Report vulnerabilities privately through GitHub Security Advisories ("Report a vulnerability" on the repository's Security tab). Do not open public issues for security problems.
| Input | Trust | Controls |
|---|---|---|
| RFB ZIPs | Untrusted bytes (no published checksums) | One regular member required, name validated, declared size ≤ 64 GiB and ≤ 200× the archive, reads stop past the declared size, CRC-32 checked; nothing is extracted to disk. Malformed lines are kept as rejects, never executed or interpreted. |
.ocnpj snapshots |
Untrusted unless you built them | Header/footer magic, version, file length, section table and every section checksummed (xxh3); all offsets bounds-checked; block decompression bounded (MAX_BLOCK_RAW, exact size); postings ids range-checked; random-corruption test asserts errors instead of panics. Checksums detect corruption, not forgery — verify the SHA-256 against a trusted source. |
| HTTP requests | Untrusted | Path/query length limits, page size and offset caps, bounded fuzzy/prefix expansion, CPU work behind a semaphore, per-request timeout, export opt-in, no write endpoints. |
data/current pointer |
Operator-controlled | Must name a file inside the data dir (.. rejected). |
unsafe code: one Mmap::map (published snapshots are immutable by construction;
documented at the call site) and one posix_fadvise call in the benchmark harness.
cargo audit # RustSec advisories (clean at the time of writing)
cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings
cargo test --workspace # includes corruption/truncation testsRun behind a reverse proxy with TLS and rate limiting for public deployments; see DATA_POLICY.md for personal-data controls.