] || [ "${repository_name}" = "." ] || [ "${repository_name}" = ".." ]; then
+            echo "::error::Dependency review evidence unavailable (visibility ${visibility}): HTTP unavailable; curl exit uncalled. Malformed repository. Use the canonical owner/name without . or .. path segments, then rerun. Failing closed."
+            exit 1
+          fi
+          set +e
           status="$(
-            curl -fsS -o "$response_file" -w '%{http_code}' \
+            curl -sS --connect-timeout 10 --max-time 30 \
+              -o /dev/null \
+              -w '%{http_code}' \
               -H "Accept: application/vnd.github+json" \
               -H "Authorization: Bearer ${GH_TOKEN}" \
               -H "X-GitHub-Api-Version: 2022-11-28" \
-              "${api_url}/repos/${REPOSITORY}/dependency-graph/compare/${BASE_SHA}...${HEAD_SHA}" \
-              || true
+              "${api_url}/repos/${REPOSITORY}/dependency-graph/compare/${BASE_SHA}...${HEAD_SHA}"
           )"
+          curl_status=$?
+          set -e
 
-          if [ "$status" = "200" ]; then
-            echo "supported=true" >>"$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
-            exit 0
-          fi
+          case "$status" in
+            000|"") http_status="unavailable" ;;
+            [0-9][0-9][0-9]) http_status="$status" ;;
+            *) http_status="malformed" ;;
+          esac
 
-          if [ "$status" = "403" ] || [ "$status" = "404" ]; then
-            echo "::warning::Dependency review is unavailable for ${REPOSITORY}; skipping dependency-review hard gate."
-            echo "supported=false" >>"$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
-            exit 0
+          if [ "$curl_status" -ne 0 ] || [ "$http_status" != "200" ]; then
+            echo "::error::Dependency review evidence unavailable for ${REPOSITORY} (visibility ${visibility}) at exact base ${BASE_SHA} and head ${HEAD_SHA}: HTTP ${http_status}; curl exit ${curl_status}. Verify dependency-graph/security configuration and GitHub service behavior, then rerun. Failing closed."
+            exit 1
           fi
 
-          echo "::error::Dependency review support check failed with HTTP ${status}."
-          cat "$response_file"
-          exit 1
+          echo "supported=true" >>"$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
       - name: Dependency review
-        if: steps.dependency_review_support.outputs.supported == 'true'
         uses: actions/dependency-review-action@a1d282b36b6f3519aa1f3fc636f609c47dddb294 # v5.0.0
         with:
           fail-on-severity: moderate

AGENTS.md

@@ -5,3 +5,4 @@
 
 Materialize accepts only exact SHA-256 pins or a bounded relative `-r` include (no `.`/`..`); a lone `--require-hashes` directive is not trust evidence. See [`docs/doctoring/hourly-nvidia-nim-autofix.md`](docs/doctoring/hourly-nvidia-nim-autofix.md).
 Conflict-scope roots fail closed when the immediate parent directory is a symbolic link.
+Dependency-review unavailability fails closed; diagnostics include allowlisted repository visibility. Named refs and `.`/`..` repository segments are rejected before the compare request and are not echoed. See [`docs/doctoring/dependency-review-fail-closed.md`](docs/doctoring/dependency-review-fail-closed.md).

ARCHITECTURE.md

@@ -90,6 +90,36 @@ sequenceDiagram
 - Rust remains the psychometric arithmetic owner. Repair never substitutes
   Python for scoring math.
 
+## Dependency-review evidence
+
+The central `Security Scan` job treats GitHub's exact `BASE_SHA...HEAD_SHA`
+comparison as a hard supply-chain evidence boundary. The probe rejects named
+refs, `.`/`..` repository segments, and other non-`owner/name` values before
+it opens a socket, and it does not echo those raw invalid values. Only an
+exact 40- or 64-character hexadecimal object ID pair plus transport exit `0`
+plus HTTP `200` may reach the immutably pinned dependency-review action. A
+`403`, `404`, timeout, truncated transfer, curl `000` sentinel, or malformed
+status fails closed and records allowlisted repository visibility with the
+now-validated revisions. Other scanners are complementary; they are not
+substitutes.
+
+```mermaid
+flowchart TD
+  Identity{"owner/name, no dot segments, 40- or 64-hex SHAs?"}
+  Probe["Exact base/head compare probe"]
+  Transport{"curl exit 0 and HTTP 200?"}
+  Action["Pinned dependency-review action"]
+  Fail["Fail closed; do not echo raw invalid identity"]
+
+  Identity -->|"yes"| Probe
+  Identity -->|"no"| Fail
+  Probe --> Transport
+  Transport -->|"yes"| Action
+  Transport -->|"no"| Fail
+```
+
+See [`docs/doctoring/dependency-review-fail-closed.md`](docs/doctoring/dependency-review-fail-closed.md).
+
 ## Quality gates
 
 `scripts/ci/` ships with 100% statement/branch coverage and 100% docstrings.

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -39,6 +39,9 @@ Semantic Versioning where the repository publishes a release.
 
 ### Security
 
+- Fail closed when GitHub dependency-review evidence is unavailable (non-200, transport failure, truncated compare, or curl's `000` no-status sentinel) instead of treating HTTP 403/404 as a clean skip; the probe records allowlisted repository visibility with the exact head SHA and never prints the API body.
+- Reject named Git revisions, `.`/`..` repository segments, and other non-`owner/name` values before the dependency-review compare request so GitHub cannot resolve `main` to a moving HEAD and so path traversal cannot leave `/repos/{owner}/{repo}`. Identity-rejection diagnostics tell the operator to resupply exact event SHAs and do not echo the raw invalid values.
+
 - Reject `.github/` and `scripts/ci/` from review-thread-derived autofix path authority so an untrusted inline reviewer cannot authorize the write-capable repair agent to modify workflows, CODEOWNERS, actions, scheduler code, or CI helpers that govern its own control plane.
 - Require the model-write snapshot and exact-path allowlist to remain outside the pull-request worktree, checking both absolute and resolved locations so repository-local controls and outside-looking symlinks resolving into the repository fail closed before they can authorize or verify model changes.
 - Snapshot the complete pre-model worktree for ordinary and conflict repair and reject every model-caused created, deleted, modified, mode-changed, retargeted, ignored, dangling, directory-backed, external-link, metadata-race, or out-of-scope path before staging or push.

docs/doctoring/dependency-review-fail-closed.md

@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+# Dependency review fail-closed operations
+
+Status: `active_pr` until the matching workflow and regression contract are present on protected `main`; thereafter `implemented_on_protected_main`.
+
+## Decision
+
+Dependency review is a hard supply-chain gate. The central workflow accepts only HTTP `200` from GitHub's exact `BASE_SHA...HEAD_SHA` comparison before invoking the immutably pinned dependency-review action. A `403`, `404`, empty or malformed status, timeout, transport failure, truncated exchange, or other unexpected outcome is unavailable evidence and fails closed.
+
+The support probe has a 10-second connection limit and 30-second total limit. It preserves curl's transport exit code separately from the bounded HTTP status and requires transport exit `0` plus exact HTTP `200`. It rejects a base or head revision that is not exactly 40 or 64 hexadecimal characters, a repository name that is not `owner/name`, and any owner or name segment that is `.` or `..`, before any network call (curl exit `uncalled`). Named refs such as `main` are not evidence: GitHub's compare API would resolve them to a moving HEAD. Identity-rejection diagnostics name the failure class and the operator next step; they do not echo the raw invalid revision or repository. After a validated identity, the probe discards the response body and logs only the now-validated repository identity, allowlisted visibility (`public`, `private`, `internal`, or `unknown`), exact base/head revisions, the normalized HTTP status, and the numeric transport exit. Curl's `000` no-status sentinel is unavailable evidence even when transport exit is `0`. Credentials, response bodies, and raw untrusted visibility strings are never diagnostic output. After a successful probe the pinned action is not independently skippable. Executable regressions record the exact compare argv so a hardcoded `supported=true` path cannot satisfy the success contract. The special `.github` repository name remains legal owner/name.
+
+RFC 9110 §15.3.1 defines `200` as a completed successful representation, not as a status that can be inferred after a truncated transfer (Fielding et al., 2022). RFC 3986 forbids unvalidated path segments, including `.` and `..`, in a request-target (Berners-Lee et al., 2005). CWE-20 requires rejecting malformed identity before it is interpolated into that target (MITRE, n.d.-a). CWE-22 requires rejecting `.` and `..` segments that would traverse out of `/repos/{owner}/{repo}` (MITRE, n.d.-b). Git object IDs are exact hexadecimal names of immutable objects, not branch or tag refs (Chacon & Straub, 2014; Dang, 2015). NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 RA-5 and SA-12 require that vulnerability and supply-chain evidence be obtained, not assumed absent (National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2020). SLSA v1.0 likewise treats missing provenance as unverified rather than passing (SLSA, 2023). An HTTP `403` or `404` is therefore unavailable evidence, not a clean skip.
+
+## Identity and authority
+
+The dependency-review job checks out the pull request's explicit head repository and immutable head SHA with persisted credentials disabled. The API comparison independently binds the event's exact base and head revisions. The job retains `contents: read` and `pull-requests: read`; it receives no write, OIDC, model, release, package, or deployment authority.
+
+Checks, status contexts, review submissions, and merge authorization remain separate evidence classes. OSV, Trivy, CodeQL, Semgrep, Secret Scan, Scorecard, and Dependabot are complementary controls and are not semantic substitutes for dependency review.
+
+## Failure classification and remediation
+
+- Transport exit `0` plus HTTP `200`: proceed to the pinned dependency-review action.
+- Malformed revision, named ref, or repository (including `.` / `..` segments): fail closed with HTTP `unavailable` and curl exit `uncalled` before opening a socket. Re-supply the pull request's exact hex SHAs and canonical `owner/name`, then rerun. Do not retry a branch name.
+- Curl status `000` or empty with any transport exit: treat as unavailable evidence and fail closed. Check runner egress and GitHub service health, then rerun.
+- Any other result: fail the job and retain exact repository, allowlisted visibility, base/head, status, and transport-exit evidence. An HTTP `200` emitted by a failed or partial transfer is unavailable evidence. Do not infer a root cause from HTTP `403` or `404`.
+- Public repository failure: verify dependency graph and security configuration, organization policy, token read access, and GitHub service health.
+- Private or internal exception: require a separately reviewed organization policy with explicit entitlement evidence and compensating controls. Never infer `not-applicable` from an unavailable response.
+
+Retries are operator-initiated only after the capability or service condition changes. Do not rerun unchanged evidence repeatedly and do not convert an unavailable endpoint into a green skip.
+
+## Known canary
+
+ContextualWisdomLab/EgressWeave#66, Security Scan run `31108241013`, job `92638903658`, compared `10d0c51daf2ad278d66f43be479df8cf6b08ba6d...c038a9509d1a8eae8561cc9081e67e12bd373d42` and received HTTP `403`. The required workflow printed the skip warning, omitted `actions/dependency-review-action`, and still concluded success. Downstream tracking: ContextualWisdomLab/EgressWeave#76. Keep ContextualWisdomLab/.github#810 open until a protected-main public consumer run proves a non-200 or failed-transfer comparison cannot green this job.
+
+## Acceptance and rollback
+
+Acceptance requires the permanent queue contract to reject the former `supported=false` path, require bounded probing and discarded bodies, require exact-head checkout, reject named refs, `.`/`..` repository segments, and other malformed identity before the network call without echoing those raw values, classify curl `000` as unavailable, prove the success path invoked the exact compare URL, and prove that only `200` reaches the action. Exact-head CI/security evidence, current review, protected integration, and a real protected-main consumer run remain required.
+
+Rollback requires an independently reviewed revert and fresh exact-head evidence. A rollback must not restore the `403`/`404` success path or print an API response body.
+
+## References
+
+Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., & Masinter, L. (2005). *Uniform Resource
+Identifier (URI): Generic syntax* (RFC 3986). Internet Engineering Task
+Force. https://doi.org/10.17487/RFC3986
+
+Chacon, S., & Straub, B. (2014). *Pro Git* (2nd ed.). Apress.
+https://git-scm.com/book/en/v2/Git-Internals-Git-Objects
+
+Dang, Q. H. (2015). *Secure Hash Standard (SHS)* (FIPS PUB 180-4). National
+Institute of Standards and Technology. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.180-4
+
+Fielding, R., Nottingham, M., & Reschke, J. (Eds.). (2022). *HTTP semantics*
+(RFC 9110). Internet Engineering Task Force. https://doi.org/10.17487/RFC9110
+
+GitHub. (n.d.). *Dependency review*. GitHub Docs. Retrieved August 9, 2026, from https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/concepts/supply-chain-security/dependency-review
+
+GitHub. (n.d.). *REST API endpoints for dependency review*. GitHub Docs. Retrieved August 9, 2026, from https://docs.github.com/en/rest/dependency-graph/dependency-review
+
+GitHub. (n.d.). *Dependency graph*. GitHub Docs. Retrieved August 9, 2026, from https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/concepts/supply-chain-security/dependency-graph
+
+GitHub. (n.d.). *Webhook events and payloads*. GitHub Docs. Retrieved August 16, 2026, from https://docs.github.com/en/webhooks/webhook-events-and-payloads#repository
+
+MITRE. (n.d.-a). *CWE-20: Improper input validation*. Retrieved August 16,
+2026, from https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/20.html
+
+MITRE. (n.d.-b). *CWE-22: Improper limitation of a pathname to a restricted
+directory ('Path Traversal')*. Retrieved August 16, 2026, from
+https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/22.html
+
+National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2020). *Security and
+privacy controls for information systems and organizations* (NIST SP
+800-53 Rev. 5). https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5
+
+SLSA. (2023). *SLSA v1.0: Supply-chain Levels for Software Artifacts*.
+Open Source Security Foundation. https://slsa.dev/spec/v1.0/