End-to-end encryption, such as the protocol used by Signal, works for what it is designed to protect. The content of your messages cannot be intercepted in transit. Not by your ISP, not by the app company, not by a hacker on the network. Even the NSA's own documents from the Snowden leaks acknowledged they cannot crack properly implemented E2EE.
The important catch is that message content is only one part of the picture.
This is one of the biggest limitations to understand. As MIT's research group and the EFF have documented extensively, encryption hides what you say but not who you're saying it to, when you're saying it, or where you are when you say it.
Specifically, metadata reveals:
- Who you talked to (every contact, every group)
- When you talked (timestamps, frequency, duration)
- Where you were (cell tower data, GPS, IP address narrowed down to city or neighborhood level)
- How often you communicate with someone (relationship mapping)
- Your IP address, device identifiers, and account creation details
The NSA's FISA court order to Verizon, revealed by Snowden, demanded all customer phone records including who is talking to whom, when, and for how long. This was confirmed by Congress's own CRS report on lawful access. No encryption app protects against this because metadata is generated by the network itself, not by the message content.
The Brennan Center documented that the U.S. government conducts social media surveillance at scale. Metadata alone can build a complete social graph of your life without ever reading a single message.
For someone with no social media, metadata from ISP records, cell tower logs, financial transactions, and device telemetry still exist. Having no socials reduces your digital footprint but doesn't make you invisible. It just changes which databases you appear in.
This is where the choice of messaging app can become largely irrelevant. If the government or any state-level actor compromises your device itself, encryption doesn't matter because they capture the message before it's encrypted or after it's decrypted on your screen.
Documented tools make this practical and quiet. Pegasus spyware, developed by the Israeli cyber-arms company NSO Group, has been documented by the Guardian, Citizen Lab, and Amnesty International. It has been deployed in over 45 countries. Once installed on a phone, it can access everything: messages before or after encryption, microphone, camera, GPS, photos, emails, and passwords. It is sold exclusively to governments.
Pegasus doesn't even need you to click anything. It can be installed via zero-click exploits through iMessage, WhatsApp calling vulnerabilities, and similar attack surfaces. You would never know it happened.
The FBI itself has acknowledged purchasing Pegasus-like tools, and the U.S. government is both a buyer and a regulator of the surveillance tech industry.
The key point is simple: If someone has the resources to compromise your device, Signal vs. WhatsApp vs. Telegram vs. SMS makes zero difference. The encryption is irrelevant because the capture happens at the endpoint.
CALEA has been federal law since 1994. It requires telecom carriers to build surveillance capabilities directly into their infrastructure. The EFF has called it a government backdoor mandate. The ACLU has documented repeated attempts to expand CALEA to cover VoIP and messaging apps.
In a particularly telling incident in 2024, Senator Wyden revealed that Chinese hackers had actually breached the CALEA backdoor infrastructure that was built for U.S. government surveillance. This proved exactly what cybersecurity experts had been warning about for years: government-mandated backdoors become targets for everyone, not just the government.
NSLs are administrative subpoenas that the FBI can issue without any prior court approval. They come with automatic gag orders, meaning the company receiving the NSL cannot tell you that your data was requested. You would never know it happened.
The ACLU and EFF have both challenged NSL gag provisions in court. The NYCLU actually won a case striking down the gag provisions as unconstitutional, but the FBI continues to use them under modified procedures. The fundamental structure remains: the government can demand your data and silence the company from telling you about it.
The EARN IT Act has been reintroduced repeatedly in 2023 and 2024. It would create a commission that could effectively penalize platforms for offering encryption by making them legally liable for user content. The EFF warns it would incentivize scanning all messages. The Internet Society states it would weaken encryption and make people less safe. Even though the bill's sponsors claim it doesn't criminalize encryption directly, the legal liability it creates would push companies to weaken or remove encryption to avoid lawsuits.
Even when messages are protected by end-to-end encryption, cloud backups can introduce another point of access. That is where the situation becomes more complicated.
WhatsApp defaults to Google Drive or iCloud backups, and these are not end-to-end encrypted by default. The EFF has extensively documented how this creates a vulnerability. If a government gets a warrant served to Google or Apple, they get access to your backup, and the backup contains the decryption keys to all your messages. The encryption on the wire was pointless in that scenario.
Signal does offer encrypted backups, but if you don't enable them, or if your cloud provider is compelled through legal channels, that's another entry point.
This part has received mainstream news coverage and is worth separating into confirmed facts and speculation.
In April 2026, CNN and multiple other outlets reported that at least 10 to 11 scientists and researchers tied to sensitive U.S. space, aerospace, nuclear, and military programs have died or disappeared under suspicious circumstances since 2024. The FBI and White House have confirmed they are actively investigating. NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory lost two researchers in a single year. The BBC reported that conspiracy theories are "running rampant online" about these cases.
Wikipedia has an entry categorizing this as a conspiracy theory, noting that the cases involve "unrelated circumstances, including natural death, homicide, suicide, and missing-person reports."
What is factual is that there is a confirmed cluster of deaths and disappearances that federal investigators are looking into. Everything beyond that, about who is responsible and why, remains unproven speculation at this point.
I wasn't able to find verified, mainstream sources on "Joefelz" or "Amy Askridge." If these are content creators or cases you've seen discussed online, I'd need more specifics to research properly. I can only work with what I can verify through documented, reputable sources.
The broader point is partly supported by the evidence, but it needs an important qualification.
The app choice still matters a lot against non-state actors. Hackers, stalkers, abusive partners, identity thieves, and random snoops are effectively stopped by end-to-end encryption. If you're hiding from another person or a criminal group, the app absolutely matters.
But against a determined government with legal authority and technical resources, the encryption on the wire is just one layer. They have many ways to go around it: metadata collection, legal compelled access, device compromise, cloud backup seizure, and more.
The idea that there is a simple "they don't want to" explanation is also too broad. The documented reality is more complex. There are legal constraints, institutional incentives, technical limitations, and genuine oversight in many (though not all) cases. The NSA, FBI, and other agencies operate under legal frameworks that are imperfect but do exist. The system isn't a single monolith making unified decisions. Different agencies have different authorities, different cultures, and different levels of accountability.
- Congress Research Service, "Law Enforcement and Technology: The Lawful Access Debate" (January 2026): https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF11769
- FCC, Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act: https://www.fcc.gov/calea
- EFF, "The Government Wants A Backdoor Into Your Online Communications" (CALEA): https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/05/caleatwo
- EPIC, Opposition to Government Backdoor Access: https://epic.org/documents/oppo-to-pet-for-recon-in-re-protecting-the-nations-communications-systems-from-cybersecurity-threats
- Wikipedia, Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Communications_Assistance_for_Law_Enforcement_Act
- ACLU, CALEA Feature Page: https://www.aclu.org/documents/calea-feature-page
- UNC School of Law, "Google kept a database of backdoor accesses provided to the U.S. government under CALEA; the Chinese breached that database in 2009": https://scholarship.law.unc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1306&context=ncjolt
- TechDirt, "Wyden: CALEA Hack Proves Dangers Of Government-Mandated Backdoors" (October 2024): https://www.techdirt.com/2024/10/16/wyden-calea-hack-proves-dangers-of-government-mandated-backdoors
- Wikipedia, Pegasus (spyware): https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pegasus_(spyware)
- Group-IB, "Pegasus Spyware: What It Is & How to Detect It": https://www.group-ib.com/blog/pegasus-spyware
- The Guardian, "What is Pegasus spyware and how does it hack phones?" (July 2021): https://www.theguardian.com/news/2021/jul/18/what-is-pegasus-spyware-and-how-does-it-hack-phones
- Citizen Lab, "Tracking NSO Group's Pegasus Spyware to Operations in 45 Countries" (September 2018): https://citizenlab.ca/research/hide-and-seek-tracking-nso-groups-pegasus-spyware-to-operations-in-45-countries
- EFF, "How Signal, WhatsApp, Apple, and Google Handle Encrypted Chat Backups" (May 2025): https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/05/back-it-back-it-let-us-begin-explain-encrypted-chat-backups
- EFF, National Security Letters: https://www.eff.org/issues/national-security-letters
- Yale Law School, "FBI's Secret Gag Orders Challenged Before the Ninth Circuit" (April 2017): https://law.yale.edu/mfia/case-disclosed/fbis-secret-gag-orders-challenged-ninth-circuit
- ACLU, National Security Letter Gag Order FOIA: https://www.aclu.org/cases/national-security-letter-gag-order-foia
- NYCLU, "Court Rules Patriot Act's National Security Letter Gag Provisions Unconstitutional": https://www.nyclu.org/press-release/court-rules-patriot-acts-national-security-letter-gag-provisions-unconstitutional
- Wikipedia, National Security Letter: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_security_letter
- EFF, "It's Back: Senators Want EARN IT Bill to Scan All Online Messages" (February 2022): https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2022/02/its-back-senators-want-earn-it-bill-scan-all-online-messages
- Congress.gov, S.1207 EARN IT Act of 2023: https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/senate-bill/1207
- Internet Society, "EARN IT Act" (December 2023): https://www.internetsociety.org/resources/internet-fragmentation/earn-it-act
- CNN, "Deaths and disappearances of scientists spark federal probe" (April 2026): https://www.cnn.com/2026/04/21/us/deaths-disappearances-scientists-investigation
- BBC, "Relatives of 10 'missing scientists' grapple with impact of wild conspiracies" (April 2026): https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cwyw9rpdl4po
- Wikipedia, Missing scientists conspiracy theory: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Missing_scientists_conspiracy_theory
- EFF, NSA Spying: https://www.eff.org/nsa-spying
- Brennan Center for Justice, "Social Media Surveillance by the U.S. Government" (January 2022): https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/social-media-surveillance-us-government
- MIT News, "Protecting sensitive metadata from surveillance" (February 2020): https://news.mit.edu/2020/protecting-sensitive-metadata-from-surveillance-0226
- Reddit, "If messages are end to end encrypted then how can the government still read them?": https://www.reddit.com/r/explainlikeimfive/comments/ohhc7f/eli5_if_messages_are_end_to_end_encrypted_then